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Solar Energy, Technology Policy, and Institutional Values demon-
strates the difficulties that individuals in and out of government
encounter when they try to instigate a reconsideration of these broader
properties of technological systems and the policies that support them.
This historical case study analyzes U.S. renewable energy policy from
the end of World War II through the energy crisis of the 1970s. The
book illuminates the ways in which beliefs and values come to domi-
nate official problem frames and get entrenched in institutions. In
doing so it also explains why advocates of renewable energy have often
faced ideological opposition, and why policy makers failed to take
them seriously.
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Preface
Why do governments take seriously some policies and not others?
Indeed, what does it mean to say that a government takes a policy 
“seriously”? What distinguishes fringe policies from their mainstream
counterparts, and how can policies move from one to the other? This
study addresses these questions through an analysis of U.S. renewable
energy policy. The result is a longitudinal case study of energy policy
change that explains what has been taken seriously and what has not,
and why.
As other authors have noted, although we discuss energy systems 
in the language of BTUs and barrels of oil, they are so pervasive 
and important that arguments about them are, in many instances, 
arguments about the kind of society that people desire. This concept
helps us to understand how much was at stake in energy policy deci-
sions between the end of World War II and the postoil embargo period
in the United States – the period that this study examines. This feature
of energy policy makes it a prime example of what I call policies for the
future. In the coming decades public policy, among other influences, will
shape emerging technological systems. Those systems will, in turn, 
condition and constrain important political and social decisions. That
fact makes it imperative that we better understand and deliberate over
such policies.
Recent studies of politics and policy have emphasized the impor-
tance of ideas in shaping the political world, and this work builds on
that literature. Ideas interact in complex ways with interests and 
institutions, all three shaping each other in the process. Ideas also 
form the basis for the problem frame through which policy makers view
policy problems and solutions. Energy policies are powerfully affected
by such ideas.
This book is primarily for those who are concerned with energy and
environmental policy in particular and broader questions of public policy
ix
more generally – anyone working in the areas of policy studies; political
science; history of technology; and science, technology, and society, as
well as professional policy analysts, policy advocates, and policy makers.
Anyone who seeks to influence policy making, especially as it concerns
energy policy and other technology policies, will, I hope, find lessons in
this study. I show that effective policy arguments must address issues as
they are understood by the officially accepted problem frame. If partic-
ular policy arguments cannot do that, their advocates must work on
changing the problem frame to change policy.
During the period that I examine here, solar energy advocates, 
both prominent individuals and organized groups, tried to influence
energy policy. Solar energy was then an umbrella term, often refer-
ring to what we now call renewable sources of energy, including 
such things as wind and biomass. Solar advocates enjoyed only modest
success. Solar energy failed to become a strong option for meeting 
U.S. energy needs during this period, not for simple reasons of untested
technology or economic cost, but for complex reasons that include a
failure to institutionalize new ideas about the energy problem at the 
top executive levels of government. To support this position, I take 
a longer historical view of solar energy policy than is typical to ana-
lyze the special dynamics of creating public policy around emerging 
technologies.
The introduction lays out the terms and theoretical frameworks that
help us to distinguish the strands of complex ideas that shape national
energy policy. It provides the tools for analyzing the ways in which par-
ticular ideas come to dominate the official definition of a problem; the
conceptualization of its possible solutions; and the rules, norms, and
operating procedures of particular institutions.
The chapters in Part I concentrate on U.S. energy policy between
World War II and the 1970s’ energy crisis. They examine the ways that
the federal government and private groups sought to develop solar
energy and how various interested parties framed its potential.
Part II applies the same interpretive tools to the energy crisis and its
aftermath. The crisis gave energy policy much greater saliency, raising its
profile among the public and policy makers alike. The crisis caused many
people to express doubts about both American international hegemony
and, coming along with the rise of the environmental movement, the via-
bility of the modern industrial way of life. People involved in energy
policy increasingly perceived that energy technology choices entailed
political and social consequences of the first order, and that perception
engendered extensive and bitter conflict.
Examining the interactions of ideas, interests, and institutions sur-
rounding solar energy policy from the postwar to the postembargo
x Preface
period can help us to discover why we have the overall energy policies
that we do. It also helps us to understand why changing such deeply
embedded policies as those about energy is so difficult. Ultimately, a
better understanding of this interaction may help to show how policy
can be made better, especially when policy makers are confronted with
difficult long-term emergent technological issues.
Preface xi
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
Acknowledgments
It never ceases to amaze me how indebted I am to so many people for
what I keep referring to as “my book.” Unlike most debts, these are a
joy to have and a pleasure to acknowledge here.
Many friends helped to form my professional community. They are 
a source of ideas and advice, to be sure, but just as importantly they
provide the support and sense of belonging that is such an important
part of intellectual life. In particular I want to thank Evelyn Brodkin,
Penelope Canan, David Guston, Patrick Hamlett, Bruce Hutton, Sheila
Jasanoff, W. D. Kay, David Levine, Dianne Rahm, Richard Sclove, and
Ned Woodhouse.
People have contributed to my research for this book in wonderfully
diverse ways. The staffs at seven presidential archives helped to guide
me through their voluminous holdings. I want to express my gratitude
to the archivists at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independnece, MO; 
the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS; the John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston, MA; the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX; the
National Libraries Nixon Project, part of the National Archives now in
College Park, MD; the Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI; and the
Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA. These materials, a gold mine for
scholars and a crucial resource for our history, are so extensive that I felt
lost when first confronting them. The archivists patiently helped me to
make sense of the bewildering collections and find what I needed. The
people and the materials are both national treasures.
I also benefited greatly from the use of the library at the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, CO. The librarians there guided
me to their historical collection, which contains materials found no-
where else.
Colleen Dunlavy found the privately printed biography of Farrington
Daniels at a yard sale and sent it to me. I never would have found it on
my own, and it helped me in more ways than even its appearance in the
xiii
endnotes would indicate. Al Teich, who knows a great deal about 1970s
energy policy, gave me all of his files on solar energy, including some
little-known studies that greatly aided my research. It pays to let your
friends know what you’re working on.
Many people helped to shape my approach to technology policy.
Attending Langdon Winner’s courses more than twenty years ago,
reading his work, and talking to him ever since has opened my eyes to
a whole range of approaches to the subject. When I sometimes got lost
in the theoretical and empirical minutiae of the work, Langdon’s ideas
helped me to stay focused on the important political issues. Ted Green-
wood and Gene Skolnikoff, in addition to guiding me through graduate
school and tolerating my incessant challenges to almost everything that
they tried to teach me, also provided examples of academics deeply com-
mitted to being part of the policy process. Sheila Jasanoff and Ned Wood-
house both spent more time talking to me about this project than they
probably care to remember, particularly at a time when I was struggling
with it. The book is much better for their labors. My intellectual debts
to Deborah Stone are only partly revealed by her frequent appearance
in my endnotes. As both a teacher and a scholar, Deborah has been a
model for me with her joyful and serious commitment to a life of ideas
and political change.
The Gerald R. Ford Library provided me with a travel grant that
enabled me to work in their archive. I am also deeply grateful for crucial
financial support from the National Science Foundation, grant SBER
9023010. I got wonderful help from Vivian Weil and Rachelle Hollan-
der in guiding me through the process of applying to the NSF. The views
expressed in this book are strictly my own, and do not reflect in any way
on the NSF or its employees.
The NSF grant made it possible for me to hire wonderful research
assistants – Jack Boynton, Enrique Zaldua, and, especially, Meade Love
Thomas Penn. They greatly amplified my ability to do research.
Gail Reitenbach provided developmental editing for the entire manu-
script at a crucial point in its evolution, improving its organization and
coherence. Two anonymous reviewers for Cambridge University Press
also provided insightful comments on the manuscript. They helped me
greatly in improving it. Alex Holzman, Alissa Morris, Lewis Bateman,
and Elise Oranges of the Press guided my manuscript through every stage
of the publication process, and did so ably.
My parents have always supported me, with no strings attached, in
whatever direction I have chosen to take in life, including stressing that
I should get the best education of which I am capable. As I have gotten
older I have come to realize what a rare gift they gave me, which is why
I dedicate this book to my mother and late father.
xiv Acknowledgments
I am at a loss to think about how I can adequately express my grat-
itude to my wife, Pamela. A remarkable scholar in her own right, she
has been involved in this book from day one – talking over concepts,
helping to structure my research, reading numerous drafts of numerous
chapters, and helping me do research in some of the archives. As an
accomplished historian, she was invaluable in teaching this nonhistorian
some of her craft. But all of these things still understate her contribution
to my work. She kept me going when I was discouraged, and made it
possible for me to recover from setbacks. She has given me a home, a
place of grace, from which I can face the tasks ahead and enjoy the
accomplishments of the past. I marvel at my good fortune to have a love
such as that.
Needless to say, all of these good people are absolved from whatever
inadequacies lie within. For those I must, alas, claim sole responsibility.
Acknowledgments xv
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
Note on Sources and Archival Abbreviations
The primary sources for much of this work come from the archives of
Presidential Libraries and from the vertical files of the library of the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory. This last collection is not in a
strict sense an archive, but they have a very wide range of newsletters
and obscure journals, many now defunct, that are unavailable almost
anywhere else. I use the following abbreviations in the endnotes for
brevity.
DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS
GRFL Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI
HSTL Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence,
MO
JCL Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA
JFKL John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA
LBJL Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX
NLNP National Libraries Nixon Project, an annex of the
National Archives, Alexandria, VA
NREL Vertical Files, Library, National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, Golden, CO
WHCF White House Central Files, a major collection in most
presidential libraries
xvii
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
Introduction
Solar Energy, Ideas, and Public Policy
On June 20, 1979, President Jimmy Carter dedicated the solar hot water
heating system newly installed in the West Wing of the White House. 
A “Who’s Who” of solar energy advocates joined him at that ceremony.
Although they provided part of the White House’s hot water needs, 
the solar collectors served more importantly as a symbol of Carter’s 
commitment to promoting solar energy to meet the nation’s energy needs.
This ceremony marked the symbolic height for solar energy within 
the executive branch. Not only did the president announce new policy
initiatives, he did so while publicly associating himself with the activists
and government officials who had been pushing for them, and all of 
this against the backdrop of solar collectors on the White House roof.
No activist could ask for a better scene and set of props. The event was
not only a symbolic peak but a policy peak as well, for solar had never
before been treated by the federal government with such generosity or
seriousness.1
Yet, as in any theater, scenes and symbols can mislead as well as
inform. The White House ceremony conveyed the impression of solar
advocates’ great success as President Carter announced policies for which
they had been fighting for years. Since many of these very same people
had pushed successfully for new environmental laws and institutions, one
could conclude that a new movement and its leaders had acquired the
resources and skills to influence government policy decisively. Yet such
a conclusion would be mistaken. Solar advocates’ successes largely evap-
orated when Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency eighteen months
later. But even while Jimmy Carter was president, their influence in 
the executive branch eroded severely, beginning only weeks after this 
ceremony. Moreover, the activists were well aware of the limits of their
influence and of President Carter’s commitment to their cause. Even at
the White House ceremony, they complained to reporters that Carter’s
policy initiatives were inadequate – barely the minimum that the solar
1
community would accept.2 How could their success be so illusory and
ephemeral?
To understand the development of solar energy policy we need to
analyze a historical chain of events over a period of decades, paying close
attention to the dynamic interrelationships of ideas, interests, and insti-
tutions, both in solar energy policy and in energy policy more generally.
The conceptual framework for this analysis, and part of its contribution
to understanding technology policies more broadly, is a long-term lon-
gitudinal case study that analyzes how key ideas, both technical and nor-
mative, enabled actors to frame problems and understand their interests,
and how such ideas got embedded in institutions.
IDEAS IN PUBLIC POLICY
In the last decade numerous scholars have argued for the importance 
of ideas in shaping public policy. They have each conceptualized 
ideas slightly differently, calling them beliefs, knowledge, values, ideol-
ogy, and so on, and have analyzed an assortment of ways in which 
those ideas enter and influence the policy process. Central to all of these
analyses, despite their differences, is the notion that either normative 
or technical ideas, or a combination of both, play a role in setting 
and changing policy, a role that is not simply a derivative of other 
more traditional influences on policy, such as interests or institutional
structures.
For example, Peter Haas argues that consensual scientific and 
technological knowledge can be embodied in transnational scientific 
entities called epistemic communities. Such communities can play crucial
roles in international policy making, particularly in facilitating coopera-
tion among states, by helping governments to understand the nature 
of transnational problems and their feasible solutions. Epistemic com-
munities are bound together by both shared scientific knowledge and
shared normative notions about the importance of the problems 
under study. This combination of normative and technical ideas can
influence policy because it can present decision makers with consensual
interpretations of uncertain events and provide legitimation to policy
decisions, particularly when members of the epistemic community
become officials in government ministries. Epistemic communities 
can help decision makers understand what their interests are in uncer-
tain environments.
In Haas’s analysis, ideas gain their force from their acceptance and
promotion by a transnational community of experts, and that commu-
nity’s importance derives from its relationship to various governing 
institutions. Haas does not overplay the importance of epistemic com-
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munities, noting that government policy makers sometimes elect to
ignore expert recommendations. He argues that the power of the ideas
depends on whether the community members are able to garner bureau-
cratic power.3 The field of solar energy had a group of experts that com-
prised an epistemic community. However, just at the time that it began
to achieve some bureaucratic power it also began to unravel in terms of
its technical and normative cohesion.
John Kingdon, in his study of agenda setting and public policy, argues
that ideas are more important in promoting policy than many analysts
of politics and policy think. Interest group pressures certainly affect
policy, but the substantive content of policies also influences their
success, in particular the coherence and persuasiveness of policy advo-
cates’ arguments. At any given time numerous policy ideas float around
policy systems, and the important question is why some of them take
hold and others do not. Policy communities, groups of technical spe-
cialists in and out of government, champion various policy ideas. Policy
communities resemble Haas’s epistemic communities, except that a
policy community may or may not share a consensus about the most
desirable ideas for some particular policy. Ideas influence policy in
Kingdon’s analysis because organized institutional forces champion them
and so use them in the policy system.4
Deborah Stone argues persuasively that ideas about public policy are
both the instruments that partisans fight with and, just as importantly,
the goals that they fight for:
Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful
than money and votes and guns. Shared meanings motivate people to action and
meld individual striving into collective action. Ideas are at the center of all polit-
ical conflict. Policy making, in turn, is a constant struggle over the criteria for
classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals that guide
the way people behave.
Stone develops an analysis of how ideas play out in setting policy goals,
framing problems, and evaluating solutions. She shows that groups and
individuals fight over and negotiate the detailed meanings of ideas like
equity and liberty in the context of particular policy controversies, and
that such meanings can change over time as well as across issues.5 Stone
has much in common with Haas and Kingdon, although she gives a
higher priority to the processes of developing shared meanings of nor-
mative ideas and less to the use of technical knowledge as a political
resource. She also provides numerous tools to analyze the ideas that par-
tisans express in their policy analyses and pronouncements.
Donald Schön and Martin Rein discuss the ways in which ideas coa-
lesce into frames, which they describe as the “underlying structures of
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belief, perception, and appreciation” through which people make sense
of and understand their world, particularly in the cases of difficult,
intractable policy controversies. Frames can be either quite specific to a
particular policy problem or broadly shared cultural understandings.
Disputants in policy controversies usually employ different frames,
which makes communication between them difficult and the controver-
sies hard to resolve.6
These authors and others share several key notions about the role of
ideas in public policy, despite their many differences of emphasis and
conceptualization. First, they stress the importance of ideas in policy
making, claiming that such importance is often overlooked. They also
stress that ideas, whether normative or technical, enable people to make
sense of the world, to understand the circumstances of their lives and
what courses of action will serve them best. Finally, they argue that a
shared understanding of ideas can provide the means to collective action.
Of course, ideas do not determine policy exclusively. They interact
dynamically with other, more traditional policy variables, such as inter-
ests and institutions. As Hugh Heclo has argued, one should analyze the
interactions of ideas, interests, and institutions, instead of assuming a
priori the importance of one over the other two.7
Ideas, interests, and institutions interact in a variety of ways. For
example, interests are not simply things that we have which were given
to us in some mysterious way. Ernst Haas argues that we need knowl-
edge (a form of ideas) to understand what our interests are. Identifying
something as “in our interest” means that we have normative ideas that
shape our concept of what is good for us and technical ideas that some
course of action will move us toward that good situation and so benefit
us. In addition, new knowledge or new technological opportunities may
cause us to change what we perceive to be our interests.8 This and other
analyses make a persuasive case that what we think of as interests are
in fact influenced by the ideas that we and others hold. Of course, this
interpretation does not exclude the other relationship – that the ideas we
hold are related to our interests. The point is to ensure that we do not
reduce ideas to some cynical derivative of interests, since ideas are actu-
ally constitutive of interests.
One difficulty in the analysis of ideas in policy derives from the blurry
distinction between normative ideas (values) and positive ideas (facts and
empirical concepts). Actors base their positions on both types of ideas,
and often one cannot cleanly separate the facts from the values in a policy
argument.9 Even more important in this analysis, partisans in a policy
dispute will argue over just where that boundary is, wanting to put as
much of their argument in the “facts” category and as much of their
opponents’ argument in the “values” category as possible. Sheila
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Jasanoff analyzes this boundary work when scientific advisory commit-
tees try to assert what constitutes a scientific consensus in contentious
technical issues. She concludes that successful boundary work establishes
the boundary in a broadly accepted way and so stakes out part of the
issue as the province of scientists and engineers, and that this sort of firm
boundary is necessary for closure on some issues. Partisans in energy
policy disputes often do contest such boundaries as a way of trying 
to influence a policy debate and a firm boundary is one barrier to 
contesting and reopening the way in which an issue is framed and 
conceptualized.10
Energy policy advocates are motivated by the meanings they attach
to the technologies they advocate. Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker delin-
eate social groups that are relevant to some technology because they all
accept a shared meaning for the technology. The technology is not merely
some good that they produce or consume, but has a more complex set
of meanings associated with it. Pinch and Bijker explain that technolo-
gies have interpretive flexibility in that different groups may design them
differently and attach different meanings to them.11 If we are interested
in policy conflicts, we need to understand the political and social mean-
ings that different energy technologies have to participants in the policy
debates.
Analyses of technology-based policies need a framework that links
particular technological choices with different sets of ideas. If ideas, with
their complex mixture of normative and technical components, influence
people’s choices of energy technology, how can we make inferences that
connect the choices with the ideas and attendant meanings? Langdon
Winner provides a concept that we can use as an interpretive scheme:
technology as legislation. Winner argues that certain technological
ensembles – large systems that produce major goods and services such
as food, energy, transportation, and communications – are more than
mere tools. They are constitutive parts of modern life. This concept does
not imply any notion of technological determinism but instead suggests
that in making large-scale technological choices we are choosing systems
that will encourage some forms of political and social life and discour-
age others. “Different ideas of social and political life entail different
technologies for their realization.”12 Winner intended this concept as a
way of analyzing extant technological systems. I am using it differently,
as an interpretive tool for understanding the meanings that drive people
to favor certain choices of technological systems over others.
Partisans in the debate over emergent energy technologies clearly 
associated their preferred technologies with their larger visions of a desir-
able way of life. These political and social visions were most overtly 
tied to energy technology choices during the 1970s, but they were 
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still present, although more implicitly, in the writings of energy advo-
cates throughout the period of this study. It follows that analyzing
debates over government policies about future energy technologies 
must take into account various actors’ views of the good polity and
society, that is, their normative political and social ideas. It does not
matter for my analysis whether or not partisans were correct in 
thinking that certain energy technologies would in fact lead to their
desired society. What does matter is that partisans thought that certain
technological choices would lead to political and social goals and that 
a shared meaning of the technology, correct or not, drove their advo-
cacy. Therefore, the notion of technology as legislation provides a frame-
work for helping us to extract partisans’ normative and technical ideas
from their policy arguments, providing an explanation for why certain
energy policies dominated decision making. This framework will 
facilitate analysis of the way in which actors in the policy process per-
ceived energy policy problems and solutions. In sum, my framework 
has two different parts: It analyzes the dynamic interplay of ideas, inter-
ests, and institutions; and it uses the concept of technology as legislation
to understand and interpret that interplay in the case of solar energy
policy. The framework also can readily apply to other significant 
emergent technologies.
POLICY FOR THE FUTURE
While ideas are important in virtually all policy issues, they are especially
important in a certain class of policies – those that deal heavily with the
future and its attendant uncertainty – and so for which we can make few
confident predictions. While all policies involve uncertainty, these issues
are particularly burdened by it, and the uncertainty is so deep that it may
approach simple ignorance. Policies concerned with developments, both
social and technological, ten or twenty years hence must confront the
various and widely divergent paths that those developments can take.
The specific consequences of such developments may be as unpredictable
as the developments themselves. For example, it is impossible to predict
what percentage of our electricity will come from renewable sources in
thirty years and what percentage from the traditional sources of coal,
oil, and natural gas. In addition, it is hard to say which renewable tech-
nologies will be used the most heavily and in what manner. Furthermore,
it is not always possible to predict the differential impacts of using
various energy technologies, even if relative directions are clear. Yet those
technological developments will influence what we pay for the electric-
ity, how it affects the environment, how much oil we have to import, the
structure of the utility industry, the ways in which that industry is regu-
lated, and a host of other social and political questions. Moreover, poli-
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cies that we implement now – including resources for research and devel-
opment, regulations on existing utilities, subsidies for renewable energy,
and the advent of competition in the utility industry – will strongly influ-
ence which technologies look the most attractive in thirty years, so that
we are, in part, creating our future, despite its uncertainty. Under such
immense technical uncertainly, people’s ideas about what constitutes a
good political and social order, and which institutional and technologi-
cal arrangements they think will further that order, come to dominate
policy-making debates, since long-term interests are hard to identify and
predict and institutions may be embryonic or nonexistent.
Numerous technology policy issues, including some parts of energy
policy, fall into this uncertain-future category, and so they require far
better understanding. Solar (often used interchangeably for the broader
category of renewable) energy policy in the decades since World War II
presents important conceptual and pragmatic questions for policy schol-
ars. It calls for refining conceptual tools for understanding policy change
and development, as well as the incorporation of recent work on the pol-
itics and sociology of technology. Pragmatically, it is an important sub-
stantive issue in itself, and, as an emergent technology, is also part of this
broader set of future-oriented, highly uncertain policies for which gov-
ernments need to be better prepared. An analysis that stresses the role
of ideas and their interaction with interests and institutions offers several
strengths. It provides a more nuanced account of the process of policy
making itself, both for the case in question and more generally. It also
helps us discover why it is that we have the solar energy policy that we
do. More importantly, such an integrated approach also enables us to
determine how policy can be made better in the context of a democracy
struggling with difficult long-term technological issues. An analysis of
the dynamics of policy making suggests the dimensions along which we
might seek improvement. What policy should we have for solar energy,
and how could we imagine getting it?
Edward J. Woodhouse, David Collingridge, and a few other scholars
have begun to articulate a set of criteria and an analytical framework
through which we can make such evaluations. They argue that, for tech-
nology policies plagued with uncertainty, policy makers should seek to
tap the intelligence of democracy by incorporating views from a wide
variety of possible participants, avoid large mistakes, maintain their flex-
ibility, and use feedback to learn about and improve the policies.13 This
prescription means that better energy policy making would include the
views of a more diverse array of people and fulfill the substantive crite-
ria of flexibility and feedback.14 The question immediately arises of how
to improve policy making so that policies better fulfill these criteria. In
the case of solar energy, in many instances various actors did try to
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increase the range of voices speaking to policy makers, but those efforts
had negligible, or in one case limited, success. This case study demon-
strates why is it so hard to make these sorts of improvements in policy.
It is not enough for more voices to speak to policy makers. They must
speak in a way that is consistent with the dominant problem definition
or frame, or seek to change it.
An understanding of the dynamics of the policy-making process gives
us a better idea of how to change it to make better solar policy and better
technology policies more generally. Given the importance of ideas in
policy making and the way they shape interests and interact with insti-
tutions, concerns for democracy suggest that key institutions and actors
be more open to ideas that challenge conventional views of the world,
and that policy debate within those institutions be structured so as to
provide critical reflection on the ideas that underlie policy and often go
unchallenged. In short, the policy-making process should be made more
democratic by opening it up to include better debate about the norma-
tive goals that we seek with our technological policies. Others have made
this suggestion, but the analysis presented here makes it clear that con-
ventional pluralist methods of participation fall far short of this goal,
given the often subtle ways that ideas influence policy. Pluralist notions
of democracy depict participation as the actions of organized groups in
gaining access to and trying to influence decision makers. Given the frag-
mented and allegedly permeable nature of the American state, groups
can choose among many routes into policy making.15 In this view, groups
are limited only by their political resources and skill in using them,
assuming a fair policy process in which all groups so inclined have the
opportunity to make their voices heard. This framework has much to
commend it, but it misses some crucial parts of the policy process, and
I will show that even a process that is explicitly designed to open up
policy making to alternative conceptions of values, problems, and solu-
tions can fail to do so by failing to address the problem of the institu-
tionalization of ideas explored here.
PROBLEM FRAMES
If ideas are important in public policy, then we must analyze how they
enter into and affect the policy process. To understand how ideas inter-
act with interests and institutions and why those interactions affect out-
comes, we need to look in detail at how ideas give us a particular
depiction of a problem, often called problem definition or problem
framing, and how they influence decision makers’ evaluations of poten-
tial solutions to the problem. Problem frames do not determine policy
outcomes in any simple sense, but they do have immense influence on
them. Donald Schön and Martin Rein show that frames enable us to con-
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struct stories about our policy problems that make the “normative leap”
from analyzing a problem to saying what one ought to do about it. If
that story is well-constructed, the final normative leap will seem like the
natural outcome, the only reasonable one.16
At the most specific level this analysis asks, how did advocates 
and policy makers between 1946 and 1981 frame solar energy technol-
ogy? How did they conceptualize its then present status and future poten-
tial? How did they conceptualize energy policy more generally, and how
did solar as a future option fit into that broader frame? What sorts of
ideas did these specific and more general frames express, and how did
actors try to change those ideas and frames? All of these questions
require detailed empirical accounts for answers. In doing this long-term
case study I developed a detailed understanding of the ways in which
ideas and their associated problem frames got institutionalized as well
as the formidable barriers to institutionalizing new ideas; it is more dif-
ficult to change institutionalized ideas than analysts often assume. The
difficulty in altering institutionalized ideas points us toward the crucial
parts of the policy process that must change if we are to have policies
that retain flexibility, learn from experience, and incorporate diverse
communities and ideas. Nowhere are these considerations more impor-
tant than in policies concerning emergent technology, where the immense
factual and conceptual uncertainties reinforce the importance of actors’
values.
Numerous scholars have noted the importance of normative ideas in
energy policy debates and attempted to document their influence.17 A few
scholars have studied in more detail the roles that particular values have
played in energy debates and the values that advocates claimed were
associated with certain energy technologies.18 Partisans in these debates
linked technological choices to social outcomes, even if only implicitly
and even if the technological system they advocated would not, in fact,
bring about the kind of society that they desired.19 Moreover, the ways
in which actors talked about the policies and energy systems that they
desired tell us much about the normative ideas that underlie their 
proposals.20
INSTITUTIONS AND PROBLEM FRAMES
Problem frames, and the ideas that constitute them, operate within insti-
tutions. As Schön and Rein put it, “Frames are not free-floating but are
grounded in the institutions that sponsor them.”21 Other scholars agree.
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane argue that ideas become pow-
erful when they become institutionalized, and that such deeply embed-
ded ideas can explain the phenomenon of policy inertia, of institutions
sticking to a policy long after one might have expected it to change.22
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To understand the ways that ideas, problems, frames, and so on in-
fluence public policy, we must investigate the ways in which ideas get
institutionalized. Particular ideas come to dominate the official definition
of a problem and the conceptualization of its possible solutions. These
ideas also shape the institution’s rules, organizational norms, and oper-
ating procedures.
Substantial, enduring changes in policy require changes in the insti-
tutionalized ideas that influence policy, which can mean either changing
ideas within an institution or changing which institution controls some
policy. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones emphasize the latter to
change institutionalized ideas and policies:
This [policy] process is the interaction of beliefs and values concerning a par-
ticular policy, which we term the policy image, with the existing set of political
institutions – the venues of policy action. In a pluralist political system, subsys-
tems can be created that are highly favorable to a given industry. But at the same
time, there remain other institutional venues that can serve as avenues for appeal
for the disaffected.23
In short, if some policy advocates consistently fail to get the policy they
want from some government institution, they can try taking their argu-
ments to a different institution, perhaps a different congressional com-
mittee or executive branch agency. Jurisdiction over policy areas some-
times changes, and if that new institution becomes dominant, then the
policy can change rapidly. The difficulty with this solution is that the
new institution may not end up having decisive influence over the policy
of concern, which in fact is what happened in the case of solar energy
policy.
Alternatively, advocates can stick with the dominant institution and
try to change the ideas that guide it. New ideas can change the meaning
or understanding associated with some policy solution, in this case a
technology, so that it looks like a more plausible solution to an old
problem. Similarly, changes in ideas can change the way the problem is
framed, so that the relevant government officials consider as a plausible
solution technologies that they previously rejected or did not even take
seriously.
Maarten Hajer’s work on discourse coalitions alerts us to an impor-
tant pitfall in the analysis of institutionalized ideas used to explain policy
change, or the lack of it. He describes discourses as “an ensemble of
ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phe-
nomena. Discourses frame certain problems, that is to say, they distin-
guish some aspects of a situation rather than others.” The relationship
of Hajer’s discourses to the ideas and frames discussed above is obvious.
He reminds us that we cannot conclude that ideas are influencing policy
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just because some institution has started using a particular discourse in
its statements, but that we must look at the institution’s practices and
decisions before we conclude that the par-ticular discourse has become
institutionalized and dominant in some part of policy making. Impor-
tant actors may start speaking the stories of a new discourse, what he
calls discourse structuration, but we must also analyze what the institu-
tions do to see which discourses are in fact institutionalized.24
For the case of solar energy, and other future-oriented energy policies,
we need to analyze which government officials were in a position to influ-
ence this kind of change and the institutional structures in which they
operated, including the means by which nongovernmental actors had
access to them. We will also need to analyze the ways that institutional-
ized ideas shaped the official definitions of problems and how some
actors tried to change those definitions. The ideas held at the top levels
of policy making, especially in the executive branch, are more important
than are usually given credit in the policy literature. In the solar case,
what appeared to be a substantial and enduring change during the 1970s,
particularly at the agency level, was in fact ephemeral because, in part,
of the stability of the way the issue was defined at the presidential level,
despite vigorous efforts to change that definition. Making a large change
in this type of institutionalized problem frame entails dramatic changes
in a massive part of the nation’s technological infrastructure, with all the
accompanying political, economic, and social changes. Such policy
changes must have high-level support, since they will conflict with many
other ideas, goals, and interests held by previously persuasive stake-
holders and hence encounter stiff resistance from those who prize the
status quo.25 Thus the key for this study will be how new values were,
or were not, institutionalized in the Executive Office of the President
(EOP). I will also analyze congressional actions to some extent, but on
solar energy policy these were mostly reactive to executive branch
actions, even in the late 1970s. The EOP was the key barrier to sub-
stantial energy policy change.
I do not mean by these comments to dismiss Congress as an impor-
tant influence on policy. Assorted energy advocates used congressional
committees very successfully as a means of promoting their technologies
and keeping pressure on the executive branch. This pressure was felt
most intensely in the appropriations process. My analysis will carefully
depict the interaction of the Congress with energy advocates and the
executive branch. That said, this analysis still focuses primarily on the
executive branch because it retained the ability to set the dominant frame
for the issue. Throughout the history of energy policy, the president and
his advisors remained the crucial actors for undertaking new policy 
initiatives linked to new ideas about policy.
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WEAKNESSES OF CONVENTIONAL ANALYSES
Despite their surface appeal, conventional analyses based on interest
groups, simple notions of ideology, or rational economic calculations all
fail to explain adequately the detailed chain of events in solar energy
policy. A simple pluralistic look at the interest groups that supported
solar energy could lead one to believe that it would have been generously
supported and a high priority for policy makers, contrary to the actual
history of solar policy. In addition to solar advocacy groups themselves,
solar has gotten the enthusiastic backing of well-known environmental
groups since the 1970s. Particularly vexing for interest group theory is
that solar advocates’ political resources stayed roughly constant during
the time that solar policy was changing radically. To respond that the
groups gained and then lost their influence in that short period of time
(roughly 1974 to 1980) merely restates the question to be answered.26
Solar has also enjoyed the strong support of the general public. Indeed,
for decades public opinion polls have shown solar energy and energy 
efficiency to be the public’s top choice for the energy technologies in
which the government should invest for the future.27 These polls, which
political leaders allegedly watch so closely, clearly do not translate into
public policy in any simple way.
A simple ideological explanation also fails to explain these outcomes.
It is not enough to say, for instance, that President Reagan was opposed
to solar on ideological grounds. Support for solar energy was declining
sharply in top policy circles while President Carter was still in office.
Moreover, the simple ideological explanation begs the more important
question: Why were the values associated with solar technologies so
anathema to conservatives? In earlier decades solar technologies had
been championed by conservative advocates, and understanding how
solar came to have particular values imputed to it requires a much longer
and deeper historical perspective.
Rational economic calculation also fails to explain the government’s
actions. Policy makers faced great uncertainty when trying to decide
about future energy options. We must base our explanations of their
actions in terms of what knowledge was available to them at the time
that they made their decisions.28 In the early decades after World War II,
solar’s economic and technical feasibility appeared no more uncertain
than other energy options into which the government was willing to
invest massive resources, most especially nuclear power. Moreover, the
government changed its policies in ways that were not justified by short-
term fluctuations in fuel – especially oil – prices, as will be detailed in
later chapters. For example, from 1980 to 1982, government solar
research and development (R&D) funding fell drastically while the price
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of oil rose or declined only slightly.29 My criticisms of simple ideologi-
cal, interest-based, and rational economic calculation frameworks for
understanding solar energy policy suggest that a full analysis needs a dif-
ferent approach, though, to be sure, those traditional variables will crop
up repeatedly in my account.
The analysis here, by emphasizing the interaction of ideas with inter-
ests and institutions, will give us a better understanding of the reasons
for the volatile fate of solar policy and how it fits into energy policy more
generally. This analysis will also suggest how those who favor solar
energy can better go about seeking policy support for it.
IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE
The broad importance of energy to all aspects of life in industrial soci-
eties needs little discussion. Energy is part of every major technological
activity, from agriculture and manufacturing to transportation and
telecommunications. The roots of energy policy stem from the U.S. gov-
ernment’s deep involvements in energy technologies, resources, and
markets, an involvement that goes back over a century and shows no
indication of disappearing.30
The government has been and continues to be involved in the research
and planning for future energy resources. The Cold War powerfully influ-
enced federal government R&D priorities, and energy, especially nuclear
energy, technologies figured prominently in those programs.31 The Cold
War influence went beyond picking R&D priorities. As Stuart W. Leslie
has argued, the military security orientation of such programs led tech-
nology and science policy in particular directions, emphasizing state-of-
the-art high performance often at the expense of technologies that could
have important applications in the civilian economy.32
Such planning for the future seemed an immediate and pressing matter
during most of the 1970s. It seems less so today, although there is no
reason that it should. Planning for the future should not wait until a
crisis strikes. Recent price increases remind us that the current low prices
and ample supply of oil will not last indefinitely. A recent survey of
studies of recoverable crude oil argues that world oil production is likely
to peak somewhere between the years 2007 and 2014, and this conclu-
sion does not assume any political events that will interrupt production.33
Energy could be a front-page issue again before long.
Solar energy – or renewable energy, as such sources are usually called
now – has the potential to be a major part of the world’s energy sources
as fossil fuels decline in production. As we will see, advocates have long
depicted renewables as the resource that will enable the continuation of
industrial civilization after the era of fossil fuels, and a recent spate of
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books and studies have updated and promoted that conclusion. Private
analysts, solar and environmental advocates, government agencies such
as the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and some
industry groups argue vigorously that renewable energy will be the cor-
nerstone of future energy systems.34 Thus, understanding the history and
dynamics of solar energy policy is important for understanding the pos-
sible changes in a technological system of great importance, now and in
the future.
Energy policy mostly focuses on existing sources of energy, their
accompanying technological ensembles, and the conflicts of their associ-
ated regional economic and political interests. For example, the coal
industry for years opposed increasing the quotas of imported residual
fuel oil, typically used for home heating, into the United States, fearing
that such imports would cut into their market share.35 In this type of
conflict, well-established economic interests argue over policies that
would affect their shares of wealth and income. The technologies and
market structures involved are mature, the various interests have close,
long-term relations to government agencies, and everyone acts as if they
have a clear idea of which policies will advance their economic interests
and which ones will not.
In contrast, policy debates over solar energy are arguments over the
shape of a large future technological system. Such policies necessarily
confront immense uncertainties about interests and outcomes. This class
of policies affects, in addition to energy, many of the most consequen-
tial technological systems of our time, including environmentally clean
manufacturing, rapid changes in agriculture wrought by advances in
biotechnology, and the linkages and developments in telecommunica-
tions and information technologies. Policies that governments adopt now
will influence billions of dollars of investment in complex technological
systems that will become constitutive parts of our society for years to
come. The approach I take to this case thereby provides insights for ana-
lyzing some of these other issues.
CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS
Those who wish to challenge prevailing public policy must be able to
challenge the sets of ideas that underlie the status quo. A democratic
technology policy cannot content itself with giving citizens a set of
cookie-cutter choices but must instead empower them to contest the
underlying judgements and ideas that constitute those choices.36 Wood-
house and Collingridge stress that intelligent democratic processes must
take into account the views of diverse partisans, lest unwise policies go
unchallenged. Clearly, partisans who cannot challenge institutionalized
ideas have very little scope for challenging policies in general. Hajer
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argues persuasively that substantial changes in policy require the 
dominance of new discourse coalitions, which entails institutionalizing
new ideas.37
Langdon Winner addresses the problem that philosophical and other
theoretical analyses seem to have little effect on the technologies that our
societies produce, even when some actors in the system recognize that
ethical and other normative issues will be greatly affected by the new
technologies. Winner concludes that “the trouble is not that we lack
good arguments and theories, but rather that modern politics simply does
not provide appropriate roles and institutions in which the goal of defin-
ing the common good in technology policy is a legitimate project.”38 This
study takes Winner’s critique seriously and asks why various technology
policy processes, including those that provide channels through which
advocates can participate, do not provide the deliberative institutions
and roles that Winner calls for. In constructing technologies we do 
construct our future, and so our policies for the future, if they are
to be democratic, require that citizens be able to challenge the institu-
tionalized ideas that underlie the status quo.
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Framing the Energy Problem Before 
the Energy Crisis
Particular ideas, interests, and institutions shape the energy problem
frame. In doing so they also influence the way in which decision makers
and the public see solar energy and its potential to solve energy prob-
lems. This chapter analyzes some of the core values that make up the
remarkably durable official problem frame that dominated energy policy.
That frame did change slowly over time, but at no time did it present a
conception of the energy problem that made solar energy look like a
solution.
The very notion that there should be an energy policy implies defen-
sible reasons for the state to intervene in the energy sector. Just this
notion was controversial. Out of the New Deal and World War II came
a mix of ideologies: Some lionized government planning, others advo-
cated government intervention for security reasons, and conservatives
sought a return to less-fettered markets.1 Postwar volatility in markets
for all fossil fuels made policy debates hard to resolve since policy makers
had a difficult time deciding if they should be responding to gluts or
shortages.2 Controversies such as those over the ownership of off-shore
oil leases and the expansion of publicly owned electric utilities kept
value-laden, ideological issues on the front burner throughout the
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, each
having a different emphasis on the proper role of the state in energy
policy, and each making at least some reference to the importance of
private markets in the energy sector.3 But all four administrations also
recognized that government de facto played a substantial role in energy
and would continue to do so.
Much of what follows focuses heavily on the presidents and their advi-
sors, because new policy initiatives that require substantial funding and
that could have dramatic consequences usually require presidential bless-
ing if not instigation. Many initiatives for solar energy came from further
down the hierarchy, from cabinet members or elsewhere in their 
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agencies. But these initiatives did not outlive their patrons, because top
policy makers had not been persuaded to change the way they looked at
the problem or the normative values that they associated with it. All four
administrations saw the need to begin to develop new sources of energy
for a postpetroleum energy system. But the existing problem frame raised
large barriers for solar advocates, and they never institutionalized a new,
more congenial energy problem frame.
THE NATURE OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM –
CONVENTIONAL ANALYSES
Conventional analyses of energy policy have shown that policy makers
focussed on four basic features of the energy problem: the availability 
of fuels, their prices, the redistributive effects of energy policies, and, by
the mid- to late 1960s, environmental protection. Availability and price
changed sharply after the Truman administration, and that change
greatly influenced the framing of the energy problem. Immediately after
World War II, Truman administration officials were very concerned
about an oil shortage. Ralph K. Davies, testifying before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1947, argued for approval of the Anglo-
American Petroleum Agreement. Without it, he claimed that the gov-
ernment would need to resume rationing, a very unpopular measure.
“We do not face an oil shortage. We are in the midst of one – now.”4
Nor was oil the only energy commodity in short supply; as Truman put
it, “Everyone knows that our Nation’s [electric] power supply is tight –
that our margin of reserve is inadequate. In almost every part of the
country increased production is being impeded and delayed by limited
power capacity.”5
Once the United States entered the Korean War, energy and other
resource shortages were prominent topics in cabinet meetings.6 Even
before the war started, officials noticed troubling signs of an insecure
energy supply. While domestic production of oil continued to grow, in
1948 the United States began to import more oil than it exported,
making it a net importer for the first time.7 Energy firms increased their
production of all fossil fuels, but volatile markets made local shortages
possible.8 Both elites and the general public perceived energy shortages.
For example, in 1948 the Sun Oil Company published a large adver-
tisement in The New York Times entitled “Fuel Users Have a Right to
Know: What’s the Score on the Oil Supply?” The ad discussed recent
increases in demand that had put pressure on supply, despite the indus-
try’s best efforts. “Sun Oil Company is working twenty-four hours a day,
at breakneck speed, producing the greatest volume of oil products in its
history.” The ad goes on to ask consumers to conserve oil by keeping
thermostats lower, installing storm windows, and so on.9
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By 1952 these concerns about shortages disappeared from discussions
of energy policy. The prospect of energy shortages that had so worried
officials in the Truman administration did not trouble the Eisenhower,
Kennedy, or Johnson administrations. Supply changed from short to
abundant, and prices stabilized and then declined for almost two
decades. President Johnson’s Task Force on Natural Resources in 1964
framed the problem ahead as one of exploiting resources more effectively,
not running out of them.10
Whenever these three administrations set about trying to assess the
overall energy situation, their advisors and analysts gave them pictures
of abundance in the short and medium terms and technological fixes 
in the long term. For instance, the Task Force report to President 
Eisenhower’s Cabinet Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources
Policy asserted that “There is no over-all shortage of energy fuels for
future growth, nor are there shortages for any particular types.” They
added that supplies appeared adequate even in the event of full mobi-
lization for war.11 During the Kennedy administration, an energy study
conducted by the Senate came to the same conclusion: “The Nation’s
resource base, in terms of each fuel, is adequate to meet projected
requirements for the period covered by this study – i.e. to 1980.” A 1963
study by the Federal Council for Science and Technology, a part of the
executive branch, came to the same conclusions. Oil industry testimony
before Congress likewise repeatedly reinforced the idea of abundance.12
The Interdepartmental Energy Study Group, a large project started 
under President Kennedy and finished under President Johnson, esti-
mated that supplies would be plentiful, with little increase in prices,
through the end of the century. President Johnson’s science advisor,
Donald Hornig, reiterated that conclusion in a speech to the National
Petroleum Council a year later.13 These and other assumptions of abun-
dance manifested a dramatic shift from the concerns of President
Truman’s 1952 President’s Materials Policy Commission report, which
is discussed below, and they dominated policy making as well as public
discourse until events of the 1970s made such assumptions obsolete. As
a key part of the core empirical ideas that made up the energy policy
frame, they tended to filter out evidence and analyses that might suggest
shortages in the near future.
Energy prices were a problem for Truman administration officials,
although not for later administrations. Policy makers considered low
energy prices essential for economic growth. But in the context of energy
shortages in the Truman years, low prices caused a problem: They
encouraged increased consumption, which in turn made shortages
worse.14 Thus the Truman administration embraced two possibly 
contradictory goals – national security, which required abundant 
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supplies of energy for military and civilian use, versus low prices for 
economic growth. Things changed considerably in the Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Perhaps just as important as
actual price patterns, most energy policy makers took price stability as
a given and enduring feature of the energy system.15 Although prices
moved in complex ways, in the aggregate the real price (that is, with
inflation factored out) of energy went down steadily between 1952 
and 1968. This energy price is a weighted average of the prices of crude
oil, natural gas, and coal.16 Coal was the most expensive fuel, but its
price declined in real terms. Oil prices were in the middle and held essen-
tially flat, and natural gas prices, the lowest of the fuels, increased in 
real terms until the mid-1960s, when they began to drop. In absolute
terms, coal’s relative costliness gave price as well as convenience incen-
tives for shifting to other fuels during this period. In addition, electric-
ity prices also fell from 1950 to 1968, with consumers paying one-
third less per kilowatt hour, after adjusting for inflation, by the end of
the period, due both to the declines in fuel prices and gains in techno-
logical efficiency.17
The growing sense of an abundant and secure energy supply during
this period made the questions of long-term energy alternatives seem 
less urgent, and so one might expect that policy for alternatives such as
solar energy would grow less important as time went on. This con-
tention, however, does not explain all of the events of these years. 
It is true that officials in the Truman administration made the most exten-
sive and expensive proposals for the support of solar technologies, but
those proposals never became policy and never changed the basic way
that energy policy was framed among the president’s advisors. And it
was precisely during the times of cheap energy that the government, with
strong agreement between the president and Congress, did in fact launch
a very expensive and far-reaching policy designed to provide an energy
supply decades into the future – the nuclear power program. Thus the
conditions of abundance did not determine a policy outcome of inaction
concerning future energy supplies. The important question then becomes
which future energy sources got the most attention when there was no
crisis to spur attention for all of them?
Another key feature of the energy problem was that energy policies
were redistributive. Controversies over specific fuels, usually involving
oil trade questions and decisions about favoring oil or coal, required
presidential attention in all of these administrations. These were not
problems of energy supply or technologies. Instead, these controversies
focused on decisions that had very large financial consequences for inter-
ested parties, who contested them fiercely.18 In particular, with declining
prices and declining market share, the coal industry presented persistent
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problems for all postwar administrations. The industry lobbied actively
over the issues that affected it, albeit not always successfully, seeking
market protections such as restrictions on fuel oil imports. The manner
and extent to which each administration decided to help the industry
varied, with the Eisenhower administration the least interventionist.19
This redistributive feature of energy policy meant that any policy change
for a given fuel might be resisted by interests associated with other fuels.
For policies aimed at the future, this problem might seem insignificant;
but if such policies began showing results, they would develop enemies.
Which enemies they developed would depend on the types of results they
showed and the broader policy environment that shaped people’s notions
of their interests.
Finally, during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, environ-
mental problems became a part of officials’ thinking about energy policy,
and that part grew stronger by the end of the Johnson years. The envi-
ronmental movement grew in the 1950s, had become a significant polit-
ical force during the 1960s, and at least some officials in government
understood that decisions about energy had profound environmental
consequences.20 An Energy Task Force in the Johnson administration
listed a set of problems related to energy issues, and “pollution” was
among them.21 In addressing energy industry associations, President
Johnson’s science advisor, Donald Hornig, talked at length about the
need for future energy developments to be sensitive to their effects on
the environment, arguing that the industry must dedicate its efforts to
finding ways to produce reliable energy without undue pollution.
Hornig’s audiences were not the most sympathetic to environmental con-
cerns, so he must have placed growing importance on them to have
stressed them as much as he did.22 This new emphasis on environmen-
tal protection could have made solar energy look better to government
officials, but only in the 1970s would the official problem frame make
that connection. Environmental ideas were just beginning to make their
way into the energy policy frame.
IDEAS, NARRATIVES, AND THE NORMATIVE
FRAMING OF TECHNOLOGY
The conventional understanding of energy policy discussed above rested
on a set of institutionalized ideas. Four different concepts framed energy
policy in the United States after World War II – two normative goals 
and two causal or empirical beliefs about the physical and social 
nature of the energy problem and its relationship to technology and
science. Although the policy frame varied over time in its emphasis 
on each normative value, and in the precise meanings and interpre-
tations that it gave to them, those values were constantly invoked as 
Framing the Energy Problem Before the Energy Crisis 23
the desirable goals of policy by each administration. Similarly, 
causal beliefs about the sources of the problems and what new tech-
nologies could do about them remained remarkably constant during this
period, and this problem frame created serious barriers to the support
for solar energy technologies. Two particularly revealing settings 
for debate and analysis during the Truman administration were the 
President’s Materials Policy Commission and the UN Resources Confer-
ence. Both processes had the attention of the president and other high
administration officials, both of them are rich as sources, and, in part,
both of them set the terms of the energy problem frame to which later
administrations adhered, emphasizing economic prosperity and national
security.
On January 22, 1951, President Truman established the President’s
Materials Policy Commission (PMPC), sometimes called the Paley Com-
mission, and charged it with analyzing the nation’s materials problems
over the long term.23 Written with evocative language and colorful
metaphors, the report analyzed policies that the government might adopt
to cope with potential shortages or price increases. The major policy
objectives were to prevent rapid rises in resource prices that would stifle
economic growth and to prepare for the resource needs of the United
States and its allies in the event that the Cold War turned hot. The central
focus of the PMPC was economics, specifically the potential for rising
real costs of materials: “The essence of all aspects of the Materials
Problem is costs.”24 Resource shortages constituted a new problem for
the United States, and the commission perceived the stakes as fairly 
apocalyptic:
The United States, once criticized as the creator of a crassly materialistic order
of things, is today throwing its might into the task of keeping alive the spirit of
Man and helping beat back from the frontiers of the free world everywhere the
threats of force and of a new Dark Age which rise from the Communist nations.
In defeating this barbarian violence, moral values will count most, but they must
be supported by an ample materials base.
To explain the grounding assumptions that the commission adopted, the
report listed a set of values that read like a liturgical profession of
national faith:
First, we share the belief of the American people in the principle of Growth.
Granting that we cannot find any absolute reason for this belief we admit that
to our Western minds it seems preferable to any opposite, which to us implies
stagnation and decay.
Second, we believe in private enterprise as the most efficacious way of per-
forming industrial tasks in the United States. . . . We believe in a minimum of
interference with these patterns of private enterprise. But . . . this minimum must
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not be set at zero . . . the coexistence of great private and public strength is not
only desirable but essential to our preservation.
Third, we believe that the destinies of the United States and the rest of the
free non-Communist world are inextricably bound together. . . . The overall
objective of a national materials policy of the United States should be to insure
an adequate and dependable flow of materials at the lowest cost consistent with
National security and with the welfare of friendly nations.25
Clearly, the PMPC was not shy about staking out normative terrain.
The Economic Growth Value
The PMPC made economic growth one of the central goals that the gov-
ernment should seek. As a means to that goal, the report came down in
favor of the private sector as the main provider of materials, including
energy, but guided and influenced by government policy. Policy played
many roles, since the government owned and bought many resources and
regulated materials industries, especially monopolies. The government
also funded R&D on resources, though on a modest scale. Moreover,
some R&D was aimed at enhancing consumption rather than conserv-
ing resources.
The authors of the PMPC report clearly wanted the government 
to retain the powers to exercise whatever influence was necessary to 
avert serious shortages or price increases, but they also argued for a 
large role for the private sector.26 To these ends the commission recom-
mended three principles to guide government actions, the first two stress-
ing the economic interpretation of resource problems. First, government
policy should make it possible to obtain materials at the least cost pos-
sible, including importing them when foreign suppliers had genuinely
lower costs. Second, policy should encourage consumers to conserve
resources in the sense of using them efficiently. The PMPC report explic-
itly rejected the notion of conservation as hoarding resources or doing
without; resource consumption that built economic growth and 
future prosperity was desirable. But such consumption did not justify
profligate use.27 The third principle was national security. These princi-
ples express the values on which the PMPC based its study. Seeking 
least cost and defining conservation as efficient consumption clearly put
the emphasis on growth and economic efficiency. Other goals, such as
distributional equity or the use of resources as means to any other social
or political ends, vanish under a problem definition such as this. 
Likewise, only a narrow conception of technology could conform to 
such a problem definition, namely, technologies as the engines of 
economic growth.
The executive director of the study, Phil Coombs, used economists’
definition of materials as economic resources, which is that they are
Framing the Energy Problem Before the Energy Crisis 25
scarce in the sense that they are increasingly expensive to produce, not
in the sense that they are running out. “The materials problem of the
United States is not, as some people would have it, that we will all wake
up some morning in the future and find that we have suddenly exhausted
our last barrel of oil or our last ton of iron ore, or our last pound of
copper.” Rather, the increasing cost of such resources would harm eco-
nomic growth.28 By casting the issue in these terms, Coombs eliminated
two different approaches to the resource policy problem. First, since the
problem appeared to be one of gradually increasing prices, it did not
require a crash program to avert the disaster of a sudden depletion of
resources and everyone’s freezing in the dark. Second, since increasing
prices endangered the economy, the existence of large quantities of low-
grade ores and other resources did not diminish the problem. By exclud-
ing both of these extremes, Coombs cleared the way for the commission’s
analysis in the middle and provided a rationale for government inter-
vention in these markets.
Later administrations also saw the need for a mix of private markets
and public policies. While the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
were more interventionist than Eisenhower’s, all of them shared a large
commitment to the use of the free market to achieve energy goals. Yet
all of them recognized that public policy did and should play a role in
providing energy to society. The Task Force Report to Eisenhower’s
Energy Cabinet Committee affirmed this belief in the market while still
leaving room for state intervention:
It seems fair to say that, up until now, broad public policy in fuels has been
to rely generally on competition and private enterprise to determine development
and use of fuels. This is not to say that in particular instances public policy has
not exerted considerable influence.
Similar sentiments found expression in the Kennedy and Johnson years.29
In fact, the government’s deep involvement as owner, consumer, and reg-
ulator of energy resources meant that energy markets could not resem-
ble classical free markets. Still, the role of the private sector remained
substantial even in the deepest crisis.
The National Security Value
Analyzing the role of ideas in policy requires understanding the ambi-
guity of shared concepts.30 Although policy makers frequently invoked
national security as a principle guiding energy policy, that principle could
have several meanings. The Truman administration worried that the
United States would not have a sufficient fuel supply for its military in
the event of war. Although this concern faded with the growing abun-
dance of energy resources in later years, it never entirely went away, and
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all administrations considered adequate stocks of energy necessary for
the military. To address energy-related national security issues, President
Truman, following a congressional mandate, created a National Security
Resources Board (NSRB) in 1947.31 The NSRB took its job very seri-
ously. Less than a year after it was created, it recommended to President
Truman that he seek legislation to expand and consolidate the govern-
ment’s power to allocate and control resources and that those powers be
vested in the NSRB.32 The report conveyed a sense of urgency, almost
crisis, in describing the need for these expanded powers, depicting the
economy as lacking spare capacity to produce these items, and arguing
that the need for additional supplies in the event of war threatened great
economic repercussions unless all demands for resources were coordi-
nated by an expanded NSRB.33 Roughly a year later, the NSRB con-
cluded in another report that the country could not meet the resource
requirements for the War Plan put forward by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.34
Truman and other administration officials spoke publicly about the great
importance of energy to defense and national security, one even claim-
ing that it was a secure supply of high-octane gasoline that won World
War II.35
Public officials also perceived that energy, and resources more gener-
ally, had another, more subtle relationship to national security. In addi-
tion to recognizing the need for resources to fight a war, a number of
world leaders saw the shortages of such resources as the causes of inter-
national conflict and war. President Truman, in proposing a conference
on conservation and resources to the Economic and Social Council of
the UN, linked resources with world peace:36
The real or exaggerated fear of resource shortages and declining standards of
living has in the past involved nations in warfare. Every Member of the United
Nations is deeply interested in preventing a recurrence of that fear and of those
consequences. Conservation can become a major basis of peace. Modern science
has itself become a major international resource which facilitates the use of other
resources.
He proposed that the conference be technical, divorced from ideology
and politics. Three years later, delegates from dozens of countries, 22
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 152 learned societies
attended the United Nations Conference on the Conservation and 
Utilization of Resources.37 Several administration officials, including the
secretary of the interior, Julius Krug, participated in the conference.
Reflecting most of the plenary speakers at the conference, the UN 
Secretary-General’s report on it linked resources and peace:
Today the United Nations is embarking on a new phase of its programme to
build the foundations for permanent peace. It is calling on science to mobilize
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technical knowledge in support of one of the high purposes of the Charter – to
raise the standards of living. For behind most wars stand the spectres of hunger
and want – effective warmongers of the past. Solutions to these problems, though
not so spectacular as those in the political field, are of vital importance to 
world peace.38
In later administrations, only this first notion of national security –
that the United States needed adequate energy resources to have a 
fully prepared military – exerted any substantial influence on the energy
problem frame. As a report to Eisenhower’s Cabinet Committee on
Energy and Resources put it, “War and defense preparations have taught
that . . . particular energy products, such as gasoline and bunker fuel, are
as vital as munitions of war.”39 Policy makers did not regard growing
imports as a problem. For example, Eisenhower administration policy
makers were aware that the United States was, since 1948, a 
net importer of oil, with growing amounts imported into Europe as 
well as the United States from the Middle East. Yet the national security
implications of these imports, while not ignored, took second place to
the economic implications for domestic oil and coal industries since
increasing imports of cheaper Middle Eastern oil affected employment
and profitability in the domestic industries.40 The alternative conception
of energy and security – that abundant resources could prevent wars –
remained largely outside official policy discourse, with the noteworthy
exception of discussions about nuclear energy, which will be analyzed in
the next chapter.
Victims Without Villains
Crucial to any problem frame is the causal story that gives it coherence.
It is not enough to think that some things are normatively desirable. One
must also have ideas about how the undesirable state of affairs came
about, and so how it may be remedied. Policy makers’ notions of cau-
sation influence which solutions they deem plausible.
After World War II a single causal story dominated virtually all policy
discourse about energy and resources. That story is best demonstrated
by some of the early policy narratives in the Truman administration, par-
ticularly from the UN Conference in 1949 and the PMPC in 1952. Detlev
Bronk, president of the National Research Council, gave one of the
opening plenary addresses at the UN Conference:
It would be folly not to recognize that the pressures of growing populations and
the transformation of the materials of nature into scientifically created products
to satisfy the increased wants of man for war and peace are rapidly depleting
the world’s resources. But we would lack reasonable faith in the powers of science
if we did not believe that scientific research and the wise use of scientific knowl-
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edge can discover and create new resources for the needs of man and better con-
serve them for his future use.41
The PMPC provided a similar narrative in the opening of its first volume:
The nature of the problem can perhaps be successfully oversimplified by saying
that the consumption of almost all materials is expanding at compound rates
and is thus pressing harder and harder against resources which, whatever else
they may be doing, are not similarly expanding.
The introduction goes on to talk about “the convergence of powerful
historical forces,” which includes growing demand for materials in the
industrialized world and growing populations and material ambitions in
the less-developed countries.42
These causal narratives defined the issues in two ways. First, speak-
ers at the UN Conference sought a cause for threats to world peace and
prosperity, and all found that threat in causal stories that centered on
inadequate resources. This expressed a remarkable consensus. The
speakers and attendees at the conference had all lived through World
War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, global depression, the rise of Fascism,
World War II, and the start of the Cold War under the Damoclean sword
of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, to these speakers, improvements in
resources had the potential to cut across all of the ideological and polit-
ical divides that rent the world and could make for the conditions of
world peace.
Second, causal narratives in both the UN Conference and the 
PMPC removed blame for world problems from any identifiable actors
and from the classical political vices of greed, imperialism, aggression,
and so on.43 Resource demand threatened to exceed supply due to 
large-scale social forces, the macroimplications of billions of microdeci-
sions, and the vagaries of nature itself. For instance, growing popula-
tions result from reproductive rates, the results of countless individual
decisions. Similarly, those populations use nonrenewable resources 
at increasing rates due to all of the small decisions that those many 
economic actors make.44 The lack of an identifiable agency to blame 
puts this causal story in the category of inadvertent cause, where inten-
tional actions have unintended consequences.45 This sort of story
removes blame – in this case rooting world problems in forces without
villains – but still threatens large numbers of victims. Assigning blame 
is always strategic in making someone responsible for fixing the 
problem, and so a causal story that blames no one absolves everyone
from that responsibility. Articulated this way, the growing pressure 
on resources is no one’s fault, but is instead more like a force of 
nature. Therefore no one can be expected to stop the process; policy 
must simply adapt to it.
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This story of unintended consequences consistently characterized the
official perspective on energy policy from the end of World War II
through the Johnson administration. The story’s proponents continued
to use the idea that problems of resources were the inevitable growth of
demands on them by the growing world population, suggesting that poli-
cies for the future would have to provide for this growth in demand,
since no one person or even group was responsible for it.46 While ana-
lysts might be able to predict these bad outcomes, such predictions were
likely to have no effect on people’s behavior, since those struggling to
improve their lot in life around the world are not likely to accept a con-
struction of the situation that makes them responsible for global resource
problems. Framing the problem this way was politically productive,
since, by avoiding blame, this problem frame did not threaten most
actors. It also suggests that the only solution, the only way to avoid
serious shortages in the future, was to find ways of supplying ever more
resources, at least until the world population leveled off. That need raised
the issue of the role of science and technology in providing such
resources.
New Technology as a Solution
Throughout this postwar period, policy makers saw scientific and tech-
nological progress as the keys to solving their problems.47 New tech-
nologies not only provided greater abundance, but a politically and
socially more desirable life, as the UN Secretary General indicated: “Sci-
entific progress and economic development are not ends in themselves;
they are means to a better and richer life for mankind, in which human
rights and fundamental freedoms can more readily be observed and
respected everywhere.”48 Other speakers at the UN conference echoed
this theme. Leaders thought that technology could accomplish these
goals both because of its ability to produce material goods and because
it seemed removed from politics. Since resource problems were apoliti-
cal, and indeed without agency, then their solutions must transcend pol-
itics as well, they reasoned, and hence officials’ repeated emphasis on
science and technology as transnational, above the petty frays of politi-
cal conflict. The image of technology approached that of a cornucopia,
an instrument that could allow all the world’s people, regardless of
number, to live in prosperity. Officials depicted technology as universally
empowering to the extent that it freed humanity from want and enabled
the wider exercise of freedom.
Officials presented many ideas that certainly entailed potential
changes and dangers, but those drawbacks were overshadowed by 
the promise of abundance. For instance, the secretary-general’s report
about the UN conference explored the tremendous potential of pro-
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ducing food from certain types of yeast, which would make much 
conventional farming obsolete.49 He threw this out as an obviously 
beneficial development, despite the sweeping social changes that would
accompany such a technological change in the production and con-
sumption of food.
The policy discourse of the PMPC also emphasized this empowering
and dispassionate quality of technology, namely, that it enabled an analy-
sis of problems untainted by partisan or other political biases. In his dis-
cussion of the overall report with his staff, Executive Director Coombs
made it clear that the analysis of materials problems required intelligent
observation and analysis, not interpretation. He described the different
parts of the final report as pictures taken from an airplane. “This [the
attached guidelines] represents a picture from an altitude of 50,000 feet,
which is about the proper altitude for the Introduction to the final
report.” In contrast, other parts of the report presented views from
10,000 to 40,000 feet.50 Coombs posits these metaphorical aerial pho-
tographs as the very models of objectivity, which are more accurate than
mere ground-based surveying and devoid of the distortions of personal
bias and interpretation. Posing a policy problem a certain way constructs
what is important and what is not. By seeing the commission’s report as
rigorously technical and unbiased, Coombs and others writing the PMPC
emphasized those aspects of the problem that they saw as technical and
ignored those thought of as more emotional or ideological, such as dis-
tributive questions or the just ownership of resources. Framing the
problem in this way excludes certain kinds of arguments by ignoring
these political and social questions, one of the functions of problem
frames.
The image of technology in the PMPC report is, to say the least, a
glorious one. For instance, “Technology, that complex accumulation 
of knowledge, techniques, processes, and skills whereby we maintain a
working control over our physical world, has had so enormous a growth
during the twentieth century as to dwarf all the previous accomplish-
ments of its history.” Elsewhere in the report, technology moved beyond
the means of control to become the very agent of control: “Wherever it
appears that known resources, exploited by prevailing methods will not
meet demands established by prevailing use, there technology must take
command and redress the balance.” Here the PMPC report anthro-
pomorphized technology. Imbued with its own agency, technology
appeared as better than an unproblematic tool; it was a powerful ally.
As the means for meeting the challenges of material shortages, the PMPC
presented technology as the source of economic growth and national
security, and hence associated those important values with it.51 A report
on energy R&D in the Kennedy administration contained similar notions
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of technology: “We can be reasonably confident that future supplies of
resources for the United States will be adequate over the next several
decades, provided we maintain a vigorous program of research and
development in the physical and biological sciences.”52
These images of technology as a source of ever-increasing abundance
dominated official discussion about technology throughout the postwar
period and posed serious obstacles for solar advocates. This shared
meaning of technology had a similar effect on the evolution of energy
technology systems to that posited by Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker,
even though the meaning operated at a different level of abstraction. For
Pinch and Bijker, relevant social groups had a shared meaning about a
particular artifact that relates to the artifact’s specific design.53 In my case
a group of important policy makers had a shared meaning about a
vaguely defined class of technologies, some that already existed and
others yet to be developed. That meaning is that resource technologies
are things that provided sufficient abundance, under conditions of expo-
nentially growing demand, to achieve political and social, as well as 
economic, goals.
This meaning created a category that enabled policy makers to include
or exclude future technologies in programs of government support. Tech-
nology policy makers are not systems builders in Thomas P. Hughes’s
classic sense. They are not, with a few exceptions, the people who, at
the most immediate level, champion particular systems and overcome 
the economic, social, political, and engineering problems needed to build
the system.54 They are instead, as policy makers, the actors, operating
with political authority, who set the ground rules under which systems
builders must operate and who sometimes supply crucial resources that
systems builders exploit. Therefore, shared meaning among policy
makers structures the environment and the possibilities that systems
builders face.55
INSTITUTIONALIZED VALUES BUILD THE
ENERGY PROBLEM FRAME
The energy policy discussions from the Truman through the Johnson
administrations all reflected the core values of either economic growth
or efficiency and national security, with constant ambiguity about the
extent of the state’s role in the economy.56 The possible shortages of
resources or rising prices had nothing to do with identifiable villains, but
instead resulted from global-scale, macroforces, the results of billions of
uncontrollable small decisions. Technology appeared as the savior, the
means by which societies could meet ever-increasing demands for
resources, including energy. These values and related technical ideas
dominated policy discourses about energy in key political institutions,
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particularly in the Executive Office of the President and among other
senior executive branch officials, both in internal communications and
in public pronouncements. They also were reflected in the policies that
those institutions favored, including the lack of much action related to
solar energy. In short, this problem frame, and the normative and tech-
nical ideas that constituted it, were institutionalized; they shaped the
ways that key institutions of governance perceived and developed energy
policy.
The Johnson administration began to develop a different economic
approach to energy policy, abandoning more popular notions of pros-
perity or economic growth in favor of more technical notions of eco-
nomic efficiency. That administration also began to consider the ways
that environmental protection should influence energy policy. But neither
of these changes made enough of a difference in the energy problem
frame to affect solar energy.
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Creating Policy for the Future
One can categorize technology policies based on the problems they are
trying to solve and the length of time necessary for the technologies’
development. Many technology policies try to solve current problems
with already or soon-to-be available technologies, such as cleaning 
up certain kinds of pollution. These problems are well defined and the
parameters of the relevant technology are also well known. A second
type of policy still focuses on current problems but needs technologies
that will require years or decades for their development. In this case,
most authoritative actors have a mutually shared understanding of the
problem, making it well defined, although that understanding might
change over time. The uncertainty lies in the technology itself, since it
may take any of several different forms in its development. An example
would be biomedical R&D, such as that focused on cancer. Cancer com-
prises a current problem, with a widely shared set of ideas about it and
well-established sets of institutions and interests involved in its diagno-
sis, treatment, R&D, and so on. However, the technologies that one
needs to cure or prevent cancer are highly uncertain, with scientists pur-
suing many different possible avenues of research. Cancer is actually an
umbrella term for a wide diversity of related diseases, which will no
doubt require a diversity of treatments, making the technological future
even more uncertain.
The third and most future-oriented type of technology policy seeks 
to solve an anticipated future problem, and do so with technologies 
that still require considerable development. These polices suffer from
rampant empirical uncertainty about future technologies and their asso-
ciated institutions and interests. It is often difficult for protagonists to
know how different policies will affect their interests, or even what those
interests are. Such policies will, more than usual, exhibit their advocates’
normative social and political commitments and will of necessity con-
struct the future technologies and their place in the world, since that
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place is in fact quite uncertain. These technology policies are policies for
the future, and energy policies aimed at replacing oil fit squarely in this
category.
Despite the support for solar energy expressed by some presidential
advisors during the postwar period before the energy crisis, no one in
these administrations perceived any potential for it to contribute to
solving short-term problems, and it had no institutional support for long
term-development, as did nuclear energy.1 Decision makers’ conception
of the long-term problem made it difficult for them to take solar energy
seriously. In general, solar energy remained relatively low on the policy
agenda, and the limited constituency that tried to raise it did not involve
actors with clear, large financial stakes, since its commercialization was
so far in the future. Solar energy did not benefit from clearly defined
interests or well-established institutional champions and solar advocates
lacked a propitious definition of the energy problem that could help them
mobilize such interests or institutional support. Thus when energy prob-
lems occurred, few saw solar as part of the solution.
From the end of World War II through the Johnson administration,
officials considered three broad categories of technologies when they
thought about policies for a future postpetroleum world: synthetic fuels,
nuclear energy, and solar energy. What follows is an analysis of how gov-
ernment officials framed the problem they were trying to solve and how
the different technologies fit into those frames. The combination of key
ideas about the energy problem and potential energy technology solu-
tions, along with the institutional structures for making energy policy,
made it very difficult for solar energy to get a serious, sustained hearing
in top policy circles. This chapter probes those linkages between problem
frames and institutions in developing policies for the future.
SYNFUELS
Synthetic fuels (synfuels) are gaseous or liquid fuels produced from 
oil shale, tar sands, or coal. Various European countries had developed
technologies for producing these fuels, some of them dating back to the
nineteenth century, and the U.S. government sponsored a substantial syn-
thetic fuels program during and after World War II.2 Fuel shortages after
the war made the problem of developing synfuels seem even more urgent
to government officials.3
Richard Vietor makes it clear that national security was one of the
driving motivations for the program. Officials understood the need for
abundant fuel during World War II and some felt that relying on
imported oil was risky, since imports could be cut off. During the winter
of 1947–1948, the United States experienced a heating oil shortage, and
the secretary of defense joined the secretary of the interior in calling for
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a dramatic expansion of the synfuels programs.4 President Truman’s Pres-
ident’s Materials Policy Commission (PMPC) continued the national
security argument for synfuels, since the United States had become a net
importer of oil. The United States possessed vast quantities of oil shale
and coal, and the technology prototypes already worked, so the key
problem was lowering the costs. The PMPC’s estimates of production
and pricing made this argument seem plausible, because they claimed
that by 1975 the United States could be producing 2.9 million barrels
per day of synfuels and that gasoline from oil shale would cost less than
10 cents per gallon.5
Interior Secretary Julius Krug argued for a very aggressive program.
He sought a national investment of $9 billion in synthetic fuel facilities
that would produce two million barrels of synfuels a day. While he hoped
that industry would make most of this investment, he thought that the
government also should do so if necessary.6 In May of 1948, he opened
a government facility near Pittsburgh designed to extract oil from coal,
one of three such units that the interior department planned.7 In May of
1949, just a few months before the UN Conference, Krug made a speech
urging the private oil industry to take over investment in synthetic fuels,
and he requested that Congress authorize government loans for that
purpose. However, many industry representatives were reluctant to
involve their firms, believing that the high costs of synfuels made them
a bad investment.8
However, 1948 was also the year that fuel stocks began to grow, partly
due to growing imports from the Middle East, which undercut the gov-
ernment’s rationale that synfuels were important, at least in the near and
medium term. In that year the oil industry began to oppose the program
in a major way and succeeded in slowing it down. From 1948 to 1953,
the oil industry and the government debated strenuously the costs of syn-
fuels, with industry estimates coming out much higher than those of the
government. Despite the support of the president and the Departments
of Defense and the Interior, the synfuels program stalled in Congress and
died entirely once President Eisenhower took office.9 The national secu-
rity argument could not trump oil industry opposition reinforced by
powerful arguments that synfuels were too expensive to invest in when
conventional fuels were abundant.
Although the Eisenhower administration killed the synfuels program,
the president did include synfuels in his 1954 charge to his Cabinet Com-
mittee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy.10 The committee’s
appointed task force did the study under very tight deadlines, with con-
siderable help from industry, and said almost nothing about synfuels.11
A Federal Council for Science and Technology study of natural
resource R&D during the Kennedy administration listed oil shale as part
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of the country’s estimated reserves of fossil fuels, but said almost nothing
else about it. The council said nothing about synthetic fuels from coal.
The administration had enlarged two programs in the Interior Depart-
ment dramatically in percentage terms: Oil shale R&D had risen from
$778,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1962 to $1.4 million in FY 1964, and oil
from coal had risen from $713,000 to $2.1 million in the same period.
However, these sums are tiny when compared to government programs
in the 1940s, and they pale in comparison to the $9 billion proposal that
Krug formulated in the late 1940s.12
These different policies were grounded in different policy narratives.
Krug repeatedly argued that U.S. petroleum stocks were dangerously low
– only ten years’ worth of proved reserves and maybe another thirty
years’ worth assuming new discoveries – and that America was taking a
big risk by depending on oil imports from the Middle East. He posited
that growth in energy consumption was inevitable, although he also
argued for conservation measures. His solution to this alarming scenario
was rapid and large investments in synfuels, building on and greatly
increasing existing government programs.13
Krug’s policy narrative locates the source of the problem in something
impossible to control – the myriad actions of millions of energy con-
sumers that result in rapidly increasing demand.14 The growth of both
the population and the economy makes such increased demand inex-
orable. Since there is no one to blame and no one whose behavior one
can reasonably expect to change, the only solution is constant and rapid
increases in energy supply. Increasing oil supplies mean increasing
imports, which causes its own set of security problems. If one assumes
that synthetic fluid fuels made from coal and oil shale are the only alter-
native means for producing large quantities of fluid fuels, then a synfu-
els program is the only place a policy maker can turn.
The oil industry disputed vigorously Krug’s claims about the costs 
of synfuels, which they claimed were much higher than government 
estimates, and they also argued that domestic supplies of oil were 
more robust and that imports were less risky than Krug thought, con-
cluding that a massive program in synfuels was premature. But note that
Krug’s argument did not, at one level, depend on the quantitative details
of fuel costs. If the price of synthetic gasoline was $0.20 per gallon or
even $0.40 per gallon, instead of Krug’s $0.12 to 0.14 per gallon, Krug’s
narrative still retained its prescriptive force. If oil reserves would last
twenty or forty years instead of ten, that merely put off the day of 
reckoning for a few years. Krug’s policy narrative reveals the structure
of his argument – that inexorable forces of increasing demand will 
soon enough cause severe shortages of fuels, retarding economic growth
and endangering national security, and it does not much matter if it
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happens in 1960 or 1970 or 1980. If policy makers accepted Krug’s nar-
rative, uncertainties in synfuel prices paled in comparison with the con-
sequences of severe shortages or the risks of imports, and in any event
the price of petroleum products was likely to go up when their supply
became short.
Krug adhered to numbers that made his case look as urgent as possi-
ble, but in the end the structure of his policy narrative made it irrefutable
unless one expected to find very large new sources of fuels. None of this
is to say that Krug was correct in his assessments of oil resources or
synfuel prices, but rather that he and others in the Truman administra-
tion constructed the energy problem so as to make large investments in
synfuels look reasonable and that such a construction of the problem
had been at least weakly institutionalized in parts of the executive
branch, as evidenced by its broad support for aggressive programs. The
values of national security, economic growth, and the notion that the
government must take a strong role in guiding these developments were
all part of the problem frame, and the president, the secretaries of the
interior (Krug and his successor), and the secretary of defense accepted
that frame. Only determined opposition in Congress, led by a powerful
oil lobby, kept the program from growing beyond the three synfuel pilot
plants that the government constructed and ran.
The problem frame changed only when all of the people in key posi-
tions in the administration changed, that is, when President Eisenhower
took over in 1953. Well before that, the government was collecting data
that suggested that oil resources were not as small as Krug had suggested,
and the public began to experience a long period of energy glut, instead
of the shortages of 1945–1949. But those changes were not enough to
change the frames of the people in key positions in the administration,
so they continued to construct the world (represent it, as Stone would
say) in such a way that they saw no reason to change their policies. Only
the change in administration brought the change in the problem frame
and the normative and technical ideas that went with it, suggesting that
the frame had been institutionalized only weakly.
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Nuclear energy underwent a fate opposite to synfuels. Throughout 
the Truman administration officials expressed skepticism about the near-
and medium-term potential for civilian nuclear energy. In one of his
speeches about the looming oil crisis, Julius Krug mentioned nuclear
power, claiming that it could not substitute for oil anytime soon. 
The projected shortages were going to be in fluid fuels, like gasoline 
and heating oil. Since nuclear power produced electricity and since it
would take a long time to electrify all of the functions that then used
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fluid fuels, even a rapidly growing nuclear power program did not
obviate the need for synfuels.15 President Truman made strongly sup-
portive statements about nuclear power in public, but internal discus-
sions made it clear that the economic use of such technology remained,
in the administration’s view, probably several decades off. In addition,
of the various civilian uses of nuclear technology, officials did not rank
electricity production the most important.16
Near the end of Truman’s term, the President’s Materials Policy Com-
mission (PMPC) voiced similar arguments about nuclear power and
added some others. The PMPC did not question that reactors for energy
could be built, but their costs and the need for nuclear materials in the
weapons programs made their feasibility as civilian energy sources uncer-
tain, at least for the near-term. While anticipating its great long-term
potential, especially with the use of breeder reactors, they found it hard
to predict when these developments would occur, except not any time
soon. They expected that nuclear energy would not displace fossil fuels
in any major way in the next twenty-five years.17 They reiterated the basic
problem of energy resources as one of increasing supply without increas-
ing price. In its discussion of the potential for electricity from nuclear
fission, which the commission classified as an unconventional source of
electricity, the report stated: “At this time, it does not appear that nuclear
fission can be regarded as a contribution in any substantial degree to
electric generation during the next 10 or 15 years, and the probability is
that the atomic energy industry will remain a heavy net consumer of elec-
tricity [due to military demands].”18
Even the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) shared these doubts
about civilian nuclear power in the near-term. In a classified report to
the president dated at the same time as the PMPC report, the General
Advisory Committee to the AEC stressed military developments as its
top priority and regarded civilian power as a competitor with military
programs for scarce materials and personnel:
The great scale of atomic energy production, present and planned, means that if
the atomic materials were not required for military purposes they would be avail-
able on a scale large enough to be an important fuel for civil power. Where, when
and under what circumstances power so generated could compete economically
with power from other sources is not now known. The work of the Commission
in developing atomic reactors has not been primarily directed toward answering
this question.19
Clearly the AEC’s emphasis on military applications overrode civilian
applications.20 Top government officials voiced these arguments, includ-
ing, in the case of the General Advisory Committee of the AEC, private
scientists who were advisors to the government.
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This official position does not mean that everyone in the government
shared these views or that the government had no civilian energy
program. For example, on December 20, 1951, an AEC experimental
breeder reactor in Idaho produced the first nuclear-generated electricity.21
Moreover, many scientists in the national laboratories and elsewhere
were quite enthusiastic about the potential for civilian nuclear energy
and thought that it could be a significant part of the energy mix far
sooner than did top officials and that it deserved much more government
support than it got. One example, with some irony, was Farrington
Daniels, a leading figure in solar energy. Daniels, a physical chemist, had
worked for the government during the war and had ended up as direc-
tor of Argonne National Laboratory. He was a principal designer of a
prototype civilian nuclear energy reactor, the Daniels pile, and had left
the lab and government service in frustration over the unwillingness of
the government to support this kind of R&D adequately.22 Clearly,
despite such enthusiasm on the part of important nuclear energy advo-
cates, the highest level policy makers before 1953 were very unsure about
the magnitude and timing of nuclear energy and regarded it as a tech-
nology of the future, two or more decades away.
In the Eisenhower administration, civilian nuclear energy began to get
more positive attention; in particular, it got a major boost from one of
Eisenhower’s most famous speeches, “Atoms for Peace,” presented to the
United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. Remarkably,
the promotion of civilian uses of nuclear technology was not the origi-
nal intention or principal focus of the speech.
Officials wanted the speech, originally called “Candor”, to lay before
the public, forthrightly and in detail, the national security situation that
the United States faced in its dealings with the Soviet Union. The presi-
dent and his top advisors felt that the public did not understand the
severity of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, especially the new
hydrogen bombs, and by the designs of the Soviet Union. The speech
aimed to mobilize the American people, to provide a stimulus similar to
that of war, but in order to avoid a nuclear war. The populous needed
to work harder, save more, and so on, to keep the nation economically
strong, and it had to be prepared to adopt explicit civil defense proce-
dures. One top aide described the speech as part of a process of “fiber-
toughening for the long pull.”23
Excerpts from sample drafts of the speech show consistently that civil-
ian applications of nuclear energy were a sidelight, not the main focus
of the talk, and in fact the references to it diminished and became increas-
ingly vague as the speech was revised. Most of the talk was about the
problems of “Atoms for War.” In the June 17 draft, two pages of a
fifteen-page speech were devoted to civilian applications, much of it
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about the medical use of radioactive isotopes. On nuclear energy per se
this version of the speech began: “Finally, we have pushed back the fron-
tiers of science and engineering in the field of power production to the
point where we believe we are no more than a decade away from eco-
nomic electrical power produced by the burning of uranium and pos-
sibly thorium.”24 The September 2 draft had even less about civilian uses,
just eleven lines making up three short paragraphs. The image of nuclear
energy was glorious, but vague: “Atomic energy in our lifetime will
lighten the burden of man’s toil, raise his standard of living, ease his ills,
and add vigorous years to his life.” In this draft C. D. Jackson, a senior
aide, also introduced in one sentence the notion of some international
control over civilian nuclear technology: “Under a system of effective
international control, the whole world would share in these advan-
tages.”25 That notion of international control of nuclear materials for
global benefit became a core part of the speech.
In later drafts and the speech that President Eisenhower actually 
presented to the UN on December 8 he expressed, remarkably, near-
term optimism. “The United States knows that the peaceful power 
from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already
proved, is here – now – today.”26 In earlier drafts it first was a 
decade away, then sometime in our lifetimes, and now suddenly ready
immediately.
Despite the importance of the “Atoms for Peace” speech, it actually
took quite a while for the government to start a substantial civilian
nuclear power program, and even longer for industry to get interested.
In October 1953, two months before the “Atoms for Peace” speech, the
AEC announced a pilot nuclear energy plant that it would build at Ship-
pingport, PA. But that plant was controversial even among nuclear advo-
cates, some of whom argued that it rushed into production a crude
technology. They prefered a much-expanded research effort to develop
more advanced reactors before moving to the pilot plant stage.27 Four
years after the speech, some former members of the AEC, along with a
number of prominent nuclear scientists, criticized the government for
going too slowly in developing civilian nuclear power plants and urged
a more coherent, aggressive government program.28
During the Kennedy administration, nuclear energy policy had 
three principal actors: the White House (the Executive Office of the 
President and the president himself), the AEC, and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy in the Congress. President Kennedy and his aides 
were publicly very supportive of nuclear energy, but they were not taken
with the idea that the government should put dramatically increased
funds into the technology and even considered decreasing the funding.
The AEC and the Joint Committee were, on the contrary, very gung-
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ho, thought that the Eisenhower administration had left too much to 
the private sector, and wanted a dramatically increased government
program.29
On March 17, 1962, President Kennedy formally requested that the
chair of the AEC initiate a study of the role of nuclear energy in the
context of other energy resources, specifically other ways of generating
electricity. The AEC drafted a report and, remarkably, discussed it with
the Joint Committee before presenting it to the administration, indicat-
ing that, while they nominally reported to the president, they considered
the Joint Committee to be at least an equally important patron and ally.
The AEC ignored Kennedy’s request to analyze nuclear energy in the
context of all energy resources and produced a report calling for a much-
accelerated reactor building program. In their draft report they assumed
that electricity demand would grow so dramatically that even the Joint
Committee criticized the numbers. The AEC’s final report called for
building “seven or eight power-producing prototype reactors, approxi-
mately half of which would be advanced converters and the rest breed-
ers,” all at the expense of the AEC. It also argued for subsidies to get
industry to build ten to twelve “full-scale power plants.”30
The White House was unhappy with this conclusion and the way 
the AEC ignored its instructions, and on February 15, 1963, the pre-
sident directed Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the director of the Office of 
Science and Technology in the White House, to chair an interdepart-
mental energy study to do what the AEC had not done, namely, to view
nuclear energy in the context of other energy sources.31 The Joint Com-
mittee saw this new study as a way of delaying an aggressive nuclear
program and expressed its displeasure five days later by calling in
Wiesner to testify at hearings and grilling him with some hostility about
the administration’s intentions for the support of nuclear energy. Wiesner
held his ground, and while he was very supportive of nuclear energy in
general terms, he was openly skeptical about the need for an immediate
crash program.32 In internal discussions in the White House, Wiesner
was even more critical, arguing that the AEC report had failed to 
make a case for an aggressive government nuclear energy program.33 The
interdepartmental study was not completed until well into the Johnson
administration.
During the Johnson administration the electric utility Jersey Central
Power and Light ordered a turnkey nuclear energy plant (one that 
is ready to use once the owner walks in and starts it up, rather 
like turning the key to start an automobile) from Westinghouse.34 The
AEC, the TVA, and the director of the Office of Science and Technology,
now Dr. Donald Hornig, all touted this purchase, and the one 
shortly after it by Niagara-Mohawk, as an indication that nuclear 
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power had become competitive almost a decade earlier than the 
AEC had originally predicted and that this would pave the way for the
rapid expansion of the industry. The estimated costs for electricity from
these plants were projections that had no basis in experience, but that
did not dampen officials’ enthusiasm.35
Nuclear advocates used a policy narrative of loss of control and
redemption.36 Inexorably increasing demand for energy would endanger
industrial society, causing us to lose control of the things that we needed
to continue to prosper. Our present course of action – a growing con-
sumption of nonrenewable energy sources such as oil and gas – was
leading to a crisis of supply that would stifle economic growth and
weaken national security. Nuclear power, particularly breeder reactors,
could restore control by providing an energy supply that could expand
almost indefinitely and enable us to reestablish control over our fate.37
Interestingly, the AEC and the Joint Committee attributed economic
growth to massive government intervention, arguing that the private
sector could not be expected to take the risky investments that were
essential to continued growth. From the Truman administration on, the
AEC and the Joint Committee also stressed the importance of national
security as another crucial condition that threatened to go out of
control.38
The normative idea of progress also aided the acceptance and domi-
nance of nuclear power in policy circles. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, the concept of progress in the United States had shifted from a
notion of people’s spiritual, moral, and social improvement to that of
technological advance. New technologies became the very embodiment
of progress. When important decision makers came to associate a par-
ticular technology with progress, that technology became more desirable
than its alternatives.39 The notion of the frontier comprises another
crucial part of the idea of progress. A technology is part of progress if
it is on the technological frontier and can help take the society to and
beyond whatever frontier it then confronts.40
Popular writings of the 1950s clearly associated nuclear power with
notions of progress. In a rather breathless book intended for general
audiences, David O. Woodbury, a popular science writer, depicted devel-
opments in nuclear technologies as the very essence of the frontier, with
new fields of science and technology springing from nuclear develop-
ments. If we could develop the peaceful atom, “we shall leap sharply
upward into a world of greater comfort and happiness, better health and
security.”41 Gordon Dean, chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from
1950 to 1953, published a book describing for the public the then-
current state of the U.S. atomic energy program and what sorts of prob-
lems lay ahead. Although more serious in tone and substance than
Creating Policy for the Future 43
Woodbury’s book, Dean also clearly accepted the notion that nuclear
technology was a major part of progress, economic and otherwise. He
also used the notion of the frontier, the idea that nuclear technology was
taking us to the next uncharted territory, and left no doubt about what
to do:
Mankind has recently entered a room, the door to which is labeled the atomic
age. We are in that room, and we have found that it is so large and so dimly
lighted that we cannot yet begin to perceive all that is in it. But we have crossed
the threshold, and we cannot turn back. All we can do is go forward as boldly,
and yet as wisely, as we can.
One does not turn back from the frontier and promise of progress.42
Depictions of nuclear technologies as part of progress were not left to
the random publications of individual authors. The government and
industry made substantial efforts to advertise for atomic energy, depict-
ing it as friendly and a part of social progress. The public relations and
advertising campaigns were massive and continued for years.43
These narratives and their associated problem frames constructed the
energy problem and nuclear power technology in such a way that they
fit together almost uniquely. Since the general problem is growing energy
demand, about which policy can do nothing, the solution is a technol-
ogy that can produce ever-increasing blocks of bulk energy. Because
existing fission technology could not, in fact, do that at the time, nuclear
advocates depicted the current generation of reactors as a necessary step
toward the ultimate solution, breeder reactors, the only technology that
could fulfill such demand.44 Even the skeptics in the Kennedy adminis-
tration, like OST Director Wiesner, accepted the general problem frame;
they just did not think that it merited the large and sudden increase in
public funding, since the crisis was not going to be acute any time soon
and other technologies, including renewables and the improved use of
fossil fuels, might play a role in stretching out the supplies of oil and gas.
But they did not, from the evidence of their internal and external state-
ments, question the basic logic of the issue.45
Thus most senior policy makers of this period shared this meaning of
nuclear power technology as a progressive, frontier, cornucopia of
energy, one that provided symbolic gratification as well as practical solu-
tions to energy problems. Note that the meaning of the technology is not
enmeshed in its detailed designs, but rather in its general outline and
structure.46 This shared meaning led to a consensus for substantial policy
support for these technologies, with the only dispute among government
officials being over how much and how fast.
The AEC, the Joint Committee, and, to a lesser extent, the Executive
Office of the President had institutionalized these problem frames and
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policy narratives. They showed up repeatedly in the ways that officials
discussed the problems, the institutions responded to questions and chal-
lenges from the outside, and even in the ways the institutions were or-
ganized and charged to operate. The Joint Committee was the only
standing, permanent committee in Congress that had members from both
the House and the Senate, suggesting that its subject was more impor-
tant than interhouse rivalries. The AEC could simply defy the president
when he ordered them to study nuclear power needs in the context of
other energy sources, and it could get away with it because of the struc-
tural protection that it got from the Joint Committee. These policy
frames and commitments remained constant for decades and transcended
the individuals who happened to occupy the leadership positions in these
institutions. So durable were these institutionalized frameworks that
when opponents of these institutions sought to make changes in nuclear
power policy, they found it easier to abolish the institutions than try to
reform them.47
SOLAR ENERGY
Although it had nowhere near the prominence or funding of nuclear
power or even synfuels, solar energy did crop up when White House
staff, and sometimes agency officials, discussed future energy policy, 
both internally and externally. Different administrations expressed
varying degrees of enthusiasm for it, but they all conceptualized it in
basically the same way. All of these instances show the interplay of a
complex mixture of ideas, government officials, outside actors, and 
the contingent events outside of energy policy in shaping problem 
frames and policy development. Ideas were not the only factors influ-
encing these events, but they played a greater role than other analyses
might suggest. The interaction of ideas with more conventional policy
variables provides a better explanation of events than the conventional
variables alone.
In Truman’s administration solar issues appeared on the policy agenda
twice in major ways – just after the United Nations Conference on
Resources in 1949, and in the deliberations of the President’s Materials
Policy Commission of 1951–1952. Julius Krug, then Secretary of the
Interior and the official representative of the United States to the 1949
UN conference, gave a plenary speech in which he suggested ten specific
areas of resource development that he thought would best contribute to
higher standards of living. The first three, in order, were nuclear energy,
solar energy, and synthetic fuels, especially from oil shale.48 Krug
embraced solar’s potential during the conference. As interior secretary,
he already had jurisdiction over several energy sources, and he made 
it clear at this conference that he wanted to add solar energy to his
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department’s programs. He suggested that a solar program in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars might be appropriate for this effort.49 The
program never developed into anything, in part due to the mobilization
for the Korean War, which put a heavy emphasis on short-term fuel
needs, and also due to Krug’s resignation as interior secretary only a
couple months after this conference.50
Exactly why Krug was so enthusiastic about solar remains unclear.51
He had long experience with energy issues, working with the Wisconsin
Public Utilities Commission in the 1930s on electrical rates and, later, 
as chief power planning engineer for the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA). When the war started, he joined the War Production Board (WPB)
as head of its power division and, after a brief stint in the Navy, became
chairman of the WPB during the last year of the war. In 1946, Krug 
was named Secretary of the Interior, replacing Harold Ickes, and the
press depicted him as nonpolitical and a very able administrator.52
During his tenure as interior secretary, Krug issued repeated warnings
about impending shortages of oil and natural gas.53 As part of the 
solution to this problem, he advocated an aggressive program to develop
synthetic fuels from oil shale, coal, and tar sands. But his emphasis on
solar was new and suggests that he had recently decided that solar
offered another partial solution. Thus a reconceptualization of solar
technology and its broader energy context did penetrate to a cabinet-
level official during the Truman administration. Yet, the failure to adopt
policies that promoted solar energy in any substantial way or with any
permanence foretold a pattern that would be repeated for decades. 
Krug never institutionalized his advocacy of solar energy and the
problem frame that went with it, so his policy initiatives did not survive
his departure from office.
The staff of the PMPC also discussed solar, and their report concluded
that solar energy, like nuclear energy, offered alternatives for the future,
not the present. The PMPC assumed that energy demand would double
by 1975 and that hydro, oil, and gas would be insufficient to meet that
demand without raising costs substantially. While they projected that
conventional sources would suffice until 1975, in the long-run the nation
would need new sources of energy. It was in this long-run that solar
energy could begin to play a role. In one of the few places in the report
that mentioned solar, the report stated, “Long before then, the Nation
should begin its transition toward currently unconventional sources,
notably solar and atomic energy.”54 Significantly, solar energy appears
nowhere in the PMPC’s volume on energy and infrequently in the bulk
of the report, while a chapter, “The Possibilities of Solar Energy,”
appeared as the last avenue explored in Volume IV, “The Promise of
Technology.”55
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This chapter was the only extended discussion of solar energy in the
PMPC report. Largely a summary of the various technologies then in
existence and the research that was being done on them, the structure of
the chapter followed that of other contemporary writings on solar, albeit
expressing more enthusiasm than some. It began by noting the immense
amount of solar energy that strikes the earth and argued that the task
for R&D was to increase the efficiency of solar technology in con-
verting that energy to useful forms. The chapter reviewed specific solar
technologies, including domestic space and hot-water heating, wind,
photovoltaics, and ocean thermal energy. It made the claim that solar
space heating could be put into 13 million homes, including some apart-
ments, between 1950 and 1975, accounting for ten per cent of the
nation’s total energy. The chapter called this scenario the “maximum
plausible market” by the year 1975 and did not propose any means by
which this market potential could be realized.56 The chapter concluded
with the argument that solar is the only option in the long-term to replace
fossil fuels and that the transition to it should begin long before short-
ages inevitably drove up the price of conventional fuels. It assumed that
populations around the world would continue to grow, that their
growing standard of living would make ever-greater demands for energy,
and that nuclear power would never be more than about one-fifth of that
energy load, thus leaving solar as the only option left. The chapter then
called for large increases in funding for solar research.
Significantly, the PMPC judged both solar and nuclear energy as viable
alternative power sources for the future, contrasting them to conven-
tional fuels rather than to each other. There was great uncertainty in the
costs and feasibility of both of them. There were, of course, also great
differences, not least of which was the massive military, and later civil-
ian, expenditures on nuclear developments compared to the tiny funds
spent on solar. Nonetheless, at that time the PMPC had no compelling
reason to conclude that solar was any less practical for civilian use in
the long-term than nuclear, and some of the language in the report
reflected this equality. Both had great potential, and both needed a great
deal of work before they could realize that potential.
Top officials in the Eisenhower administration gave solar energy little
credence. The Cabinet Committee Task Force report lumped solar in
with nuclear and shale oil as future resources. “The prospect of using
newer sources of energy, such as nuclear power, oil products from shale
or coal, and solar energy, appear farther in the distance than would be
of any significant concern in this study.”57 The privately sponsored World
Symposium on Applied Solar Energy prompted the main discussions
about solar energy among administration officials. The government 
officials most interested in promoting solar were one step lower in the
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hierarchy than was the case in the Truman administration. Orme Lewis,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and Howard Pyle, Deputy Assistant
to the President, were trying to get the president involved in the upcom-
ing solar symposium and in the subject more generally. They sought 
the attention of White House staff by discussing what the president
should do with regard to the symposium and by circulating a speech 
by Dr. M. E. Spaght, a vice president of the Shell Oil Company. In 
summarizing Spaght’s speech, they emphasized his use of the ideas of
income energy, principally solar, and capital energy, which comprised
fossil fuels and uranium.
The speech argued that we could live on income energy indefinitely,
but that the current costs were too high and that we had better soon find
ways to bring those costs down, since we would exhaust our capital
energy in about a century.58 These ideas presented a very different frame
for the energy problem than the one that dominated the administration,
and Pyle and Lewis tried to circulate them among the top White House
staff. The aides appealed to the desirability of having the president be
part of a growing phenomenon:
It occurs to me [Pyle] that this general subject and the vast possibilities in the
field parallel in some respects the atoms for peace idea. This solar energy thing
has unlimited possibilities and might conceivably be another way in which the
President could reflect the great vision he has in planning for the future. . . . It’s
going places inevitably, and there’s no reason why the boss shouldn’t be identi-
fied with it.59
However, it was not so easy to get the top White House staff interested
in solar energy. In response to Lewis’s request that the president send a
welcoming message to the symposium, Bryce Harlow, a senior aide to
the president, expressed skepticism:
Orme agreed that before the President would pay the slightest attention to all of
this solar energy business, he would have to be interested by someone with a sci-
entific background who could show factually exactly where the science is now
and what its future holds in store.60
Lewis and Pyle did get the president to send a friendly but noncommit-
tal letter of greeting to the symposium delegates, but little else.61
The Kennedy administration said little about solar energy, with the
most discussion coming in the May 1963 report on natural resources
R&D. This report discussed some “important gaps and imbalances” in
the current division of energy R&D funds, and mentioned renewable
resources first:
As shown in the inventory tabulations of work in progress in 1963, only about
0.3 percent of the $1.5 billion spent on energy resources research and develop-
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ment is directed toward renewable resources and no research and development
at all is underway on tidal power, wind power, and naturally occurring temper-
ature gradients in tropical and arctic waters.62
The report made technological and institutional recommendations, but
only in general terms:
The Subcommittee believes that research on solar energy ought to be increased
beyond the agency proposals [for the coming fiscal year]. . . . At the present time,
the most promising ways of utilizing solar energy beyond photosynthesis are as
a supplemental source of energy for space heating, drying, and desalination of
sea water. No Federal agency has primary responsibility now for research
directed at development of solar energy and as a result no coordinated program
of solar energy research is in existence.
The report goes on to endorse an Interior Department proposal that it
house such a research program. It also proposes that the government
fund R&D on wind and tidal power because they may be locally impor-
tant, even if they do not have the potential for national impact on energy
supplies.63 Thus the report begins to discuss the institutional problem of
supporting solar energy research, the lack of an institution that would
develop and champion such work.
IDEAS THAT THWARTED SOLAR ENERGY
R&D INITIATIVES
A consistent set of causal stories and values is woven through these pro-
posals and discussions of energy policy and solar energy. To elucidate
those stories and values, consider at length a specific example, the PMPC
in the Truman administration, which provides us with a window on the
thinking of those who were trying to change the way that top policy
makers conceptualized natural resources policy, including energy policy.
As a study that had the president’s and other officials’ attention, the
PMPC report was in a position to influence the ideas associated with
those policies. Although it came too late in Truman’s term to affect
policy, it did set out a new way of thinking about these issues. Applying
Stone’s method of narrative analysis to both the report as a whole and
to the chapter on solar energy can help us to see what kinds of stories,
symbols, and metaphors were used in portraying both resource issues
and solar energy in particular.
The basic story of resources in the PMPC follows a classic theme 
of a loss of control, which dominated the thinking of the staff through-
out the report. They saw World War II as a turning point that marked
the end of the United States’ self-sufficiency in resources. Since that 
time, demand for resources, and energy in particular, had increased
steadily and promised to keep increasing. Economic growth, coupled
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with growth in population, would continue to increase demands on
materials, potentially leading to rapidly rising prices and shortages, sti-
fling prosperity, and threatening security. These large-scale trends
appeared to have a certain inexorable quality to them, and only contin-
uous efforts to stay just ahead of disaster offered any solution:
One thing seems certain about the materials problem: it will persist. Its forms
will alter; its severities may be controlled, and partial solutions will brightly
present themselves – but the forces that brought the problem into being will
increase rather than diminish. The central fact seems unalterable: as industrial
civilizations grow in complexity they compound demands made upon materials
. . . the reason the Malthusian doom is so overdue is that Malthusian calcula-
tions have never given sufficient weight to the extraordinary ingenuity of
mankind in extricating himself from situations before they become wholly and
finally intolerable . . . the materials problem may never be solved, but it can be
compensated. We will accomplish this, however, only if we recognize that as
physical resources decline, the resources of ingenuity must rise up to serve
mankind in their stead.64
Thus the PMPC presented a narrative of a situation heading steadily
toward disaster. Only planning and ingenuity could rescue the nation.
But even that rescue could not be permanent; it required continuously
finding new ways of supplying materials and energy.
The solar chapter in the PMPC report exhibits the same narrative
structure as the broader report, only this time with a happier ending.
Globally increasing population and per-capita energy demands make
inevitable dramatic real increases in the costs of energy unless alterna-
tive sources are ready to take up some of the load in twenty-five or thirty
years. Because the report projected that nuclear energy would only bear
a fraction of the load, solar would have to take the place of conventional
fuels. Since the United States had spent almost nothing to develop eco-
nomical solar energy, it appeared to be time for a massive commitment
to it to avoid this collision of increasing demand with dwindling sup-
plies.65 The ending to this narrative was happier because the potential
supply of solar energy is very large and will continue at the same rate
indefinitely. This type of narrative seeks to persuade by arguing that the
normal course of events is leading to a very bad outcome and that only
the change recommended by the author can prevent tragedy. Actors who
seek to promote substantial policy change tell such a narrative because
they need to provide a compelling reason for change since, on the surface,
all seems right with the world. Similar stories characterize the policy
statements of the later administrations, though they are not worked out
as elaborately. Those who favored solar energy saw it as the solution, or
part of the solution, to an ever-increasing demand for energy, one that
threatened loss of control over social processes.
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Although solar advocates used these stories about solar energy, they
could not persuade top officials that solar energy was in fact a good fit
with the energy problem in its dominant problem frame. With a few
exceptions, officials were quite resistant to changing their definitions and
frames of the energy problem. Again, the most developed example comes
from the PMPC. Early on in its work, the PMPC perceived energy as key
to the nation’s ability to meet the challenges of adequate materials, and
advances in technology as key to an adequate energy supply. Since con-
version from raw resources to usable materials took energy, and since
future resources would come from lower grade deposits, the demands on
energy needed to supply resources were sure to increase, and rapidly. The
PMPC expressed little concern with energy as a consumer product. In
fact, when they described energy as part of the set of materials under
concern, the word “material” was put in quotes. As with all materials,
the objective was to expand supply without a substantial rise in costs.66
Even more fundamentally, the PMPC accorded solar little attention
because it regarded solar, like atomic energy, as promising long-term
replacements for fossil fuels but of no supply significance for the next
twenty-five years, a conclusion that was fully consistent with contem-
porary technical writing.67
Both the entire report and the solar chapter of the PMPC used a mech-
anistic metaphor, depicting the trends in resource use as rolling along
autonomously. While such trends resulted from human actions, they
seemed independent of human control or choices, the unintended
macrooutcomes of millions of microdecisions. Since the causes of these
trends appear deeply structural, rooted in normal and unalterable human
activity, there was no point in trying to change them; one simply sought
to keep ahead of them. Concerned people explored numerous strategies
for keeping ahead, such as substituting more abundant resources for
scarce ones and using scarce ones more efficiently, but they never con-
sidered altering the underlying structural causes.
Solar’s Lack of Institutional Structure
The institutional structure associated with energy policy did little to
promote solar energy. As the May 1963 report in the Kennedy adminis-
tration pointed out, solar did not have a centralized institutional cham-
pion in the government, unlike nuclear power. Instead, agencies pursued
it only for their own narrow mission purposes, such as NASA working
on photovoltaic cells for its satellites. There was no institution in gov-
ernment charged with thinking about a comprehensive program for
developing solar technologies and, just as important, no institution to
fight for that program. Sometimes highly placed individuals developed
an interest in solar energy for various idiosyncratic and contingent
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reasons, such as Interior Secretary Krug in the Truman administration,
or Lewis and Pyle in Eisenhower’s. Nonetheless, those interests were not
put into place as institutional structures that would stay in government
and continue to support solar programs after those particular officials
who advocated solar energy left office.
Research and procurement programs for solar technologies reflected
this lack of institutionalized support. Government interest in solar tech-
nologies during most of the 1950s and 1960s showed up mainly in the
military services and the space program, both of which had small
research programs that were mostly concerned with photovoltaics (PVs),
devices that convert light directly into electricity. Because of their light
weight and lack of moving parts, NASA used PVs to power satellites,
and they powered the Vanguard, one of the first American successes in
space. The government bought PVs in substantial quantities in the late
1950s and 1960s.68 Science advisors in the Kennedy administration 
saw solar as promising, and went further to argue that government-
funded R&D favored nuclear too heavily and should be reoriented
toward other energy sources, solar among them.69 This notion of trade-
offs between two sources never made it into the public discussions,
largely because powerful forces in Congress, such as the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, were quite hostile to cutting nuclear funding for
the benefit of other energy sources. And indeed, the budgets of those
years continued the trends of large funding for nuclear and little 
for others, particularly solar.70
Even so, during the Kennedy years solar R&D funding increased
steadily, though remaining substantially less than nuclear or conven-
tional fuels. Total energy R&D reached about $717 million in FY 
1962, $909 million in FY 1963, and an internal study expected it to
reach about $1 billion in FY 1964, with most of the money coming 
from the Department of Defense, the AEC, and NASA, with the rest 
from the Departments of the Interior and Commerce and the NSF.71 The 
solar energy component (classified as “direct solar energy”) of this 
R&D program grew from about $1.7 million in FY 1962 to about $5.4
million in FY 1964. The indirect solar energy R&D, mainly hydro, 
wind, and biomass technologies, grew to about $2.4 million by FY
1964.72 Biomass includes plant matter that can be converted into 
fuels such as alcohol.
These data demonstrate several things. The budget for solar energy
R&D was much larger than is often thought, and it increased rapidly in
this period, from $2.1 million to $6.6 million over a three-year period.
Most of that budget fell into the Defense Department and NASA, and
so it probably developed power systems for satellites.73 The small NSF
budget for solar was growing rapidly in the biomass area. In contrast,
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the AEC spent no money at all in the solar areas, while its funding of
nuclear R&D topped $400 million by FY 1964.74
These data demonstrate most tellingly that each agency focused on a
small number of solar energy applications relevant to its particular
mission. No government institution existed to try to develop a balanced
plan of R&D for solar, conceived of broadly, or to act as a champion
for solar in competition with all of the other claimants for federal
research funds. The FCST report tried to provide the beginnings of that
centralized analysis, but it had little effect on policy, despite its presi-
dential mandate. Thus the institutional structure for energy policy left
solar energy with only a small fraction of the total energy R&D funding,
and only then when it suited the particular needs of certain agencies.
While most people recognized that solar had great potential, it still
seemed an energy source of the future, ironically a more distant future
for the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations than for
Truman’s. Solar never got serious consideration as a source that might
be a major part of the future U.S. energy system and so it lacked the
support that such a role might have entailed. In a technology policy for
the future, with all its attendant uncertainties about interests and tech-
nology, a technology needs institutions that embody favorable ideas to
get serious attention from decision makers. Solar had none of that, and
so it never got that attention.
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3
Advocates Construct Solar Technology
From the end of World War II through the 1960s solar enthusiasts sought
to shape public understanding of solar technology and to influence gov-
ernment policy toward it. During this period solar advocacy began to
mature, with the establishment of research programs, professional and
advocacy associations, technical journals, popular writings, and confer-
ences. Within this growing group of advocates, consisting mostly of 
scientists and engineers, a core of experts emerged on whom the gov-
ernment could and did call for advice about solar issues. However,
debates within this core about the potential for solar energy made it dif-
ficult for advocates to depict it as a technology that government policy
makers should take seriously, especially given the framing of the broader
energy debate.
SOLAR TECHNOLOGY: STATE OF THE
ART AFTER THE WAR
Even before World War II some solar technologies enjoyed experimen-
tal or even commercial use.1 For example, by October 1939, Palmer
Putnam, a consulting engineer and a central figure in solar energy circles,
persuaded a Vermont electric utility and a turbine manufacturer to test
his design for a large wind turbine that would feed electricity directly
into the utility’s grid. By October 19, 1941, they had finished a large,
1.25-megawatt wind turbine with 175-foot-diameter blades, sited on the
top of Grandpa’s Knob, a treeless mountain near Rutland, Vermont, and
began generating electricity. The machine ran well for two years, until a
bearing wore out that took two years to replace due to war-time short-
ages of such parts. It began operation again in 1945 and ran for several
months before a blade broke off, after which the machine was perma-
nently retired.2 Modest-sized firms in the private sector funded the entire
project. Putnam involved many eminent people from the mainstream of
the engineering world in this renewable energy project, including Van-
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nevar Bush, the former dean of engineering at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology (MIT) and the head of the federal government’s entire
R&D effort during the war, along with several other professors from
MIT and Harvard, including the chair of MIT’s civil engineering depart-
ment. Surprisingly, the costs of the wind power were not drastically
higher than power from conventional sources. In 1945, Putnam and his
colleagues estimated that they could put up more wind turbines for the
utility of the same design at a cost of about $190 per kilowatt of installed
capacity. The utility needed a cost of about $125 per kilowatt for the
wind machines to be competitive. Putnam estimated that it would cost
several hundred thousand dollars to build and test new designs that
might bring the costs down sufficiently, but the manufacturer felt that it
could not risk more money on such an uncertain enterprise, and the 
project was abandoned.3
Prior to the war, commercial firms also sold solar hot-water heaters,
which became commonplace in Florida, California, and other parts of
the South.4 From 1936 through 1941, the solar hot-water market
boomed in Miami, with the total number of installations in southern
Florida estimated at 25,000 to 60,000. By 1941 solar hot water instal-
lations in new Florida homes outnumbered electric by two to one.5 Solar
systems also supplied hot water to subsidized low-income housing pro-
jects in California, Florida, and Georgia. The largest such installation,
apparently put in during the war, operated at a complex in Georgia,
where flat plate collectors connected to 153 storage tanks served 480
dwellings. This system provided 72 gallons of hot water per dwelling per
day, which government officials considered adequate by public housing
standards of the era.6 Due to materials shortages, manufacturing of the
systems ceased during the war, and the industry never entirely recovered
thereafter due to declining prices for fossil fuels, maintenance problems
with systems already installed, and increasing per capita use of hot
water.7
Before and after the war, solar home heating also gained a modest
popularity. In 1945, McCall’s Magazine published a collection of articles
about passive solar homes that had appeared earlier in the magazine.
The houses, all modest in size and mid-priced or lower, were not called
“solar homes,” but many had large south-facing windows, and their
descriptions expressed an intent to use the sun’s heat to provide for some
heating needs.8 In the building boom after the war, some developers mar-
keted houses explicitly as solar heated. But the popularity of such homes
declined in the late 1940s, due both to declining fuel prices and to the
poor performance of some of the homes.9
Researchers investigated a number of other solar technologies 
just before and after the war, such as flat plate and concentrating 
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collectors for the generation of heat and photovoltaic cells that converted
sunlight directly into electricity. But all of these technologies were in the
research stage, and none were yet commercial. In the case of photo-
voltaics, one researcher called for substantial basic research that was
“completely divorced from any present considerations of a practical
nature.”10
With a few exceptions, scientists and engineers made only modest
progress in developing solar technologies between the end of World 
War II and the late 1960s. In a comprehensive review of solar technolo-
gies published in 1964, Farrington Daniels presented a list similar 
to those published fifteen or twenty years earlier, including solar 
domestic heating and hot water, solar cooling, solar furnaces, solar 
heat engines, and photovoltaic (PV) cells, along with a few more obscure
technologies. Photovoltaics had enjoyed the most dramatic improve-
ments since the war, with their efficiencies growing from about one 
per cent in 1953 to about fourteen per cent in 1964.11 Nonetheless, 
high prices still characterized all solar technologies. A 1963 book
reported PVs producing electricity at about $100 per kilowatt-hour. An
Italian firm made solar pumps for about $1,000 per horsepower 
and solar stills desalinated seawater at a cost of about $700 per acre-
foot, compared to $2 to $40 per acre-foot for conventional water 
supplies. Despite these prices, Merritt Kastens argued that some 




Scientists and engineers working on solar technologies dominated 
public discourse about them in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. In techni-
cal and popular arenas, they presented not just research results but 
a whole conception of and framing for solar energy and where it fit 
in society. They agreed on many points, and all used the same data. 
They all acknowledged that immense quantities of solar energy reached
the earth, that existing technologies used that energy with very low 
efficiency, that the energy was intermittent, and that energy from 
such sources was expensive compared to fossil fuels. Despite these
common points of departure, they did not all draw the same conclusions
about solar energy. They did not all share the same understanding of 
the meaning of the technology.13 They disagreed among themselves 
about the potential for solar technology as a substitute for fossil fuels.
That disagreement stemmed primarily from two things: the nature of the
energy problem that solar was supposed to solve and the extent to 
which they thought that deliberate, targeted research and development 
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programs could accelerate or change the path along which a technology
develops. One can, roughly, place the experts in two clusters based on
these disagreements.14
The Guarded Cluster
Hoyt Hottel, a professor of chemical engineering at MIT and head of
one of the best-known solar research programs, exemplified the cautious,
guarded cluster of solar experts. In an address to the Smithsonian Insti-
tution in 1941, Hottel referred to solar enthusiasts as “cranks” who
brought more “rosy optimism” than knowledge to their work and
argued for the “informed pessimism” of a good engineer. He pointed out
that the conversion efficiencies of solar energy technologies were very
low, rendering irrelevant the large quantities of solar energy that strike
the earth. He was also dubious that these efficiencies could be increased
dramatically, leaving little room for policy impacts on solar’s future.15 By
espousing lower expectations for solar technologies, Hottel both pro-
vided reassurances that he was a careful, sober technologist, that is, one
who was credible, and suggested that the exploitation of solar had to
wait for the results of extensive research.16 Other solar researchers, such
as F. W. Hutchinson of Purdue University, shared Hottel’s skeptical view
of solar energy.17
Even more enthusiastic solar researchers and advocates such as Far-
rington Daniels could also be very guarded about the short-term
prospects for solar energy. He warned at an opening plenary address at
a 1955 symposium, the “Sun For Man’s Use,” that solar technologies
could not yet enter the mainstream and that excessively optimistic
proclamations coming out of the conference would only hurt solar later
when they failed to materialize.18
Throughout the 1950s, many solar researchers kept this guarded 
view of solar’s commercial value. But they still promoted it on the
grounds that fossil fuels were limited and that solar and nuclear 
were the only long-term substitutes. It was still unclear what role 
solar would play due to “the low intensity at which the energy is
received, its intermittent nature and the consequent difficulty of energy
storage, and the low efficiency of present energy converters.”19
This guarded, cautionary approach informed government under-
standing and policy, discouraging high levels of intervention on behalf
of R&D. In Gusfield’s terms, the guarded technical community owned
this issue, that is, its definition and understanding of the issue made 
up the official definition.20 Of course, numerous factors in addition to
expert opinion influenced government officials’ views of solar energy.
Nonetheless, cautious elites in the technical community contributed 
to those official views.
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Ambitious, Imaginative Advocates
Another cluster of solar advocates expressed more ambitious and 
hopeful scenarios for solar’s future. Perhaps the most important of these
was Farrington Daniels, who, though cautious about the short-term,
believed that focused R&D could greatly improve the prospects for 
solar technology. Daniels was a major figure in American science, elected
to the National Academy of Sciences in 1947 and president of the 
American Chemical Society in the 1950s. A physical chemist, Daniels
had worked on the Manhattan Project during the war at the Chicago
Metallurgical (later Argonne National) Laboratory and after the 
war produced the first design for a civilian power reactor, the Daniels
Pile. The Atomic Energy Commission refused to support the project,
largely because it did not want any diversions from its military program.
He left Argonne in 1947 and returned to the University of Wisconsin 
at Madison, where he took up the study of the application of solar
energy.21
In a 1948 talk Daniels framed the energy problem and solar energy
within it:
When we have used up our coal and oil, exploited our available land with 
intensive farming, and trebled our population, can we then call on the sun to
give us still more means to satisfy our ever increasing demands for food, 
fuel, and power? The answer is yes. But there is a long challenging road of
research and development which must be followed first – and we must not 
get the idea that we are about to step into a new era of physical and economic
abundance.22
This article contrasts strikingly with the cautious advocates. Daniels had
very few technical disagreements with them, acknowledging the eco-
nomic shortcomings of many solar technologies. Yet he was very posi-
tive that the possibilities of solar could be realized with sufficient
investment in research, reflecting his belief that a strong R&D policy
could affect this technology’s development. This core belief framed the
technology very differently. His fluid notion of technology meant that
applications of resources and talent could dramatically alter technolog-
ical outcomes, which implies that technologies are changeable through
policy decisions. This view is hardly surprising for a physical chemist
who came of age during the flowering of quantum mechanics and
worked on the Manhattan Project. The skeptics did not share that view
of technology’s plasticity.
Daniels’s is a classic narrative of decline, one of the fundamental types
of stories told in policy narratives. Such stories seek to persuade us to a
course of action, not simply by a recitation of facts and analyses, but by
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depicting the situation so as to make any other course of action look
irresponsible because it would leave us to a terrible fate.23 Thus Daniels
reconstructed the energy problem as one in which large-scale forces
resulting from human behavior steadily moved us toward trouble, only
to be arrested by increased intensity in scientific and technological
research on solar energy. His positive outlook for solar energy grew out
of this larger energy context, which gave more urgency to developing
new energy sources and technologies.
Other solar experts, such as Maria Telkes, Eugene Ayers, Palmer
Putnam, and M. E. Spaght, joined in this more ambitious advocacy for
solar energy, and all of them identified the lack of R&D funding as the
factor that prevented solar energy from making the progress that it
could.24 In 1952, Ayres used, and apparently introduced, a financial
metaphor for energy, categorizing energy sources into two groups –
capital and income. “More and more we will be required to live on our
energy income and be less dependent on our energy principal within the
next few decades.”25 This metaphor suggested a strong argument for
investing in solar energy as a source of energy income and appears to
have been persuasive to the officials in the Eisenhower administration
who promoted solar within the administration, since they referred to a
speech by Spaght that used it.
Such metaphors can serve to reconceptualize an issue in our mind.
They powerfully invite us to see a phenomenon as one thing rather 
than another and shape the way we understand that phenomenon.26 If
we see energy sources as all of a piece, as interchangeable fuels and tech-
nology that heat our homes, light our lamps, and so on, then we 
conceptualize them as standard private economic goods, no different
than toasters or baseballs. Our only concern with them is price and,
perhaps, reliability and service. However, categorizing energy sources as
either capital or income sources compels us to think about them differ-
ently. The capital versus income distinction implies that energy is not
merely a private economic good, but rather that energy sources are of
two qualitatively different types. Since spending one’s capital is consid-
ered a profligate, unsustainable thing to do, this distinction carries the
suggestion that we should use as much income energy and as little capital
energy as possible.
Finally, environmental values gradually began to come into the 
ambitious advocates’ frames for solar energy. Farrington Daniels 
invoked the idea of stewardship, the need to leave future generations 
sufficient resources, as the reason to expand the use of solar energy 
as quickly as possible. Eugene Ayres likewise talked about how the 
status quo would leave the world grossly depleted in important
resources. Bringing the problem back to the present, Maria Telkes 
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listed the lack of pollution as one of the virtues of solar energy. The idea
of stewardship seemed most important to these advocates, with pollu-
tion a secondary concern.27
Interestingly, throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, environmen-
tal advocates, with rare exceptions, paid no attention to solar energy. In
histories of the environmental movement and in the writings of its advo-
cates, solar energy does not even show up, much less occupy an impor-
tant place.28 The solar energy and environmental movements apparently
had no overlap. Leaders in the solar energy field did not figure in the
environmental movement prior to the energy crisis. With one notable
exception, environmental advocates did not discuss solar energy as part
of their program of reform.
Murray Bookchin provided that exception. In his book Crisis in 
the Cities, published in 1965 under the pen name Lewis Herber, he 
cataloged the many environmental health problems that grew out of 
ever-growing cities and urban sprawl. In the book’s last chapter, “In the
Long Run,” he addressed energy and the city. The “urban blight” 
and suburban sprawl and their attendant diseases, which fossil fuels 
for cars made possible, and the finite supplies of fossil fuels themselves,
made their use, to Bookchin, simply unsustainable in the long-run. 
He ruled out nuclear power as a large-scale replacement for fossil 
fuels because of environmental difficulties of nuclear waste disposal. 
He concluded that only an energy system based on a wide variety of
renewable sources would ultimately work, and so he championed 
solar heating, photovoltaics, wind, tidal power, and other renewable
energy sources.29
EARLY ORGANIZED SOLAR ADVOCACY
Solar advocates began serious organized activism during President Eisen-
hower’s administration. Through the 1950s and 1960s they held con-
ferences and meetings and built new institutions. Although their
institutions declined in the 1960s, they remained active and reemerged
vigorously in the 1970s. Rather than attempt a comprehensive chronicle
of their activities, what follows demonstrates the ways in which solar
advocates tried to build institutions and to influence public opinion
during the 1950s and 1960s, and the values that they sought to associ-
ate with solar technologies.
Conferences and symposia on solar and other energy resources flour-
ished in the early 1950s as experts debated where current developments
in solar science and technology pointed. For example, a 1953 sympo-
sium at the University of Wisconsin tried to define the state of the art in
using solar energy. The symposium’s organizers attempted “to bring
together all the scientists who had worked on the utilization of solar
60 Before the Energy Crisis
energy.”30 Farrington Daniels claimed that they only missed a few such
experts, so the forty-one invitees suggests the field’s size at that time. The
symposium included many of the more publicly active figures in the field,
including Daniels, Hoyt Hottel, George Löf, Palmer Putnam, and Maria
Telkes.31 Despite their disagreements about solar, most of them spoke to
its overall potential and emphasized its difficulties and problems. Solar
had great potential and deserved much more research support, all agreed,
but its moment had not yet arrived. In an interesting construction of
solar’s future uses, Daniels made an analogy between the diffuse versus
concentrated physical nature of energy sources and the population den-
sities that they could best serve:
In the long-range development of new energy resources to supplement our fossil
fuels, it is likely that atomic energy, with its concentrated energy, its complicated
safety devices, and its requirement of a minimum “critical size,” will be used in
large expensive central stations near urban centers. Solar energy, on the other
hand, with its universal availability and simplicity and its need to cover large
areas, will find its place first in isolated and rural areas.32
Conferees perceived solar and nuclear energy as policy complements, not
antagonists. The published proceedings assessed space and hot-water
heating as closest to commercialization, and photochemistry and photo-
voltaics as holding promise for the longer term.33
A much larger and wider ranging Mid-Century Conference held the
same year aimed at a comprehensive look at all of the nation’s resources,
including energy. A group of prominent individuals had founded
Resources for the Future (RFF) before the 1952 election, and with a Ford
Foundation grant they planned the conference. This high-visibility event
had attending or on its advisory boards university presidents, corporate
CEOs, journalists, and labor officials, as well as scientists and engineers
who worked on various resource issues.34
The RFF leaders conceived this conference in the mold of the 
1908 Roosevelt–Pinchot conference that had earlier promoted the ideas
of conservation and resource development. Concerns that growing 
populations, economies, and military needs put ever-greater pressure on
natural resources motivated the RFF organizers, who felt the need 
for wise policies to prevent problems decades down the road.35 This 
was an explicit attempt to influence policy for the future. The section 
of the conference that addressed energy reflected these themes. Speakers
saw the reserves of coal, oil, and natural gas as substantial but 
feared that the growing demands for them could create trouble later. 
Panelists discussed nuclear and solar as unconventional energy sources.
Farrington Daniels co-chaired the energy section with George 
Gadsby, president of Utah Power and Light. The first three speakers
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during the solar discussion were Hoyt Hottel, Maria Telkes, and 
George Löf, followed by people from research institutes, oil companies,
utilities, municipal governments, and the National Science Foundation.36
The discussion had the usual profusion of reports of developments 
in various solar technologies, from photovoltaics to heat storage, and 
the standard assessments of them all as promising though not cur-
rently economical. Several speakers also pointed out that, compared to
nuclear, solar energy had received virtually no research dollars from 
the government, although they disagreed about how much money it
should receive.
On March 17, 1954, a group of financiers, scientists, business-
men, and educators founded the Association for Applied Solar 
Energy (AFASE) in Phoenix, Arizona. The group embraced a free-
market ideology, believing that a promising future for solar energy
required stimulating industry involvement. Henry Sargent, a utility 
executive and the first president of the AFASE, emphasized the impor-
tance of business:
[The AFASE] would serve as a means of presenting to industry and business accu-
rate information on the present state of the art [of solar technology]. Its purpose
in doing so would be to enlist the support of private capital in the development
and application of those phases of solar energy utilization which give promise
of economic feasibility.
As one of their first actions, they began to organize a large World Sym-
posium on Solar Energy for the following year.37 Lewis W. Douglas, who
had also chaired the RFF conference two years before, chaired the sym-
posium. The Advisory Committee also contained some familiar names:
C. G. Abbot, Vannevar Bush, Godfrey L. Cabot, Hoyt Hottel, George
Löf, and Maria Telkes. Farrington Daniels gave a keynote address at the
opening plenary session. Most of this group became active in the AFASE
as a small but well-established circle of leading solar technical experts.38
In his opening remarks, Lewis Douglas, a banker and insurance exec-
utive as well as a former member of Congress, claimed that science and
technology in general, and solar in particular, offered an answer to
Malthus, and together they would enable humanity to defy the claim that
scarcity was inevitable. “The economic, social, and the political impli-
cations of this proposition,” Douglas said, “penetrate deeply into the
organic structure of human society itself.”39 Sargent, AFASE President,
stressed the necessity of involving the private sector because “the ulti-
mate success or failure of an endeavor of this kind lies largely with the
business man.”40
After the 1955 symposium, the solar community remained active but
experienced steadily declining fortunes. The substantial popular media
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coverage of the 1955 symposium quickly tapered off, with neither dra-
matic technologies nor policy changes to keep up interest.41 The AFASE
launched two separate journals, The Sun at Work, a popular magazine
for AFASE members, and Solar Energy, a technical journal. But neither
these nor other conferences and popular publications sufficed to main-
tain sufficient public interest.42
In the 1960s several organizations sponsored numerous meetings and
conferences that made solar energy look like a very active and rapidly
developing field during this decade.43 Nonetheless, the principal advo-
cacy organization, the AFASE, experienced considerable difficulty. By the
end of 1962, membership had dropped thirty per cent. In 1963, AFASE
leaders reorganized it into the Solar Energy Society (SES), more of a pro-
fessional scientific society. Farrington Daniels, active since the founding
of the AFASE, became the SES’s first president and its first elected officer,
which Harvey Strum describes as a shift in control away from many of
the people who had founded its predecessor. However, the financial prob-
lems persisted, and in 1967 the SES suspended publication of The Sun
at Work.44 The Arizona businessmen who had contributed in the early
days of the AFASE reduced their support because American industry had
not gotten very involved in solar energy. In turn, industrial membership
declined because industry leaders saw no apparent payoff in the short-
or even medium-term. In addition, declining electricity prices during this
period further undercut the solar heating industry.45 The cost of solar
technologies had to come down for them to appeal to business people.
This brief review of solar advocacy demonstrates three things. First,
in the period before the energy crisis, experts in solar energy did consti-
tute a policy community in John Kingdon’s sense.46 A group of experts
drawn from industry, academia, and the lower levels of government
debated among themselves policy proposals for better government
support of solar energy. This small group all knew each other, were aware
of each other’s work, and shared a common foundation of consensually
agreed on technical knowledge.
Second, members of this community disagreed substantially with each
other over both the future potential for solar energy and the extent to
which government policy could affect that future. The more negative
views of this community dominated the thinking of the most senior gov-
ernment officials.
Third, the disagreements within the community demonstrate clearly
the complex nature of technical policy knowledge. The members argued
over what sounded like technical subjects: the future possibilities for
solar energy technologies and the extent to which they could replace
fossil fuels. However, the analysis of their positions shows that these
technical-sounding disagreements were grounded in political and social
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disagreements over the ability of government to shape future technolo-
gies and the nature of the energy problem that solar energy needed to
solve. All advocates engaged in boundary work to make their differing
positions appear to be grounded in technical considerations, once again
making political and social disputes implicit, hidden behind the techni-
cal arguments.47
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4
Solar Energy’s Incompatibility with 
Official Problem Frames
In light of the conferences, technical and popular publications, the 
creation of new institutions outside of government, and the intermittent
interest of senior government officials, why was there so little official
action on solar energy before the 1970s? The customary explanations of
short-term policies or markets do not hold up to closer scrutiny. Clearly,
due to the relatively high cost of solar energy from the 1940s through
the 1960s and the declining prices of fossil fuels during the same period,
the research, development, and diffusion of solar technologies would
have required the support of some institution willing and able to take a
very long-term view of the future needs for energy resources. While one
often hears the glib complaint that governments never take long-term
perspectives on policy issues, in fact such institutions and leadership were
very much in existence in the decades after World War II. These long-
term investments showed up in Republican and Democratic administra-
tions alike, such as Eisenhower’s initiative on the Interstate Highway
System, Kennedy’s support of a greatly expanded space program, and
Johnson’s Great Society programs.1 Although always constrained by
budgets, all of these administrations invested in future-oriented projects,
ones that required a certain amount of vision and commitment to the
nation’s development. Solar technologies could have been, but were not,
included among them.
Another standard reason given to explain the failure of solar energy
to develop in these years focuses on the lack of any pressing short-term
need for it. Although conditions changed at the end of the Johnson
administration, abundance and decreasing prices in most parts of the
energy market characterized the postwar period to 1968. This situation,
framed by conventional thinking of the day, left solar without a problem
to solve and made solar technologies too expensive in comparison to
conventional technologies. The economics of solar certainly made it very
difficult to develop a consumer market composed mainly of individuals
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putting solar devices on their homes, or of industrial markets in trans-
portation or manufacturing.2
But this explanation fails to account for two historical realities. First,
at least since the 1880s, U.S. energy markets have been in part political
markets. Besides the traditional set of atomized small buyers and sellers
who constitute the microeconomists’ conception of a market, the 
production and supply systems that deliver energy to consumers 
have included governments at the national and state levels, large utility
monopolies, large supply companies, and a variety of financial institu-
tions. All of these institutions and their interests influence the prices that
consumers see and the energy choices from which they may pick. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, energy technologies could also be devel-
oped quite independent of consumer demand. Public policy makers in
fact made immense investments in energy technologies in the United
States and elsewhere and developed them extensively, all without any
real short-term economic incentives. In the most striking case, nuclear
technology’s advocates succeeded in politically constructing it as the 
technology of the future.3
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the 1940s energy specialists had gener-
ally equated nuclear and solar energy as long-term alternatives to fossil
fuels, regarding each as expensive but promising future energy technolo-
gies and calling for research and development in them. It was in the Eisen-
hower administration that nuclear energy jumped into the foreground of
energy policy, leaving solar behind. Advocates of nuclear energy managed
to lay claim to the proximate future and billions of R&D dollars, while
policy makers continued to relegate solar energy to the distant future, if
they considered it at all. The rise of nuclear power is a complex story that
involves scientists in and out of government promoting it, along with a
special congressional committee, some officials of the fledgling Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC), and a host of popular writers.4 Even though
some top officials remained skeptical of the need for a large government
nuclear energy program, it continued growing in size. The “Atoms for
Peace” speech did not turn around nuclear policy in one stroke, but it did
articulate publicly a policy frame in which nuclear power could play a sig-
nificant role. In this speech civilian nuclear power became not merely the
positive side to a troubling technology but rather part of an international
process of spreading prosperity in a way that would lessen the chances of
another world war.5 Eisenhower’s speech gave the idea of civilian uses of
nuclear energy an enormous boost, and coverage of peaceful nuclear tech-
nology expanded into the popular media dramatically with almost entirely
positive assessments.6
The rapid development and expansion of policies for nuclear tech-
nology, with its many technical and economic uncertainties, had nothing
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to do with solving short-term problems of energy supply. Indeed, solar
energy had the support of some of the same people who supported
nuclear energy development. For instance, Representative Craig Hosmer
(R-California), who had introduced the earliest bills to support solar
developments in the 1957–1960 period, strongly supported Project 
Plowshare in the 1960s, a proposal to use nuclear explosives to dig
canals, harbors, and the like.7 Yet solar research never received anything
approaching the resources given to nuclear. Why was nuclear so 
successful and solar not? The failure of solar energy to attract more 
substantial policy support must lie beyond any scientific or objective
assessment of its potential. Instead, the contrasting histories of nuclear
and solar energy in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrate the symbolic and
valuative components of policy making, as well as their interaction with
public and private institutions that led in the nuclear case to massive
investment in a technology. Despite a small constituency, interested
bureaucrats, and a few sympathetic representatives and senators, the
advocates of solar energy never made the pluralist penetration of policy
making. As the Truman through the Johnson administrations tried to
solve energy problems, three particular features of the energy problem
definition contributed to the inability of solar advocates to make much
headway in getting government support for solar energy. These were the
emphasis on economic growth and free-market mechanisms, energy’s low
priority for high-level policy makers, and the belief in the need for expo-
nentially increasing supplies of bulk energy. In addition, solar energy suf-
fered from the fragmentation of energy policy, which, coupled with the
reigning problem definition, made it difficult for solar energy advocates
to find an institutional champion within government.8
In this chapter I will draw together the materials developed earlier and
show how political pressures can affect policy only if they are congru-
ent with the problem definitions and values that structure the way insti-
tutions and decision makers conceptualize the issue.
SOLAR’S STRUGGLES WITH INSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEM FRAMES
Solar advocates tried a number of times to press their case to govern-
ment officials and often found a sympathetic ear somewhere in the White
House. But they could not change the dominant problem frame at the
top level. For example, solar advocates tried to influence President 
Eisenhower, but with little impact. The first symposium sponsored by
Association for Applied Solar Energy (AFASE) offered a way for solar
advocates in and out of government to try to get the attention of top-
level policy makers. People from the Stanford Research Institute (SRI),
one of the co-sponsors of the conference, met with various government
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officials who might have an interest in solar energy.9 As detailed in the
previous chapter, Orme Lewis, an assistant secretary of the interior, and
Howard Pyle, deputy assistant to the president, both worked with 
the symposium organizers and circulated the pro-solar speech by M. E.
Spaght, pushing for the president’s involvement in the symposium.10
Despite Lewis’s and Pyle’s enthusiasm, and Spaght’s business credentials,
the president’s top aides remained skeptical. Although Lewis and Pyle
did get Eisenhower’s welcoming message for the symposium,11 this level
of visibility did not translate into greater administration support for solar
energy. In addition, symposium sponsors did little to lobby the adminis-
tration, consistent with the free-market ideology that they espoused at
the conference.12
The Resources for the Future (RFF) conference was also quite visible
to policy makers in the White House, and, in fact, its organizers initially
had a close relationship with President Eisenhower and his aides. How-
ever, after receiving considerable criticisms from conservative members
of the business community, the administration kept cordial but distant
relations with the RFF and the conference.13 More importantly, the
problem frames articulated at the conference – the urgent need to 
avoid future resource shortages and the wide scope for government
action toward that goal – never penetrated administration thinking.14
A conference in which solar received a sympathetic hearing did not 
influence official problem frames.
Solar advocates’ repeated efforts to get the attention of policy makers
failed, despite the visibility and entrée that some of these advocates had.
The reasons for this failure grow out of the structure of decision making
for energy policy and the empirical and normative ideas that were insti-
tutionalized as officially accepted problem frames in these institutions.
Since solar had little in the way of short-term consequences, it could 
not address the shortage or price stability concerns just after the war or
compete with cheap fossil fuels in later years. As a longer term resource
of potential importance, it seemed to have a claim on funds for R&D,
much like nuclear energy, and its advocates spoke in such terms.
However, the fragmented decision-making structure suggests why getting
such funds was an uphill battle, since no agency became a bureaucrati-
cally entrenched champion for solar energy. This conclusion, of course,
raises the question of why there was not such a home, since it was 
possible to create one, as Julius Krug had in fact intended to do in the
Interior Department. Krug’s resignation, over a different issue, before 
he could create a home for solar energy speaks partly to the contingent
nature of policy outcomes. But that explanation leaves unanswered the
question of why no one else in Interior or elsewhere took up the cause
of solar energy. The answer lies in the way technical and normative ideas
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associated with any technology can become institutionalized. Of course,
interests also shape policy.15 That said, solar advocates never succeeded
in institutionalizing ideas, especially normative values, favoring the 
promotion of solar energy, and that lack of supporting institutionalized
values influenced both the interpretation of empirical ideas and the arena
in which the assorted interests sought their preferred policy.
As Lindblom and Woodhouse have argued, elites choose policies from
a restricted set of choices based on uncertain and incomplete informa-
tion and while under partisan pressures.16 Under such circumstances,
what are the “obvious” two or three policies from which they choose?
As argued by Schön and Rein, that set of choices is heavily influenced
by decision maker’s problem frames – the way they see the world and
various possible policies fitting into that world. Solar advocates pre-
sented their technology in a way that did not fit with official established
problem frames.
Solar advocates varied in their detailed assessments of various solar
technologies, but they presented a technological narrative that was
remarkably consistent in its overall structure and content. Surveying the
various advocates discussed in Chapter 3, we see a story with three basic
parts. First, all of the advocates started by showing that the potential
resource of solar energy is immense, that the quantity of energy reach-
ing the earth’s surface dwarfs humanity’s consumption. Second, they
depicted the fundamental problem of using solar energy as either the very
low efficiencies with which such energy was currently used or the prob-
lems of storing such intermittent energy, or both. Third, they all con-
cluded that the only way society could prevent severe energy shortages
and make effective use of solar energy was to fund R&D that would
enable scientists to struggle against these limits and raise the efficiencies
of converting and storing solar energy, lowering the costs so that solar
could provide large and increasing quantities of energy to satisfy human-
ity’s insatiable demands. In this narrative, the scientists and engineers
were working to solve their problem before declining stocks of fossil fuels
caused great suffering and social disruption.
Could this narrative persuade a government agency or presidential
aides? At one level, the narrative has to be empirically compelling, or at
least plausible. Did anyone have reason to believe that solar’s great
potential could, in fact, be tapped? On this score, solar was clearly at a
disadvantage compared to nuclear power after World War II. Nuclear
scientists and engineers, working in a crash R&D program during 
the war, had produced a series of breakthroughs in creating nuclear 
technologies and the technology itself was novel, exotic, and not that 
well understood. Nuclear weapons had revealed dramatically that
nuclear technologies could produce immense quantities of energy. Such
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a technology seemed ripe for more breakthroughs that could resolve its
cost and engineering uncertainties. In contrast, solar technologies were,
for the most part, quite familiar and so seemed less amenable to big
breakthroughs. How much more efficiency could one expect to squeeze
out of wind turbine blades or the copper pipe, painted metal, and glass
that made up solar collectors? Fifty years later, we know that the answer
is “quite a bit,” particularly for photovoltaics, wind power, and passive
solar design.17 However, decision makers forty years ago could only use
the knowledge available to them at the time, coupled with whatever con-
ceptual frameworks they used to think about the future. And that frame-
work, from the 1940s through the 1970s, put a heavy emphasis on
breakthroughs – the creation of novel technologies that they perceived
as qualitatively different from previous technologies.18 It is hardly sur-
prising that solar advocates like Daniels said that the greatest potential
for radical improvements lay in the most exotic solar technologies, such
as photovoltaics.
An agency also might adopt a technology if it comported well 
with that agency’s beliefs, values, and problem frames. At this level, 
the Department of the Interior was not an institution likely to champion
solar energy. This department was concerned with the exploitation 
and management of existing resources, including fossil fuels, not with
long-range alternatives to them.19 Fossil fuels themselves were not under
some “energy office” but instead delegated to separate bureaus and
offices, which were quite independent fiefdoms. Even the partial excep-
tion to this rule, synthetic fuels from coal and oil shale, fit the larger
pattern. Run by the Bureau of Mines, part of Interior, the synfuels
program was to some extent an attempt to find alternative uses for 
an already existing resource, in the case of coal, or to produce a tradi-
tional product from a novel resource, in the case of oil shale. In both
cases policy makers believed that the technologies were very close to
being economically competitive and so did not think that they needed
the extensive development that everyone thought that solar technologies
required.20
One agency was very compatible with the solar narrative in that it
believed in the need for long-term alternatives to fossil fuels and the
immediate necessity for large R&D investments to develop them. Unfor-
tunately for solar energy, that agency was the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC), and it was committed to a different technology. In short,
solar energy, as it was then conceptualized, did not fit with the institu-
tionalized problem frames of any government agency, and so had no
champion within government. Alternative ideas that might have favored
solar, particularly values like ecological stewardship, found no place in
official problem frames.
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NUCLEAR POWER’S FIT WITH INSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEM FRAMES
By contrast, institutionalized problem frames worked quite differently
for nuclear power. Most obviously, nuclear power had an institutional-
ized home in the AEC, which was charged with promoting it. Also
important was the way in which nuclear power advocates could articu-
late a problem that their technology seemed likely to solve, and do so in
a way that was congruent with the values that framed the larger issue of
energy.
People often point to the obvious linkages between military and civil-
ian nuclear technologies as a reason for the government to support 
civilian nuclear power. The nuclear weapons program developed a con-
siderable background knowledge on technologies relevant to civilian uses
and created its own line of power reactors for naval vessels.21 Nonethe-
less, as I demonstrated in earlier chapters, some parts of the military
nuclear establishment were ambivalent about sharing the technology,
materiel, and personnel with the civilian sector. In addition, this linkage
with nuclear weapons often impeded broader public acceptability of
civilian nuclear power.22 Thus, one must look to other political activi-
ties, particularly a broad debate over energy, to fully account for the
growth of the civilian nuclear power program.
President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech, driven by his 
desire to mobilize the country for the Cold War, gave considerable
impetus to nuclear power. Among other things, the speech got his 
ideas into a wider public literature. For example, in addition to the daily
press, a book published in 1955 by popular science writer David O.
Woodbury used the same title, Atoms for Peace, and asserted everything
that Operations Candor and Edify (the media campaign that followed
the speech) pronounced. Woodbury gave breathless accounts of new
developments in nuclear technology and stern lectures about the 
need for all Americans to accept the responsibilities that came with 
the Atomic Age. Most importantly, he tried to dispel people’s fears of
nuclear technology, recounting how he once woke up in the middle of
the night to see the sky lit as brightly as day. At first Woodbury and 
his wife stood together trembling, thinking that the end of the world 
had come. Suddenly he realized the source of the mystery and declared,
“ ‘It’s that atom bomb [test] over in Nevada!’ . . . We laughed and went
back to bed.”23
An institutional public relations campaign in the 1950s and 1960s
joined private writings like those of Woodbury. As Michael Smith details,
a consortium of the AEC, reactor vendors, and electric utilities launched
a massive effort to convince the American public that nuclear power was
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their friend and would transform their lives dramatically. Starting in the
1950s the consortium produced millions of copies of booklets promot-
ing nuclear power and in the 1960s produced films seen by over 100
million people in theaters and on television. They also created travel-
ing exhibits and demonstrations that went to schools all around the
country.24 These messages conveyed a sense of nuclear’s immense, almost
magical, power, but also that that power had been tamed and controlled.
They evoked a world that was effortless, clean, and prosperous thanks
to the wonders of nuclear-generated electricity.
“Atoms for Peace” and the following public relations campaign
afforded nuclear technologies wider public and policy attention and,
coupled with institutional support from the AEC and the Congressional
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, increased government resources for
civilian nuclear developments. The speech and its fallout also took place
in the context of a rapidly worsening Cold War. Even before the speech,
some senior government officials and advisors had worried about 
competition with the Soviets over building civilian power reactors. They
pushed for an aggressive reactor development program as a matter of
international prestige. They argued that nuclear power was a high-status,
cutting edge technology and that U.S. technological leadership required
that it have the most advanced nuclear power system. While not every-
one in the administration accepted that argument, it clearly motivated
many senior officials.25
The Eisenhower administration had cut the budgets of the AEC and
other agencies during its first year in office, and the AEC eagerly sought
to get resources back for its various programs. With this new legitimacy,
ironically from the same administration that first cut the AEC budget, it
succeeded. Not only did the federal government fund research on nuclear
electricity, but also on nuclear ships, airplanes, and rockets. As a measure
of funding enthusiasm, nuclear airplane and rocket research received
over a billion dollars in the 1950s alone, but neither ever tested a pro-
totype.26 In addition to increased funding for nuclear technology, later
in the 1950s legislative and executive changes made it easier for private
firms to get into the business of producing reactors. Of course, “Atoms
for Peace” did not create these changes out of whole cloth. An assort-
ment of powerful actors had been pushing for many of these policies for
quite some time before the speech, but policy changed quickly when such
interests received the assistance of legitimating discourse and high-level
support.27
These problem frames and accompanying policies became deeply insti-
tutionalized, allowing the AEC and its congressional supporters to pres-
sure President Kennedy in 1962 to increase substantially the support for
the AEC and its reactor building program. As I discussed in Chapter 2,
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in response to these pressures, President Kennedy ordered the AEC to
undertake a study of the general state of energy resources and where
nuclear power fit into the whole picture, in effect asking the AEC to
justify its requests based on broad national needs. The AEC delivered its
report in November 1962, and, not surprisingly, it saw a rapid expan-
sion of nuclear power as the only solution to meeting energy demands
that it expected to increase very rapidly. The AEC tied nuclear power to
the two major values that had driven energy policy since the Truman
administration: prosperity and national security. The report claimed 
that nuclear power would contribute to economic growth by producing
cheap electricity everywhere. Furthermore, nuclear power could enhance
national security by housing the reactors in very strong buildings, or
underground, making them relatively invulnerable to attack.28
Kennedy’s aides were less than happy with the AEC report, seeing it as
promotional instead of analytical. Yet because of the AEC’s strong
support in Congress, administration spokesmen could not openly criti-
cize the report. For instance, in February 1963, testifying before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, the president’s science advisor, Jerome
Wiesner, trod lightly on the report:
I feel it is a very useful report, representing much effort and thought on the part
of the Commission and the other groups whose studies it reflects. The report
proposes a pattern for nuclear power development, several aspects of which I
feel are generally appropriate.
Faint praise indeed. Wiesner also testified that the report failed to do
what the president had requested, namely, putting the nuclear program
into the context of resource policy more generally.29 Wiesner wrote a
much more candid internal memo to McGeorge Bundy about the fail-
ings of the AEC report:
In answer to your question concerning the Administration’s position on
atomic power, I believe we could be considerably less ambitious on this field.
Even the AEC study completed last fall . . . fails to make an urgent case for
nuclear energy development, though I am sure they would interpret the docu-
ment differently.
The report is in two parts, an analysis which indicates that there is no energy
crisis, and a part devoted to a description of an ambitious development program.
A number of groups in the Government . . . did not believe that the AEC study
provided adequate justification for an aggressive program and recommended that
the President not endorse it.
One of the most serious deficiencies in the AEC study is that it failed to
examine adequately non-nuclear energy resources research, and a new study has
been initiated to remedy this deficiency.30
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Despite these concerns, the strength of the AEC’s institutionalized
problem frame and congressional support prevailed, and Wiesner’s call
for redistributing expenditures went largely unheeded for another
decade.31
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, in their analysis of the
nuclear case, argue that critics of civilian nuclear energy were, by the late
1960s, able to shift the venue of decision making to different congres-
sional committees, which led to the decline in government support for
these technologies. This new venue embraced different problem frames.32
But the controversy over nuclear energy in the Kennedy administration,
only a few years prior to the events that Baumgartner and Jones analyze,
suggests how difficult it is to disrupt some policy monopolies. President
Kennedy’s science advisor had become deeply skeptical of both nuclear
energy policy and the line agency responsible for it, but the constituen-
cies for that agency in the scientific community, industry, and Congress
were still firmly in place. Jerome Wiesner’s criticisms of nuclear energy
policy were technical in nature and consistent with the dominant values
that framed energy policy. He claimed that current and projected energy
supplies and prices were adequate for anticipated demands, and so 
prosperity and national security did not require an aggressive nuclear
program. In making these criticisms Wiesner did not take account of the
symbolic importance that advocates attached to nuclear technology.
Moreover, different groups provided very different interpretations of
what was required for national security. As Michael Smith has pointed
out, one of the themes that the AEC and its allies used in promoting
nuclear power was a connection to national security: If the Soviets
develop it first, that will harm U.S. interests by giving the Soviets more
prestige with less-developed countries.33 Such a notion of national secu-
rity may be more vague than estimates of barrels of oil, but it had a 
powerful influence on problem frames nonetheless. Policy-making frag-
mentation thus facilitated the development of insulated policy systems
in this case. No one – including the Office of Science and Technology –
was institutionally located to challenge these narrow perspectives in a
way that led to a change in policy. That would only come later with the
rise of new social movements.
SOLAR ADVOCATES ADOPT ESTABLISHED 
PROBLEM FRAMES
Throughout this period, solar advocates argued for greater government
support of solar energy, largely in vain. Time and again, their claims
failed to persuade key policy elites, even when they got a hearing. The
most important presidential and congressional actors held to a framing
of the energy problem that made it impossible for solar advocates to
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present a compelling case that their technology fulfilled either the nor-
mative or pragmatic requirements of energy policy, partly due to the way
those requirements were deeply intertwined. Most solar advocates during
this period tried to reaffirm conventional problem frames and values,
usually by making no explicit mention of normative issues in their writ-
ings, or if they did, they simply repeated the requisite emphasis on pros-
perity, which required reasonably priced energy for endless economic
growth, and national security, which required both secure energy sup-
plies and cutting-edge technologies. Solar advocacy around the time of
the PMPC in the early 1950s and Farrington Daniels’s mid-1960s book
on solar energy both illustrate these practices.
The PMPC saw solar energy through the eyes of most of the leading
solar advocates of the day, including Daniels, Hottel, Putnam, and
Telkes.34 These scientists and engineers characterized solar energy and its
limitations in ways that did not suggest associating any new values with
solar energy. To the contrary, they proposed that solar technologies
could, over the long term and with sufficient research support, replace a
significant part of the conventional energy system, operating within con-
ventional social and political institutions and furthering conventional
political and social goals. They believed that future generations would
simply unplug fossil fuels and plug in solar energy. In that sense, their
technology seemed quite compatible with conventional ideas and
problem frames. The only hitch seemed to be the pragmatic question of
whether they could make a convincing case that solar technologies could
deliver ever-increasing blocks of bulk energy in the not-distant future,
and at prices that would not stifle economic growth.
Put in these terms, however, the pragmatic problem reveals its nor-
mative entanglements. The requirement, after all, that energy prices not
increase much while supply does is a normative one in that it assumes
that ever-increasing consumption of resources is a desirable future tra-
jectory. The narrative about solar in the PMPC, and among most tech-
nical advocates, tried to address this problem, though without universal
agreement. It told the story of an immense resource with very low effi-
ciency of use. The problem was how to increase such efficiency so that
prices would come down, a task about which researchers like Hoyt
Hottel expressed skepticism, and one that even Farrington Daniels
acknowledged would not be easy. Could technologies based on pipes,
mirrors, and photosynthesis compete or even compare with nuclear
power as the breakthrough technology of the future?
Daniels’s Use of Conventional Problem Frames
Probably the best-known work of solar advocacy in the 1960s was 
Farrington Daniels’s Direct Use of the Sun’s Energy. Comparing his book
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to the two major government energy policy reports of the time demon-
strates how congruent Daniels’s advocacy was with the official definition
of the energy problem and solar’s place in it. His fundamental problem
frame stemmed from the exponentially growing demand for energy. He
argued that increasing global populations and increasing incomes would
require ever-greater consumption of natural resources, including energy.
This growing demand would, in the not-distant future, lead to a short-
age of fossil fuels, since their supply was clearly finite, and this shortage
would mean that societies would need alternative fuels to maintain a
good standard of living.35
Daniels argued that solar energy could be that alternative source, but
the book is cautious, indeed, ambivalent, about when that might be 
or the extent to which solar energy could support a high-consumption
lifestyle. The book is organized by different technologies, and in every
case it stresses the caveat that solar cannot compete with cheap fossil
fuels. He also states at one point that solar energy is too diffuse to have
much impact on urban or cloudy areas. Despite these qualifications, his
book does advocate greater research on the use of solar energy. He points
out that it could have immediate cost advantages in sunny remote areas,
where fossil fuels were already expensive. While solar was too expensive
then in most applications, recent advances in research and the potential
for mass production suggested that the costs could come down. Short-
term research should be targeted at applications in less-developed coun-
tries and long-term research at applications in industrialized countries.
Solar had the further advantage that “There is no gamble in solar energy
use; it is sure to work.” The only question was whether the costs could
be brought down or if the costs of alternatives would go up sufficiently.
He noted that solar R&D had been almost totally neglected by both the
government and the private sector, especially when compared to the then-
booming programs in nuclear power and space exploration. This neglect
of R&D, a common theme in solar advocacy, carried with it the sug-
gestion, sometimes implied, that more generous R&D funding would
have substantial results for making solar more competitive.36
Daniels drew an analogy between population density and energy
density. Since solar was an energy source of low density and nuclear was
one of high density, he argued that they would serve populations of cor-
responding densities, rural and urban. This analogy provided a clever
way to try to carve out a market and political niche for solar energy. His
arguments could catch the interest of rural constituencies, providing 
a new possibility for institutionalized champions for solar. But in an
increasingly urban society there were limitations to this strategy as well.
Second, Daniels and others constructed solar technology as one that
could benefit primarily the poor in less-developed countries, which at
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that time were mostly rural. A technology projected to be compatible
with the practices and resources of the Third World was likewise very
different from one being touted as the replacement for fossil fuels in the
United States or Europe. Daniels’ construction of the energy problem 
and solar energy limited its appeal.
The Federal Council on Science and Technology (FCST) report on
energy R&D came out one year before Daniels’ book and had a similar
description of the general problem. How could the United States provide
increasing quantities of energy at low costs well into the future? The data
that compared R&D on various energy sources made clear that solar
received vastly less government funding than conventional or nuclear
power technologies. In FY1963, for example, solar got $3.8 million in
R&D funds versus $16.9 million for fossil fuels and $534.1 million for
nuclear power.37
The Interdepartmental Energy Study (IES) released during the Johnson
administration, just two years after Daniels’ book, contained a differ-
ent approach to analyzing energy R&D needs. Like Daniels’ book and
the FCST study, the IES concerned itself with R&D, which was its
mandate, and it also suggested that the key government activity for
solving future problems should be developing new energy-producing
technologies, not subsidizing some industry or otherwise intervening in
the market directly. The difference with the earlier studies was in the way
the IES framed the energy problem. While acknowledging the importance
of energy and national security, the IES stated up front that it would
focus on energy’s economic aspects. While all of the earlier studies had
also considered economic issues of energy, the IES took a much more
technically rigorous approach to the subject. The IES argued that the
proper goal for energy R&D policy was the optimal allocation of
resources, a basic premise of microeconomics, and it explicitly rejected
goals such as economic growth or other popular economic notions. Fol-
lowing from this goal, it advocated the use of a cost–benefit analysis as
the best way of analyzing policies. The IES group acknowledged the
extraordinary technical difficulties of actually carrying out such calcula-
tions and so argued that their approach would give at best “a heuristic
description of the overall problem.”38
The IES authors’ problem frame also contained other assumptions.
First, from historical data they concluded that high incomes required
high energy consumption and, therefore, policy should seek to sustain
such consumption. They argued that industry R&D paid too little 
attention to long-term energy needs, suggesting a need for government
involvement. In addition, they noted that technical and economic uncer-
tainties severely limited the ability of policy makers to target R&D in
any precise way. It was hard to know just which technologies would
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emerge from particular R&D programs and whether those technologies
would be competitive, given the uncertainties about the future social and
market conditions into which they would emerge. Their conception of
R&D was quite sophisticated for the time. They explicitly rejected the
linear model of R&D, noting that sometimes technological developments
preceded scientific understanding. They also acknowledged the social
and economic influences on R&D:
Not everything that is scientifically possible and technologically feasible will be
produced. The cathode-ray tube, for example, has been known since at least
1870. It was ignored then because society at the time needed large-scale indus-
trialization and concentrated therefore on motors, generators, and lights. Had
society been ready for precise measurements, been preoccupied with high-speed
warfare, or had leisure, the cathode-ray-tube technology of oscilloscopes, radar,
or television would have arisen many decades earlier. Comparable examples in
every field prove how often technology is the handmaiden of socioeconomic 
justification and desire.
These social influences and economic and technical uncertainties implied
that R&D policy could not be precisely targeted. “The most that can be
done is to analyze R&D in terms of the past and present, to determine
what factors are involved and how they interact, to search for the
obvious gaps and imbalances, and then to combine all these findings into
a comprehensive yet flexible plan for energy R&D.”39
This IES perspective on technology parallels nicely the constructivist
school of technology studies. It recognizes explicitly that there is no
abstract optimal way to design or develop a technology, but rather that
the social and economic goals of the actors involved heavily influence
the outcome. The brief example of the cathode ray tube suggests the
notion of interpretive flexibility: It can become an oscilloscope or a tele-
vision depending on what people want to do with it.40
What is missing from the IES notion of technological development is
the concept of social conflict: that different actors may attach different
meanings to a technology and seek to solve different problems with it.
Thus government policies aimed at developing new energy technologies
need not, in this perspective, resolve political or social conflicts over
which technologies to promote or how to shape their design. The IES
commitment to the optimal allocation of resources assumes that there is
an abstract optimum for such allocation that is removed from explicit
social conflicts. Their constructivist notions of technology do not extend
to constructivist technology policy. The irony, of course, is that if the
government had adopted the IES recommendations, it would have
changed substantially its allocation of R&D resources. It was precisely
the actors who had achieved political stabilization and closure on this
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technology policy – the AEC and its congressional allies – who beat back
calls for such changes, at least for a few more years.
The IES said very little about solar energy, relegating it to a few pages
in a chapter on “Other Energy Sources,” and said nothing about it in a
chapter on the “Environmental Aspects of Energy Development.” In a
large foldout table the report gave a brief summary of the state of tech-
nological development and the capital and operating costs associated
with all energy sources, including solar. It depicted most solar tech-
nologies as only long-term options due to their being technologically
immature or too expensive, or both. For example, the table listed pho-
tovoltaics, which it called technically well developed, as having capital
costs of $200–400 per watt, vastly higher than fossil fuel plants, 
and included the comment that these costs would probably not go 
down significantly.41 These economic perspectives on solar technologies,
coupled with the fundamental problem frame of the report, explain why
solar was not taken seriously in IES. If you believe that the technologi-
cal goal is ever-increasing amounts of bulk energy and that price is the
only reasonable signal to use for setting policies, then solar’s capital costs
make it look quite unattractive.
These estimates of solar costs contrast with the report’s estimates for
nuclear power. The same table gave no current estimates for the capital
costs of a nuclear power plant, from which one could conclude that there
was little basis for making estimates of future costs. Nonetheless, the
table did list a future capital cost of $0.165–0.175 per watt, several thou-
sand times less than the current costs for photovoltaics. The higher end
of this estimate is taken from the 1962 AEC report discussed earlier, the
one that the president’s science advisor had so criticized.42 Thus in two
cases of technologies with highly uncertain future costs, the report’s
authors gave a large benefit of the doubt to nuclear technology and vir-
tually none to solar; this did not bode well for future policy for solar
R&D.
Note the way technical and normative ideas subtly mix here to
produce a technical-sounding conclusion: that solar is unlikely to be a
significant energy source in the future compared to nuclear. The techni-
cal claims about future capital costs are, of necessity, highly speculative
and could include factors such as public and private levels of investments
in R&D, the benefits of scaling up production, and the cost of capital
for the necessary production. The nuclear estimates, as mentioned above,
came from an AEC study that other government officials had heavily
criticized. The solar estimates came from unnamed “solicited review
papers and panel discussions,” so we have no way of knowing how the
forecasts were made and if they were done in a manner consistent with
the nuclear projects.43 The report combined these technical speculations,
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which rested on a flimsy bed of evidence, with the fundamentally polit-
ical and social assumption that the point of energy technologies was to
produce exponentially increasing quantities of bulk energy at low costs.
The report then expressed this set of combined ideas as the allegedly
technical conclusion that solar was not going to be a large part of the
country’s future energy system.
These official studies show why it was hard for government 
policy makers to take arguments like Daniels’ seriously, despite his 
prestige and establishment credentials. His book and the official studies
had similar general problem frames, though the IES used a much 
more technical interpretation of economics and what that meant for
policy. Moreover, Daniels did not claim that solar could be an impor-
tant energy source in the United States now or in the near future. The
FCST report and the IES agreed, but the IES relegated practical solar
energy to a more distant future, with greater uncertainty of result, 
than did Daniels. Given that view of solar energy, Daniels’ claim 
that solar deserved much more support was not so compelling, consid-
ering the contrasting official optimism about future nuclear power costs,
the uncertainty of the price of solar, and the emphasis in the IES on
microeconomic efficiency.
THE FORMIDABLE BARRIER OF
PROBLEM FRAMES
The officially accepted frame of the short-term energy policy problem
remained consistent from the Truman through the Johnson administra-
tions. It emphasized the care and feeding of the various fossil fuel indus-
tries, carefully catered by their associated Interior Department agencies.
The long-term problem definition called for the replacement of fossil
fuels. By the middle of the Eisenhower administration the replacement
was nuclear energy, which alone among alternatives seemed to have the
capacity to provide large blocks of energy, and solar advocates could not
change that perceived need, and indeed accepted it themselves.
Changing the ways in which people think about policy problems is a
daunting task. Convincing a few people of the need for such change, 
even if they are very important people, is not sufficient. One must 
affect numerous actors’ beliefs and values about the policy issue. Clearly
no one accepted the notion that solar energy was the immediate solution
to the most pressing problems that the nation faced with regard to 
fuels, and the values that advocates tried to associate with it were either
not convincing or not of great concern. Advocates like Daniels and
Putnam presented solar as a long-term solution that would allow 
the continuance of industrial civilization. Almost alone among advo-
cates, Eugene Ayres associated it with a new and better form of society.
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Neither of these ideas found broad interest, much less acceptance, among
officials, and there is no evidence that the presidents of this period
embraced them, thus depriving them of a powerful leadership voice that
could have influenced issue definition by changing the terms of the
macropolitical debate.44 Furthermore, solar advocates did not speak with
one voice about the values associated with solar energy, and they lacked
a strong organizational voice to speak for them. As a result, advocates
of solar energy left the energy policy subsystems undisturbed and found
no home for themselves in government structures or in the mind of the
president.
In contrast to the solar advocates, advocates of civilian nuclear energy
promoted their technology in very different ways. Possibly emboldened
by recent technological breakthroughs and the immense quantities of
energy available from the fission of uranium, they promoted nuclear
power with great enthusiasm, uninhibited by fears of overselling the tech-
nology and then disappointing the public. For instance, before a com-
mercial nuclear power plant was ever in operation, Lewis Strauss of the
AEC made the now-well-known prediction that electricity from such
power plants would be “too cheap to meter.” Nuclear proponents also
quickly settled on specific nuclear technologies – the light water reactor
in the short-term and the liquid metal fast breeder in the longer term.45
The relevant social groups, as Pinch and Bijker would call them, reached
closure and stabilized the artifact, at least in policy terms. These sorts of
claims enabled nuclear advocates to present a narrative about the future
of their technology that was congruent with existing official energy
problem frames and fulfilled the symbolic need for U.S. leadership in a
crucial technology.
The values explicitly associated with energy in this period remained
remarkably constant in name, but they did change slightly in the way
that policy makers conceptualized their meanings. Energy was a source
of economic prosperity and national security, everyone agreed. By the
end of the Johnson administration, however, the popular economic
notions of growth or prosperity were being supplanted by more tech-
nical ideas of optimal resource allocation and the quantitative method-
ologies that went with them, in particular the cost–benefit analysis in the
IES. Concerns about environmental problems found articulation only at
the official level by the end of the Johnson administration. Moreover,
while government officials in the Johnson administration linked en-
vironmental concerns to energy production, such concerns were not yet
linked to solar in a compelling way.46 The values that advocates tried to
associate with solar also stayed consistent throughout the period. They
saw solar as a future energy source, as renewable after fossil fuels ran
out. As merely a replacement, most advocates did not associate solar
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energy with an explicit articulation of any alternative social or political
arrangements that would accompany a solar future.
The concept of income energy versus capital energy introduced by
Eugene Ayres and M. E. Spaght in the 1950s added the only wrinkle to
traditional values in the advocates’ arguments and had the potential 
to change solar advocates’ articulation of the fundamental problem.
Implicit in the claim that we should instead live on energy income, and
therefore within our means, is the notion that we should be living 
differently than we do, that is, more frugally. It follows that living in a
world that runs on solar energy means consuming less primary energy,
in the sense of number of barrels of oil or kilowatt-hours of electricity,
and hence building different technological ensembles that provide energy
services. But during the 1950s and 1960s, no one drew out such con-
clusions. Officials did not find this narrative compelling.
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Problem Frames During the Energy Crisis
In the 1970s a situation of energy abundance and falling prices 
turned into one of shortages and escalating prices, greatly raising 
energy policy’s salience. This short-run crisis opened a political oppor-
tunity to take a longer term look at energy sources and govern-
ment support for them, as the crisis strained public confidence in 
the existing system. In short, the energy crisis was an opportunity to
revise the existing problem frame and institutionalize a new set of 
ideas to guide that frame. The crisis did give rise to new energy policy
institutions, and those institutions to some extent centralized energy
policy making and gave a new institutional home to advocates of 
solar energy. Nonetheless, the core ideas driving energy policy at the 
presidential level changed very little, and the possibilities contained 
in the new institutions were never realized. Before turning to the 
official energy problem frame, it is important to understand the new
institutional structures that helped to formulate and implement energy
policy.
My emphasis on debates within the White House does not imply 
that the White House alone set policy. Decades of studies have 
shown that there are many important actors in a political system as 
fragmented as that in the United States, such as executive branch 
agencies, Congress, interest groups, and the courts. That was as true 
in energy policy as in any other issue area. Nonetheless, one of the 
most important of those actors was the White House. Presidents 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter may not have gotten all that they wanted, but
all of the other actors had to react to their initiatives, and the president
and the White House staff could and did severely constrain what 
other actors, particularly executive branch agencies, did. Therefore, in
thinking about the way values become institutionalized, seeing how they
were debated within and pushed by the White House, is a good place 
to start.
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CENTRALIZING ENERGY POLICY INSTITUTIONS
The organization of policy-making institutions is not simply a question
of efficiency or effectiveness. Rather, such institutional structures affect
policy outcomes and the ability of interested parties to influence those
outcomes. Groups involved in energy policy clearly understood this
implication of centralizing policy institutions, and those who benefited
from the status quo resisted it. In addition, the fragmented nature of
energy policy fit well with the pluralist political context in which it was
embedded, providing further resistance to change.1
Nonetheless, major organizational change held a high priority in Pres-
ident Nixon’s administration, and the growing energy crisis increased the
issue’s salience. The White House sought centralization to evaluate
energy alternatives in an integrated way and to make trade-offs among
them. The Nixon administration produced a bewildering array of infor-
mal groups and new offices in a very short period of time within the
Executive Office of the President (EOP), some of which are discussed
below.2 President Nixon also sought a centralized cabinet agency, the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), later called the Department
of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR). Presidents Ford and Carter
also sought, and eventually got, this new agency.
Energy Policy Institutions Under Nixon
In April 1973, President Nixon established the National Energy Office
within the EOP and appointed Charles DiBona, a systems analyst, to
head it.3 Although DiBona thought that he would be the key White
House aide on energy, conflicts with powerful White House and agency
officials undercut his role. The fights over turf got fierce and DiBona lost
them.4 Less than three months later the president created the Energy
Policy Office and appointed former Colorado Governor John Love to
head it. Officially, Love was the top White House aide for energy and
reported directly to the president. In practice he fared little better than
DiBona and resigned before the year was out.5
After the oil embargo of October 1973, reorganization proceeded
apace. The president created the Federal Energy Office, which was later
replaced by the legislatively mandated Federal Energy Administration.
The FEO had a rather stormy beginning, but the second person to head
it, John Sawhill, reorganized it and reduced much of the internal overlap,
which began to create the centralized policy and regulatory agency that
the president wanted.
White House staff organizations settled down considerably during 
the Ford and Carter years. While due partly to their different styles of 
managing the White House, certainly much of the settling came from
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closure on the Executive Branch reorganization for energy, the creation
of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and
then the Department of Energy (DOE). These new institutions settled the
matter of which line agencies were responsible for energy, so there simply
was not as much to fight over concerning who would control energy
policy. Within the Executive Office of the President, both Ford and
Carter designated key aides who focused on energy, along with some
staff from the OMB.
The institutional difficulties that President Nixon experienced in 
centralizing long-range planning for energy policy in the White House,
where he could make unilateral decisions, demonstrate how hard it 
is to change policy institutions. In one sense, the changes may have
seemed irrelevant to policy outcomes, since officials articulated values
consistent with those since President Truman, emphasizing economic
growth, national security, or both.6 While they often compromised 
with powerful established energy interests, the administration clearly
tried to pursue policies aimed at national security goals and at the 
deregulation of energy markets, despite its wage and price controls 
in other areas. Nonetheless, White House officials felt that the lack of
centralization hampered the detailed articulation and implementation 
of these goals. Moreover, these new institutions within the EOP did 
not open the policy process to new constituencies, particularly not to
groups that had new ideas to offer about energy policy. The specific 
political players came and went, but organizations such as environmen-
tal or solar energy groups had no place in the process. For example, 
a proposed President’s Energy Advisory Council was supposed to be 
“an outside advisory council to enable major groups concerned with 
and knowledgeable about energy matters to contribute to energy policy.”
The initial list that the White House staff suggested to the president
included people from industry, environmental groups, a few academics,
and other political officials.7 However, the council that eventually got
appointed looked quite different, with ten people from industry, five from
academia or other research institutions, and one from a national labo-
ratory.8 Moreover, decision making within the Nixon administration was
so Byzantine that it was not clear what influence these advisors could
have had.
The Nixon White House’s centralization effort included proposals for
a Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which later added “Energy”
to the title (DENR). The idea of a new cabinet-level energy department
developed early in the administration, and proposals appeared under
several names. By late 1970, the DNR idea seemed to some aides like an
inexpensive and politically safe energy policy initiative, unlike things
such as price deregulation:9
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There is one additional area, however, which involves no cost and only a limited
political impact. I am referring to a reorganization of the government’s energy
activities. This is sorely needed. Specifically, it would involve a reorganization of
parts of Interior and legislation to split out some of AEC’s activities. . . . The
selling point would be that for the first time, fossil and atomic fuels could be
under one roof so that the proper tradeoffs can be made.10
They were seriously mistaken about it being easy and low-cost.11
White House staff knew that their DNR proposal would encounter
resistance from Congressman Chet Holifield, Chair of the House Gov-
ernment Operations Committee and therefore able to hold up any of
Nixon’s reorganization plans that required congressional approval:
Holifield has one burning desire – to go down in history as the father of the
breeder reactor . . . [he] is so emotionally involved that he is nearly irrational 
on the subject. . . . [Supporting the breeder reactor] will assure that Holifield 
will report out a DNR bill and presumably the other reorganization bills. 
The DNR bill, however, as reported out, will not include the AEC activities
presently written into our bill. Holifield will not give up control of either the
enrichment plants or the reactor program to DNR. . . . Now our choice is
whether to accept a DNR without the AEC programs or go to the mat with
Holifield.12
Nixon’s staff urged him to stick with the more comprehensive reorgani-
zation and to offer Holifield support for the breeder and some other
nuclear programs only if he acted favorably on the DNR bill. “Holifield
will probably explode and accuse us of blackmailing him, etc. – but after
the fireworks are over, I am virtually certain he will cave [in to our
demands].”13
The administration did give strong support to the breeder program,
but Holifield, while expressing gratitude, continued to defend the AEC’s
turf.14 In April 1973, the administration tried again, this time with
support from Senator Henry Jackson, proposing a Department of Energy
and Natural Resources (DENR). Again they failed, in part due to Nixon’s
increasing distraction over Watergate.15 Finally, by late 1973, just prior
to the embargo, the administration focused its efforts on ERDA, trying
to make it more than a “warmed-over AEC,” and gave up on grander
reorganization schemes for the time being.16
These failures to centralize policy making reflected how much the
Nixon administration had given in to a powerful policy iron triangle,
consisting of industry, agencies, and members of Congress. The proposed
ERDA would in fact be a “warmed-over” AEC, which would absorb the
energy research divisions of other agencies, such as the Interior’s Office
of Coal Research. The Nuclear Energy Commission (later called the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) would absorb the regulatory functions
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of the AEC, and the commissioners would go with them, leaving the
ERDA to be run by a single administrator. The new proposed DENR, in
the meantime, would absorb all of the rest of Interior, as well as all non-
research energy functions from around the government, such as policy
studies, collecting data, selling electric power, and so on.17 Chet Holifield
had not been the one to cave in.
Many members of Congress supported an ERDA bill, particularly one
that would set up a separate regulatory apparatus for nuclear power.
They were unhappy with the AEC and its dual role as the regulator and
promoter of nuclear power, which they saw as a conflict of interest. The
time was ripe for this sort of reorganization.18 Nonetheless, the ERDA
bill remained months from passing despite the October 1973 oil embargo
and the deepening energy crisis. The political crisis surrounding the col-
lapse of the Nixon presidency absorbed the time of Congress and the
administration, and it was not until Gerald Ford became president that
Congress moved on its passage.
The case of energy policy centralization in the Nixon administra-
tion demonstrates how the executive branch of the government tried 
to make sweeping institutional changes but did so without seeking any
substantial changes in the values associated with the energy policies 
and without a strong outside constituency pushing for the change. 
For instance, the Nixon administration was most certainly not antinu-
clear, but it had other reasons for wanting to make changes that would
possibly imperil the policy treatment of nuclear energy. As a result, it
encountered strong resistance from both congressional and industrial
sources. At that time, nuclear power policy, and especially the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, was under attack, and both would soon
be forced to change. Nonetheless, they could still resist the Nixon admin-
istration’s attempted centralization. Moreover, since the administration
did not bring any new groups into the fray, it had no allies to counter
opposition pressures; in Schattschneider’s terms, Nixon did not enlarge
the scope of conflict.19 One potential set of allies in this cause, the 
environmental groups concurrently fighting nuclear power, were anath-
ema to the Nixon administration. They represented a set of values to
which Nixon and his supporters could only feel hostile. The Nixon
administration’s notions of environmental protection, while increasingly
important, were narrowly construed to mean that one should burn
cleaner fuel, if possible. Because groups representing nuclear power con-
tended strongly that their technology was, in fact, clean and environ-
mentally benign, this set of values left the Nixon White House with no
argument to curtail this sector of energy production. Thus the adminis-
tration failed in this period to get any of the reorganizing legislation 
that it wanted.
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Ford and ERDA
After President Nixon left office, Congress passed some reorganization
legislation, and President Ford signed the ERDA bill on October 11,
1974, and the Executive Order that activated ERDA and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) on January 15, 1975.20 ERDA brought
together, for the first time in one agency, almost all of the federal gov-
ernment’s energy R&D programs, though nonresearch aspects of energy
policy were still split among Interior, the Federal Power Commission,
and the Federal Energy Administration.21 In terms of its formal institu-
tional structure, ERDA seemed to create a new arena for energy policy
that would give voice to advocates of energy sources other than nuclear
or fossil fuels. It seemed to provide a way that the ERDA administrator,
the agency’s top official, could make the necessary trade-offs in terms of
funding for different energy sources. Separate assistant administrators
managed programs for fossil energy; solar, geothermal, and advanced
energy systems; nuclear; environment and safety; national security; and
conservation. For the first time, the federal government possessed sig-
nificant centralization in energy policy.22
The administration understood the political importance of ERDA’s
structure. In one sense, ERDA was an Atomic Energy Commission that
had absorbed energy R&D programs from other agencies, and con-
stituencies for nonnuclear energy feared that their programs would be lost
and diminished in an agency dominated by AEC personnel. Those fears
were understandable. ERDA staff initially consisted of 5,988 full-time staff
from the AEC, 1,106 from Interior, 17 from the EPA, and 13 from the
National Science Foundation (NSF), of whom 8 had worked on solar
energy programs and 5 on geothermal. Outnumbered at the start by
roughly 1,000 to 1, solar constituencies had good reason to worry about
being dominated. That said, ERDA did have separate, structurally equal
solar and conservation programs, which grew quickly. The administration
acknowledged and sought to alleviate numerous constituencies’ concerns
about nuclear domination of ERDA, pointing to its new structure.23
Carter and DOE
President Carter spoke out for the creation of a Department of Energy
(DOE) before he was elected, during the 1976 campaign.24 The authors
of the National Energy Plan, produced in the first ninety days of his
administration, continued the push for it, stating the same need for a
rationalized, centralized institution:
Although organizational changes alone will not solve any energy problem, cre-
ation of the Department of Energy is a necessity if the elements of the Plan are
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to be carried out in a coherent and effective manner. . . . Only through creation
of a Department that combines the skills and expertise now dispersed through
numerous Federal agencies will the Government obtain the comprehensive
overview of interrelated energy problems and the organizational coherence
needed to implement the National Energy Plan.25
President Carter got his DOE legislation in August 1977. The DOE
did consolidate energy policy, bringing in ERDA as well as several other
energy agencies. The department did achieve a formal level of rational-
ization. That said, it also had numerous difficulties. It was born as a
huge, complex bureaucracy, cobbled together from other agencies, not
built from scratch. It exhibited many of the unfortunate characteristics
of such organizations, often rigid and unresponsive. It became quite
unpopular with numerous constituencies.26 Solar advocates were among
those who quickly grew to dislike the new department.
THE ENERGY CRISIS AND PROBLEM FRAME BEFORE
THE EMBARGO
The United States experienced energy crises before the oil embargo of
October 1973. Both the mass media and government officials referred to
assorted shortages as an “energy crisis.”27 As is often the case in a crisis,
energy policy changed substantially between 1969 and 1973 and, more
slowly, so did solar energy policy. Nonetheless, the problem frame for
energy policy proved quite durable, despite numerous pressures for
change engendered by the crisis. Its core values – national security and
economic rationality – framed a problem to which solar could contribute
little. This period has a very complex history, and I will sample events
from it to analyze the developments most relevant to solar. A more com-
plete account can be found in the sources cited and in the more special-
ized literature on individual fuel sources.
The Growing Energy Crisis
By the late 1960s Americans began to experience tightening energy
markets. The real price of electricity stopped declining, and by some mea-
sures began to increase. Petroleum markets similarly began to tighten,
with prices staying flat or beginning to nudge upward. These problems
contrasted sharply with the period from 1950 to 1970. For example,
during that earlier time, the real, inflation-adjusted price of electricity fell
from 3.8 cents per kilowatt-hour to 2.3 cents, and per capita consump-
tion of it more than tripled.28
From its beginning, the Nixon administration also faced less subtle
problems with energy. On hot summer days large numbers of air condi-
tioners, combined with lighting and other electric loads in offices, 
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produced demand that exceeded many urban utilities’ capacities, causing
power shortages – brownouts rather than total blackouts.29 Even more
troubling were fuel shortages. The winter of 1969–1970 was unusually
severe, resulting in shortages of heating fuels as well as talk of more
shortages to come.30 The United States’ increasing dependence on
imported oil, particularly from the Middle East, concerned some policy
makers. The Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC, part of OPEC) had threatened to cut off oil supplies
as early as February 1972.31 Thus, in a few short years, consumers began
to experience energy shortages – a notion that almost no one would have
associated with energy only a few years earlier.
Media Presentations of the Energy Crisis
Several popular and technical writers interpreted these events as a 
crisis. They saw exponentially increasing consumption of fossil fuels as
leading to severe shortages in the not-distant future, depriving future 
generations of the chance to live an affluent life and consigning the 
less-developed countries to permanent immiseration.32 The mass media
reported shortages, actual or impending, in electricity and fluid fuels. 
In August 1969, Business Week reported that electric utilities, frustrated
by the delays in getting nuclear power plants online, were increasing 
their investments in coal-, oil-, and gas-fired power plants as a way of
meeting the growing demand.33 A November 1969 Business Week issue
included a ten-page “Special Report” entitled “Why Utilities Can’t Meet
Demand,” claiming in the article’s first sentence that “Things have 
never been worse for the utilities than they are right now.” Numerous
cities had experienced power shortages in the two previous summers, and
some planners feared that future summers could be even worse. The 
utilities had created part of the problem themselves, heavily advertising
air conditioners and other electric appliances, only to be caught by sur-
prise when consumers bought such products more quickly than they
expected, increasing electricity demand more quickly than the utilities
were prepared to handle. Utility executives also attributed their woes 
to labor shortages and costs, conservationists who challenged power
plant construction, manufacturers who missed deadlines and produced
faulty equipment, and overly stringent government regulations. In addi-
tion to these problems, the article devoted a full page to coal shortages.
Utility stockpiles were dropping, other demands for coal were increas-
ing, and utility and coal executives expected the tight coal market to 
continue.34
A little more than a year later, Consolidated Edison, the New York
City utility, faced a “mini-crisis” due to a cold snap in the Northeast,
forcing it to cut voltages to its customers and to plead with institutional
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customers to cut electricity usage.35 As the summer of 1971 approached,
the chair of the Federal Power Commission said electricity shortages
“can be expected to continue over the next four or five years.”36
Major media also expressed concerns over petroleum supplies. The
oil companies were engaged, in the words of a Newsweek article, in a
“frantic search” for sources of crude, including making high bids to
explore for oil off of Alaska’s North Slope. Firms and governments from
other industrialized countries likewise were searching for new oil fields,
including off-shore fields. All the while, relationships between American
and European petroleum firms and OPEC, particularly those in North
Africa and the Middle East, were becoming increasingly tense. OPEC
countries threatened to cut off supplies to the United States, Europe, and
Japan, arguing that they were not getting a fair share of the oil revenues.
And all of this was happening more than two years before the oil
embargo.37
The issue reached television on September 4, 1973, when NBC aired
a three-hour long documentary entitled “NBC Reports: The Energy
Crisis – An American White Paper.” The show included interviews of
seventy-eight different people espousing assorted interpretations of the
problems and advocating various solutions related to energy, concluding
with the overall message that the situation pointed to a seemingly inex-
orable crisis coming out of the increasing use of ever-more-scarce
resources.38
In addition to the popular media, policy analysts were developing
arguments about the nature of the crisis and publishing their views in
widely read, though not quite “popular,” journals. In framing the energy
problem, some analysts portrayed energy as an economic good and
others emphasized its physical nature and relationship to the ecosystem.
In an example of the former, M. A. Adelman of MIT argued strenuously
that the rising price of oil did not reflect any real scarcity, but instead
resulted from a combination of the OPEC cartel’s manipulating the
market and its being aided in doing so by U.S. foreign policy. If the indus-
trialized nations could break the cartel, oil would be cheap and in secure
supply.39
Other perspectives were more critical of the economic approach. 
Environmental writers argued that the market prices of energy did not
capture the externalities associated with its production and use, and
some expressed skepticism that such externalities could ever be captured
by pecuniary prices:
Because [environmental] damage is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to reckon
in dollar terms, it is necessary to go beyond the market system in order to
appraise the true costs of energy. As externalities cause the channels of money
flow to diverge ever more widely from the channels of true costs and benefits,
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adequate appraisal of energy costs increasingly presupposes a shift away from
strict reliance on traditional economic theory, with its confidence in pecuniary
price as a measure of product costs. . . . These traditional misperceptions suggest
the need for a new perspective, an “ecological perspective.”40
Other analysts simply ignored the economic dimension to energy entirely.
In a famous book on the environment, Paul and Anne Ehrlich wrote of
energy as if it were simply a physical quantity being used up too fast:
Our supplies of fossil fuels – coal, petroleum, and natural gas – are finite and
will probably be consumed within a few hundred years, possibly much sooner.
. . . The most recent and thorough estimate, by geologist M. King Hubbert, gives
us about a century before our petroleum reserves (including recent Alaskan 
discoveries) are depleted.41
This tension between these ways of seeing energy continued throughout
the debates of the 1970s.
Official Problem Framing Under Nixon
To understand how solar energy fit into the larger energy policy context
and why the normative and pragmatic ideas associated with solar energy
technologies were a poor fit with those that framed energy policy more
generally, we need to examine the ideas associated with energy more gen-
erally. Although the government devoted rapidly increasing resources to
solar energy R&D, the relevant government agencies never institution-
alized values that made solar appear a likely solution to their problem.42
Early in Richard Nixon’s first term, government officials saw evidence
of short supplies and increasing prices. Fossil fuel use had long since
become integral to all parts of American society and culture. Industrial
production, a high standard of living, and, above all else, the American
obsession with automobiles, required a ready supply of energy for the
good life.43 In this context, and with this problem frame in mind, offi-
cials identified insufficient supply, not excessive demand, as the energy
problem, occasionally pointing to a need to conserve as a short-term
policy.
How, exactly, did policy makers articulate this problem? Early in
1971, White House aides presented the problem in a memo to President
Nixon as one of inadequate supply: “We will have a serious shortage of
fuels, and most particularly clean fuels, during the next five years.”44
Their greatest concerns emphasized winter shortages of natural gas and
heating oil and summer shortages of electricity. This memo echoed the
concerns of an oil industry report sent earlier to the White House staff,
arguing that the shortages resulted from government policies that had
put the industry in a squeeze between its costs and the prices that it could
charge.45 By early 1972, presidential aides called the imminent shortages
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“the energy crisis.” They expected electricity shortages in the summer of
1972 and natural gas shortages the following winter, and they attributed
the crisis to misguided government policies that restricted supply.46 By
early 1973, the notion of an energy crisis, interpreted as inadequate sup-
plies, was in full swing in popular parlance as well as government circles.
White House staff noted repeatedly in memos and public statements
that the United States, with only six percent of the world’s population,
consumed over a third of the world’s annual energy production.
Although they stated this fact without any apparent sense of moral
opprobrium, by 1973 the administration concluded that the only answer
in the short-run entailed encouraging Americans to reduce voluntarily
their demand for energy by reducing driving, carpooling, keeping tem-
peratures lower in the winter and higher in the summer, and so on.47 By
this time the oil industry, both in communications to the public and with
the White House, tried to further this conception of the problem. In doc-
uments claiming to “set the record straight,” they argued strenuously
that they were victims of demand growth and policy constraints that
made it impossible to keep up with demand.48
Administration spokesmen stressed the centrality of energy supply and
its necessity for the good life, even when they tried to convince the public
of the importance of conserving energy in the short-run. As John Love,
then assistant to the president for energy and formally the top White
House energy official, put it:
I do not believe that it is an overstatement to claim that the distance man travels
from his cave – that is both his social and material progress – can be measured
by his use of energy to improve his environment, to produce goods, to make
things grow and to provide mobility. . . . To a large degree, the development of
a Nation can be measured by its use of energy. Americans are the greatest energy
users in the history of the world. With only six percent of the population, we
use 35 per cent of the energy produced in the world. . . . What a tribute that is
to our intelligence and innovativeness.
Love continued by saying that rapidly increasing demand caused some
difficulties, and he called for conservation. But nothing in the letter, or
Love’s other public statements, suggests that he took Americans to task
for their heavy use of energy. Quite to the contrary, he regarded such use
as the pinnacle of not only material but social achievement.49 Love’s
statements reflected, more baldly than most, the thinking of many in the
administration. Note the values that he associated with technologies for
producing and consuming energy. He emphasized the role of energy as
a source of economic prosperity and legitimated it with the important
value of economic growth, the same value that had consistently driven
thinking about energy since the Truman administration. But Love took
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these notions further by equating a high-consumption society with a
socially well-developed society. Love believed that energy technologies
within a high-consumption system constituted the means to encourage
social progress. Even more pointedly, consuming ever-increasing quanti-
ties of energy was the measure of a good society; consuming energy was
the foundation of the good life. Technologies of ever-increasing com-
plexity made possible the exploitation and consumption of energy
resources. Thus the value of an energy technology increased with its
ability to produce energy in ever-greater quantities. Perspectives such as
Love’s saw energy production technology as the thing that made modern
society possible and dictated a constant upward spiral of production and
consumption. By putting such technologies in place society could main-
tain its status quo. We can understand the shared meaning of these tech-
nologies to Love and his compatriots by understanding that they linked
the technologies to this particular social and political outcome.50
This valorizing of energy consumption strongly framed the adminis-
tration’s views of the energy problem. If increasing consumption was an
unalloyed social good, then energy policy should seek maximum pro-
duction to overcome shortages. Administration officials saw conserva-
tion, especially as it refers to reduced activities, as an unfortunate and
temporary expedient that was to be set aside when production rose to
meet demand. Similarly, solar energy appeared as a weak solution in such
a problem frame, unless advocates could make a persuasive case that it
could produce large quantities of bulk energy. The administration’s
emphasis on production carried through right up until the embargo.
Thus, at a cabinet-level meeting on energy chaired by Love just six days
before the embargo, he emphasized the president’s wish that disagree-
ments among government agencies be resolved so as to maximize the
production of energy.51
The administration’s public positions framed energy in the same way.
On June 4, 1971, more than two years before the embargo, President
Nixon sent to Congress the first comprehensive energy message.52
Responding to the brownouts and heating fuel shortages of the previous
two years, the message made public the administration’s concern about
a growing energy crisis. The president used the message to outline his
view of the energy problem and to present sweeping new policies and
institutions that could solve the problem. This message suggested the
ideas that underlay his administration’s conception of energy policy.
The message described the proximate cause of the problem as twofold:
rapidly growing demand and a greater need for clean fuels to reduce pol-
lution. The message claimed that, in the previous four years, the growth
in energy demand had accelerated, growing faster than the economy as
a whole, due largely to low energy prices. During the same period, the
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public and the government had put greater emphasis on environmental
protection, making even greater demands on clean fuels. The solution to
this problem was a greatly expanded supply.53 To that end, the president
proposed a list of policies for both the short- and long-terms.
One could break Nixon’s list of policies into three parts: R&D on new
technologies for the longer term; a set of stop-gap measures for the short-
term; and reorganization of energy agencies to better analyze, plan, and
implement such policies. The R&D program’s top priorities were pollu-
tion control technology (so that users could burn dirtier but more plen-
tiful fuels), coal gasification, and, most importantly, the breeder reactor.
“Our best hope today for meeting the Nation’s growing demand for eco-
nomical clean energy lies with the fast breeder reactor.”54 Indeed, the
president made the breeder reactor demonstration program the first spe-
cific item that he mentioned in his energy message, and said that he
wanted a successful demonstration plant completed by 1980. He also
called for the creation of a Department of Natural Resources (DNR),
which we discussed previously.55 Some observers think that this combi-
nation of items in Nixon’s policy speech reflected a truce with Senator
Holifield, a strong supporter of the breeder who also opposed the DNR.56
For all three programs the president requested from Congress additional
funding for FY 1972, due to start in less than a month, over and above
what they had already approved.
Note that all three of these technologies were intended to produce
large quantities of bulk power. The solution to accelerating demand
growth is accelerating supply growth. Most of the message emphasized
expanding supply and said nothing about controlling demand. The note-
worthy exception is a section, far down on the list of “other” policies,
on “Using Energy More Wisely.” Here the message makes a plug for
greater energy efficiency, and suggests better housing insulation stan-
dards and energy efficiency information for large appliances. More
importantly, this section argues for more economically efficient pricing
of energy in which all costs of energy sources are incorporated into
energy prices:
We believe that part of the answer lies in pricing energy on the basis of its full
costs to society. One reason we use energy so lavishly today is that the price of
energy does not include all of the social costs of producing it.57
Here is a classic argument for economic efficiency. By internalizing the
social costs of energy consumption into its price, consumers will pay
more directly for those social costs and, as economically rational agents,
will seek to minimize their costs by taking actions to reduce their energy
consumption until the marginal cost of more energy efficiency equals the
marginal cost of buying more energy. In short, environmental protection
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provides the rationale for raising energy prices, which will then depress
demand. Although raising prices was buried in the energy message, it
occupied a very prominent place in the administration’s internal discus-
sions, as we will see in the next section.
Finally, the message argued for the consolidation of energy policy into
a single agency, the Department of Natural Resources. The president
emphasized that energy policy was scattered all over the government,
making it impossible for the administration to approach the problem
comprehensively and make necessary comparisons and trade-offs among
different energy sources.58 Government officials had voiced this desire to
centralize energy policy since the Truman administration, and it finally
began coming to fruition under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.
The themes of the 1971 energy message remained constant in the
administration’s public pronouncements. For example, about seven
weeks before the oil embargo of October 1973, President Nixon held a
publicized, hour-long meeting with his energy advisor, John Love, and
other top administration officials, including Roy Ash, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), George Shultz, and Henry
Kissinger. A draft of the statement released after the meeting made clear
the seriousness of the situation. “The energy challenge is not a cliche. It
is a fact of overwhelming consequence to the future of our country. . . .
[W]e cannot wait until we are on the edge of an energy crisis. We cannot
wait until the last minute, because the last minute is now.”59 (Emphasis
in original.) The policy response articulated in this statement contained,
at the broadest level, the same four major components: the use of market
forces to bolster supply; a recognition of the need to protect the envi-
ronment or at least placate environmental constituencies while doing so;
the use of research and development for long-term solutions; and the
need to centralize energy decision making in one cabinet-level agency,
instead of having it scattered all over the government. By that Septem-
ber the administration already had seven energy bills pending in Con-
gress that embodied these policy responses, including one to create a new
Department of Energy and Natural Resources, and the remaining six to
make it easier to produce or import energy. All seven reaffirmed the con-
ventional approach of trying to bolster supply.
Deregulating Energy
Deregulating energy was a central part of the administration’s private
discussions of energy policy. The Nixon administration believed that gov-
ernment policies were at least partly responsible for the fuel shortages
and that deregulating oil and natural gas prices and controls would alle-
viate most of the shortages. John Whitaker put the matter succinctly in
a 1971 memo to the president:
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These actions [ones other than deregulation] skirt the hard policy decisions,
require little or no new funding, all have little political appeal or impact and,
not surprisingly, would have no real effect on the energy shortage. . . .
The fact of the matter is that there are meaningful possibilities to increase the
supply of clean fuels. One is to deregulate, at least partially, the price of natural
gas. The resultant increase in price would stimulate additional exploration and
production. The other is to modify or terminate production controls and import
quotas on oil. Both items, as you well know, are political hot potatoes.
Nixon did indeed know that these were “hot potatoes.” At the end of
the memo, Whitaker suggested two options, neither of which was to
deregulate. Option one entailed not even discussing deregulation inter-
nally, much less in public. Option two assigned a small group of 
top-level officials to study the possibility of deregulation and then rec-
ommend to the president whether or not he ought to deregulate. Nixon
agreed to option two, but wrote by hand on the memo, “But in com-
plete confidence. Don’t stir up the political issue. If it can’t be done
without fanfare (which is probably the case) – go to option 1.”60 What-
ever Nixon’s views on the virtues of the free market, in his first term he
intended to tread very gently on the issue of deregulation.61
President Nixon did not mention natural gas price deregulation in his
June 1971 energy message, but it remained a topic of discussion for
White House staff concerned with energy policy, and he did mention it
in his 1971 Annual Economic Report. Nixon and his staff continued to
believe that allowing gas to rise to its market price would solve the supply
problem. A memo to the president in July 1972 discussed the conclu-
sions of five separate energy models – one corporate, one government,
and three academic – which all said that the supply of gas was quite
elastic with respect to price, and that the deregulation of new gas prices
alone would solve the energy shortages. But the memo also noted the
potential political backlash, advising Nixon that such an initiative should
wait until after the election. Deregulation would enrage consumers and
only please the oil industry, which was probably unnecessary, for “if the
Democrats nominate McGovern, the oil industry and its sympathizers
will have no political alternative to the President.”62
Industry pressure for price deregulation continued after the 1972 elec-
tion. Tom Paine, a vice president with General Electric and former Nixon
administration official, wrote to the president and attached a brief paper
on the energy problem that emphasized the need for freer markets in
energy resources. The letter was widely circulated among the staff,
including George Shultz, John Ehrlichman, and Henry Kissinger, along
with a very complimentary cover memo written by Peter Flanigan.63
Although Paine may have been preaching to the converted, it did not
hurt his cause to keep up the pressure. Frank Ikard, President of the
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American Petroleum Institute, in his letter of June 23, 1973, to Peter
Flanigan, a senior White House aide, defended the oil industry from
charges of creating a phony shortage and argued that prices were too
low and needed freeing.64 The day after Christmas 1972, the White
House staff presented Nixon, now entering his second term, with a
memo detailing ten new energy proposals for the Congress that would
convene in a few weeks. “The principle underlying these proposals is 
that government interference with the free market system should be as
limited as possible, and that this system is best capable of providing suf-
ficient clean energy at an acceptable price.” True to this credo, the first
of the proposals called for the deregulation of newly found natural gas.65
On April 18, 1973, President Nixon made good on his commitment to
deregulating prices, proposing partial deregulation in his energy message
to Congress.66 The bill had a tough time in Congress, as the adminis-
tration knew it would. By September 1973, the administration did not
think that the bill had a very good chance of passage in 1973 or 1974.
Nonetheless, at the September 8 energy meeting of the president and his
top advisors, complete deregulation remained one of the topics on the
agenda.67
The administration’s emphasis on price deregulation suggested little
in the way of a short-term role for solar energy. Even significant increases
in conventional energy prices would not create a solar energy industry
overnight. Many of the technologies were immature and the industry was
still small and fragmented. A basic policy orientation that sought to
reduce government involvement in energy markets suggested that an
aggressive solar R&D program or other forms of subsidy were not likely
to be forthcoming.
Environmental Protection
Environmental protection developed into a very important issue during
the Nixon years, and the president signed the landmark National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) into law on January 1, 1970.
While NEPA grew out of a congressional initiative, and many observers
believed that Nixon’s support of it was less than whole-hearted, it 
institutionalized environmental protection as a concern that his admin-
istration could not ignore. Moreover, the act established within the 
White House structure a staff agency called the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ).68 Although the ways in which environmental 
concerns influenced energy policy reflected this new organizational struc-
ture, which now included the CEQ, policy outcomes were also con-
strained by the policy and ideological commitments of top officials. 
In the following analysis, we will see that the values associated 
with environmental protection did not penetrate as high in the structure
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of decision making as standard pluralist accounts of environmental
policy claim.
Pluralism sees environmental concerns as one among many, each 
with its own constituency pushing the government in its favored 
policy direction. According to this interpretation, environmentalists’ suc-
cesses derived from the resources that they brought to bear and the 
skill with which they used them, relative to competing groups. While this
account has much to commend it, it misses some crucial parts of 
the way environmental values entered into policy making during the
Nixon years.
Two phenomena are relevant here in forming a more complete
account: the segregation of environmental concerns within the policy
structure and the perfunctory internalization of environmental concern
at higher levels of decision making. Consider the environment in energy
policy. The agencies leading the charge for making environmental con-
cerns central to policy making were, not surprisingly, the EPA and the
CEQ. In late July 1972, an EPA official, Robert L. Sansom, sent a memo
to White House aides John Whitaker and Richard Fairbanks in which
he presented both EPA and CEQ views on energy and, particularly,
energy conservation. This memo offered a starkly different conclusion
from the supply orientation present in most White House discussions of
energy. It asserted that a “significant reduction in energy use (up to about
20 per cent by the latter part of this century) can be effected without
impairing our standard of living if a coordinated program is under-
taken.” Sansom then emphasized the environmental aspects of energy
production and conservation and ranked energy production technologies
according to their environmental effects. Sansom knew that his analysis
was at variance with the way that the administration typically looked at
energy, for in the introductory part of the memo he wrote, almost apolo-
getically, “You will note our summary is from an environmental view-
point.”69 Environmental concerns thus entered energy policy discussions
from a relatively new agency and peripheral White House office, in con-
trast to the views of those agencies and persons at the center of energy
policy making.
Environmental concerns did, to some extent, penetrate everyone’s
thinking about energy policy in the early 1970s, but in such a way as to
not alter or even challenge the fundamental thinking about energy policy.
Frequent references in White House memos and other writings to 
the necessity of providing “clean fuels” or “clean energy” show that envi-
ronmental concerns had entered the official lexicon of presidential
aides.70 Yet clearly such concerns defined criteria that were desirable 
but not central. For instance, the same memos that noted the need to
find clean fuels also outlined the ten new energy initiatives that the
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administration proposed in April of 1973. All of the initiatives were
aimed at boosting supply, not finding ways to improve the efficiency of
energy use, and many of the supply proposals clearly threatened envi-
ronmental concerns, such as speeding the exploitation of off-shore oil
and accelerating coal use.
I do not suggest that the EPA was irrelevant to public policy during
the Nixon years. Clearly it had a powerful effect on policy in imple-
menting the statutes in its domain, and these laws multiplied in the
1970s. Moreover, it is significant that the language of environmental
concern entered the official lexicon of energy policy at all. To some
modest extent, therefore, the value of environmental protection was
becoming institutionalized. However, the large-scale changes in institu-
tional venue and policy framing, posited by Baumgartner and Jones as
the indication of an old policy monopoly’s replacement by a new set 
of arrangements, had yet to take place in energy policy.71 Environmen-
talism remained a new value for which advocates fought in a variety 
of policy arenas, but by 1973 they had only modestly succeeded in 
energy policy. Solar energy advocates increasingly tried to sell their tech-
nology to policy makers on the basis of its environmental benefits, but
they were as yet knocking on the wrong door. Environmental values had
not yet been institutionalized at the top level of energy policy making,
and hence the environmental appeal of solar continued to be, to a large
extent, irrelevant to White House officials concerned about energy prob-
lems. For the time being, the problem remained framed as one of increas-
ing supply.
POSTEMBARGO
The oil embargo of October 1973 raised the intensity of activity in Amer-
ican energy policy.72 Nightly newscasts, people’s daily experiences of lines
at gas stations, and rapidly increasing energy prices revealed a severe
energy crisis. Public opinion polls measured a strong reaction to the
crisis, coming as it did on the heels of several other major social
upheavals.73 Politicians at every level responded.74 The Iranian Revolu-
tion of 1978–1979 reduced for a time that nation’s oil exports and again
led to sharp price increases, ensuring that energy remained a high-
salience issue throughout the 1970s.75 How did ideas influence institu-
tions in energy policy, how were the issues framed, in what sense did
partisans see energy technology as encouraging a particular kind of
society, and how could solar energy fit into all of these questions? The
official frame of energy policy changed less than one might expect,
despite the issue’s greatly increased intensity and salience. Nonetheless,
the sense of crisis reemphasized issues of national security in energy
debates.
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Problem Framing and Policy Response: Nixon and Ford
In energy policy, as in so many other ways, the Nixon administration
felt embattled by the end of 1973. Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson, with
whom the administration had begun a series of cordial, quiet meetings
only a year before, now accused the president of a slow and inadequate
response to the energy crisis. In turn, an internal memo to Nixon
reflected the administration’s changed perceptions of Jackson and
addressed the need to counter Jackson’s “demagoguery.” The memo
advised the president to “accentuate the positive” as a tactic instead of
meeting Jackson’s charges head on, by which Nixon wrote “good” in
the margins. He wrote “OK” next to another paragraph which suggested
that “This is not to say, however, our people cannot subtly attack dem-
agogues. . . . (This type of information will be distributed orally rather
than by memorandum.)”76 The memo continued with a six-page list of
accomplishments by the new Federal Energy Office, an office established
within the White House to coordinate federal energy policy, in the month
of September alone and fourteen “major” initiatives by the president,
most either organizational or aimed at boosting domestic supplies,
including the new five-year R&D program. In one initiative, for instance,
four months before the embargo the administration had begun an energy
conservation program for the government itself. The program was suc-
cessful, and by early 1974 it had exceeded its original target by a large
margin.77 The Nixon administration also had twelve pieces of legislation
pending before Congress, although most were not moving along well,
and the White House was considering eleven more. The bills moving
along best were those creating the Federal Energy Administration (FEA)
and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).78
On the other hand, President Nixon vetoed a bill that did pass in Feb-
ruary, an Energy Emergency Act, because it contained a number of unac-
ceptable measures, such as price rollback requirements.79 In short,
President Nixon and his advisors felt that Congress was hindering them
in dealing with the energy crisis.
The Ford administration held similar sentiments. Early in Ford’s
tenure, one top aide circulated a memo to other White House staff listing
sixteen pieces of energy legislation awaiting congressional action.80 By
1976, President Ford had gotten eight of the bills he wanted passed, and
Congress had added six of its own, but the administration still had fifteen
energy proposals on which Congress had not acted.81
A set of consistent empirical and normative ideas dominated White
House discussions concerning new energy policies and institutions, and
those ideas did not bode well for policy toward solar energy. These ideas
made up the official frame of the problem and suggested who owned this
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issue. Some of these ideas harkened back to every administration since
Truman. The essence of the problem in this view was a growing short-
age of inexpensive fossil fuels resulting from the more or less natural evo-
lution of personal and industrial use of previously abundant energy. As
demonstrated above, presidents and their spokespersons frequently cited
the statistic, publicly and internally, that the United States, with only six
percent of the world’s population, used about thirty-five percent of its
energy production. Moreover, they cited this fact, not as a criticism of
American energy use, but rather as the natural consequence of millions
of rational microdecisions that together had a macrooutcome that posed
difficulties for energy supply. From the Truman administration on, this
way of depicting the problem presented it as an unintended consequence
and suggested that there was no specific villain and no one to blame. But
Presidents Nixon and Ford did introduce an important difference in this
conceptualization of the energy problem. They identified a villain, even
if an unintentional one, namely, government interference in the market.
The centrality of free market ideology was crucial to the way that these
two presidents saw the issue, and so it is worth examining how their top
aides argued on its behalf.
In the last year of his presidency, Richard Nixon became increasingly
isolated in the White House, distracted by the unfolding Watergate
scandal. Two aides, Roy Ash of the Office of Management and Budget
and Herbert Stein, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, retained
some modicum of access to him, at least in regard to energy policy. Ash
had come to the Nixon administration from Litton Industries where, as
a senior executive and eventually president, he had been one of the key
people responsible for building Litton from a small electronics firm into
a gigantic conglomerate. A self-made corporate success, it is not sur-
prising that Ash held strong views about the importance of unfettered
markets.82 He was clearly a dominant player in White House policy
making, and his preferred outcomes often won when White House staff
disagreed with each other. He sent numerous memos, some on specific
programs and some on the energy problem more generally, to the pres-
ident and other aides, emphasizing the importance of free markets and
the need for the private sector to be deregulated in order to solve 
the energy problem.83 “We must allow,” he wrote, “and hopefully help
and lead the private sector . . . to adjust to new market conditions in the
1974–1980 period. For it is the private sector which will solve the energy
problems of this period.” (Emphasis in original.) President Nixon agreed,
writing “Makes great sense” on this memo.84 Ash was also aware of 
the implications of massive decontrol and the political difficulties in 
carrying it out. Consequently, he recommended “that particularly we
avoid meddling with the private sector in ways which interfere with its
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ability to produce. (Publicly, we probably must join in the clamor against
the oil companies to some degree and take some specific steps so as to
be perceived this way.)” (Emphasis in original.)85 While some of the
Nixon energy policy may have been based in cynicism, Ash had a very
clear idea of the nature of the problem and of how he preferred policy
to work.
Herbert Stein, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, named the
administration’s postembargo energy program “Project Independence”
and strongly influenced White House policies.86 Stein sent at least two
of his speeches on energy to President Nixon, whose handwritten notes
on them suggest that he read them through, marking one “Brilliant” and
another “Very thoughtful.”87 In these speeches Stein asserted his view
that deregulated markets, and the higher prices that such actions would
entail, were far preferable to continued regulation and rationing schemes
in dealing with shortages. If higher energy prices had undesirable dis-
tributive consequences, then those should be addressed directly by taxes,
employment policies, or other means, not by interfering with the markets
for one commodity.88
Project Independence
“Project Independence” was President Nixon’s policy initiative to free
the country from dependence on foreign oil and as such laid out the
general problem frame for energy policy. He announced “Project Inde-
pendence” in a televised address to the nation on November 7, 1973,
less than one month after the start of the OPEC price increases and
embargo. Despite the sensational proximate causes of the energy short-
ages – the Mid-East war and oil embargo – the president put the energy
problems in a broader, longer term context:
But our deeper energy problems come not from war, but from peace and abun-
dance. We are running out of energy today because our economy has grown
enormously and because in prosperity what were once considered luxuries are
now considered necessities. . . . Now, our growing demands have bumped up
against the limits of available supply, and until we provide new sources of energy
for tomorrow, we must be prepared to tighten our belts today.89
As so many studies had before him, he depicted energy shortages arising
out of the beneficial processes of economic growth; the tens of millions
of microdecisions to install air conditioning, drive larger cars, and so on
added up to an unintended consequence. Lacking villains, this story
instead spread the responsibility among the public at large, whom he
urged to “tighten our belts.” The address included a long list of admin-
istrative actions and legislative requests intended to increase domestic
supplies and reduce consumption, such as lowering speed limits, shifting
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to daylight savings time year-round, reducing airline flights, reducing
government energy consumption, finishing the Alaska pipeline, and
relaxing some environmental standards.90
Belt-tightening is not a very attractive long-term policy, and the pres-
ident had a different plan for the 1980s. He made the goal of “Project
Independence” that the United States be self-sufficient in energy by 1980,
a little more than six years away. Drawing comparisons with the “Man-
hattan Project” and “Project Apollo”, President Nixon called for self-
sufficiency as the way to ensure American freedom of action abroad and
prosperity at home. “Today the challenge is to regain the strength that
we had earlier in this century, the strength of self-sufficiency.”91 As policy
narratives so often do, this one harkened back to a better time when
American strength was uncompromised by foreign dependence.
Conspicuously absent from the values framing this crisis was that of
free markets. Indeed, one could read Nixon’s statement of the problem
to suggest that free markets got the country into this mess in the first
place. In any event, price decontrols did not show up anywhere in this
speech’s list of policy options. However, the president was clearly con-
sidering such market-oriented actions. The next day, in a special message
to Congress discussing his legislative wishes, he included price deregula-
tion for new natural gas. The president simply included gas deregulation
as one item in a long list, not giving this modest step any special promi-
nence, and saying nothing about deregulating oil markets.92 The fact that
the president, now in his second term and ineligible to run again, said
nothing about deregulation in his televised speech suggests that he still
considered it a “hot potato.”
The “Project Independence” study got organized starting in January
1974. Some presidential advisors, such as William Simon, favored a
strongly market-oriented approach and saw no need, from an economic
perspective, for imports to go to zero. Simon favored importing up to
fifteen percent of oil and gas from diverse sources. This approach was
not favored by all of those working on the study, and from March 1974,
when the work got underway in earnest, to the November 1974 release
of the study’s report, there was constant fighting within the administra-
tion over the extent to which the report would mainly favor oil and 
gas deregulation, possibly coupled with new energy taxes. A staff that
reached 500 people at its peak produced the final report, a huge, multi-
volume work that was produced under a very constraining deadline.93
Project Independence described the source of the energy crisis in much
the traditional way, as the unintended consequence of growing affluence
and cheap energy, which was in turn partly responsible for such a rise
in affluence. It noted that per capita U.S. energy consumption was eight
times the world’s average.94 A separate volume, entitled An Historical
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Perspective, elaborated on these trends, showing that total and per capita
energy use had increased steadily since World War II in all regions of the
world, but most steeply in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States.
This historical volume also presented another cause of the problem, the
loss of control over production and distribution by the large multina-
tional oil companies, including the “Seven Sisters,” to the countries that
owned the oil.95
This report put a much heavier emphasis on economic efficiency than
did President Nixon’s announcement a year earlier. Several features of
the report showed that the project had engendered strong debates over
key ideas. First among these was energy independence itself:
To some, energy independence is a situation in which the United States receives
no energy through imports, i.e. it produces all of its energy domestically. To
others, independence is a situation in which the United States does import to
meet some of its energy requirements, but only up to a point of “acceptable”
political and economic vulnerability.
The report’s authors stated that they did not intend to actually 
recommend policies, but instead to discuss trade-offs and present a
framework for analysis.96 Nonetheless, buried deep in the report is a
chapter on the definitions and methodologies that drove the analysis, and
here they made it clear that they were using the latter definition of inde-
pendence, one based on some imports. They argued that the nation
should seek the least total national costs, which is a sum of both the
market costs of energy and the costs of vulnerability associated with
imported energy. They emphasized that this point of least cost was not
at zero imports, since the market costs of energy are very high under that
scenario.97 Here issues of national security are expressed as straightfor-
ward economic costs, such as the costs of establishing an emergency oil
stockpile. Operating on these assumptions, and by analyzing policy
options that assumed modest (in retrospect) oil prices, this definition of
the problem left little for solar in the short-run, as will be discussed in
later chapters.
The Federal Energy Administration put great effort into the 
Project Independence Blueprint. The Blueprint was leaked to the press
in draft form and came under heavy criticism from various agencies,
especially Interior Secretary Rogers Morton.98 The Blueprint argued 
that nothing the government could do would have any effect on the
nation’s energy problems for the next three years, but that efforts 
to increase domestic supply and decrease demand could pay off by 
the 1980s. The report devoted 250 pages to conservation. While it did 
not consider demand reduction to be an adequate policy without poli-
cies to boost domestic supply, the draft report contained a number of
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government regulatory measures for curbing demand, concluding that
voluntary conservation would be inadequate. Sawhill wanted policy to
include a substantial twenty or thirty cents per gallon gasoline tax, but
President Ford made his opposition to such a tax known before the draft
was released. Indeed, advocating this tax may have contributed to
Sawhill’s being fired on October 29, 1974. Regarding solar energy, the
report argued that a five-year, $1 billion program could have noticeable
effects on energy consumption through space heating and electricity 
generation.99
President Ford and his principal energy advisors articulated a very
similar conceptualization of the energy problem. From their perspective,
the energy crisis had the same origins and the same solutions as discussed
by Nixon’s advisors, some of whom had carried over to the Ford admin-
istration.100 Such views received support from legislators in energy-
producing states.101 The Ford administration wanted to make more
progress on energy matters than had Nixon’s, and the Energy Resources
Council (ERC), headed by Rogers Morton and Frank Zarb, put together
a briefing book for the president that set out the general goals of the
administration and the types of programs that could meet them. Some
of the goals of this energy policy contradicted each other, particularly
the desires for free markets and for national security.102
The briefing book argued that several principles should drive 
energy policy, the first of which was to provide energy at the lowest pos-
sible cost “consistent with our need for secure energy supplies.” This
policy statement also asserted the need to “[p]rotect the environment 
in every way consistent with our national energy needs.” The ERC
explained the free market principle this way: “Look first to the private
sector and our free market pricing system as the most efficient means of
achieving the Nation’s goals, but act through government where the
private sector is not able to reach the national energy goals.” They
affirmed a commitment here to the free market, but not as an end in
itself, and they offered no suggestion of how to resolve the conflicts of
principle and practice that might arise.103 The ERC put the national secu-
rity implications of the energy crisis very starkly, emphasizing the 
relationship between the two:
What is essentially at stake is the economic balance of power achieved by the
Western World over the last century and a half. . . . Prior to the late 1960s the
United States was not only self-sufficient, but had sufficient surplus capacity that
it set the price and direction of the world petroleum market. Energy consump-
tion grew rapidly at 4–5 per cent per year. Since then, however, the U.S. situa-
tion has seriously deteriorated: . . . The restoration of American dominance in
setting the goals and establishing the price of energy must be the ultimate objec-
tive of our national energy policy.104
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Since the United States had become a net importer of energy in the
Truman administration, the ERC’s interpretation entailed rewriting a bit
of history. But whatever its factual inaccuracies, the narrative structure
of this analysis tells of a happy past, when the United States dominated
world markets and so had all of the energy that it wanted at low prices.
That situation had changed, and the goal was to restore the good old
days, a bluntly described American hegemony over international energy
markets.
Clearly, seeking this national security goal meant compromise with
free market goals. Deregulation of domestic energy markets would cer-
tainly result in higher prices for all fuels, especially in light of OPEC
actions. Higher prices should depress demand as well as stimulate domes-
tic production and thereby make it easier to reduce dependency on
energy imports. However, the ERC’s notion of the free market did not
extend to international trade, since the whole purpose of its policy was
to reduce imports faster than market dynamics. Moreover, in a properly
functioning market, no single buyer establishes the price of a good.
Despite these complications, Ford and his advisors considered the dereg-
ulation of energy markets their primary policy instrument for achieving
energy independence, both ideologically and in terms of the expected
impact on reducing imports.105 In numerous other memos and messages
to outside constituencies, the administration continued to promote this
set of sometimes conflicting principles of energy independence and low
prices for secure supplies on the one hand, along with price deregulation
of domestic supplies on the other, which everyone knew would result in
higher prices. Occasionally they also mentioned a need to relax envi-
ronmental regulations.106
Ford’s White House staffers frequently came into conflict with 
agency personnel, particularly ERDA and the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ), over the issue of government intervention in the
private sector, even though the CEQ was also part of the White House.
The White House staff, including those in the OMB, tried hard to 
keep the agencies more consistent with the basic principles of the 
president’s plan, especially the emphasis on the free market and increas-
ing domestic supply. The White House feared that the agencies, espe-
cially the ERDA, would appropriate too much power for themselves,
with the help of Congress, and would thereby interfere with the 
market. So to ensure its authority over policy, for example, the White
House chose to clear ERDA’s annual plan for R&D, which it was
required by statute to submit every year, resulting in constant battles 
over the wording and emphasis of the various drafts. Hugh Loweth 
of the OMB complained to ERDA that its R&D draft plan for 1976
failed “to emphasize the role and importance of the private sector.” 
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He pointedly explained the ideological significance of word choices, for
instance:
I note that the legislation does not call for a “National Plan,” but only a com-
prehensive plan. By calling the document a National Plan for Energy RD&D
[Research, Development, and Demonstration] I believe we have overstated the
Federal Government’s role and capability in this area. As we have discussed, we
are concerned that this title could be misinterpreted to mean that the Federal
Government somehow intends to determine and direct the timing and nature of
private sector actions and investments in energy RD&D and energy production
capacity.107
Loweth lost the battle over the title of the document, but the White
House got most of what it wanted in other respects.
The White House also disagreed sharply with the ERDA draft 
about its emphasis in the executive summary on conservation, which 
the draft interpreted as energy efficiency, as being the most important 
set of energy technologies to foster, more important than any supply 
technologies. Some called the dispute at the staff level “irreconcilable,”
especially when it centered around specific sentences, such as “Conser-
vation (energy efficiency) technologies are identified as being of the
highest national priority for national action.” Presidential aides, partic-
ularly OMB staff, rejected singling out conservation over supply since
both were important, asserting that such priorities countered previ-
ously stated policies, and, moreover, they would open the door to 
criticizing the president for not spending enough on conservation. Glenn
Schleede, a staffer on the Domestic Council (part of the Executive 
Office of the President, i.e., the White House staff) who focused 
on energy issues, advised his superior on the Domestic Council that the
issue could cause problems if the White House tried simply to override
ERDA:
On merit, I believe that there is no strong basis for ranking energy conservation
technologies highest. . . . The whole issue has apparently raised an emotional
state among the ERDA staff and thus presents a real problem for Dr. Seamans
and Bob Fri [Administrator and Deputy Administrator of ERDA, respectively].
Schleede recommended that the differences be “papered over” instead of
resolved. He offered specific wordings to the effect that conservation
technologies now “ranked with several supply technologies as being 
of the highest priority for national attention.” He also suggested putting
in words that would emphasize the primacy of the private sector in 
actually deciding which technologies got deployed when.108 Schleede 
got his compromise. The final published version of the ERDA plan used
his exact words in the executive summary when discussing the new
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importance of conservation technology, except that the published 
document substituted the word “action” where he had suggested 
“attention.”109
Such battles between ERDA and the White House occurred whenever
there were statements to be made about energy because they entailed
profound implications for the choices of which ideas would dominate
policy. Thus, in discussing a message to be sent to an energy conference,
Schleede described the significance of this contentious process:
I’m not surprised by the ERDA draft but I’ll confess to some disappointment. It
runs directly counter to the whole thrust of the President’s policy on Federal vs.
private sector roles. The emphasis should be on the private sector’s primary
responsibility for developing and bringing into use new energy technologies. The
Federal Government’s is the supporting and assisting and facilitating role.
ERDA persists, understandably I guess, it [sic] perceiving of itself as the center
of everything . . . we’ve run into this same problem in ERDA reports . . . and in
other things that ERDA writes for us.110
Despite these conflicts, the White House and the ERDA agreed on many
points. ERDA’s 1976 annual R&D plan listed the fundamental goals
toward which energy policy should lead, and these conveyed a set of
values or ideologies with which the White House could be very com-
fortable, such as preserving national security, maintaining a strong and
growing economy, preserving the status quo in terms of lifestyles, and
protecting the environment.111 Obviously, stating the problem in these
general terms left much room for disagreement on very important details.
This type of problem framing also left out, or made it difficult to justify,
a whole range of policies, particularly those relating to certain solar tech-
nologies and decentralized energy production, some of which were begin-
ning to develop a constituency.
The issues of conservation and the role of the public versus private
sectors also turned up in conflicts between the White House and the
CEQ. In a draft report evaluating the ERDA plan, the CEQ emphasized
conservation and the public sector too heavily for the White House’s
liking, making the report an implicit criticism of the administration’s
budget and policy.112 Schleede argued that the CEQ should not be
allowed to publish the report, even if such action looked oppressive to
outsiders, because to do otherwise “would ‘reward’ CEQ for taking an
approach with a proposed public report that is pretty irresponsible . . .
we insisted that ERDA get in line with Administration position. . . . (Inci-
dentally, the ERDA report had also leaked and there were ERDA staff
charges of heavy-handedness.) Why should we treat CEQ differently?”113
In this case and others, the White House determined the broad ideology
to which others at least had to respond.
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As the 1976 election year wound on, Congress did pass a few more
energy bills, but President Ford vetoed two of them. In part, he vetoed
both bills because they interfered too much, in his view, with the private
sector – a battle he fought with Congress during his whole term.114 In a
study published a month after Ford had lost the 1976 election, the
Energy Resources Council (an organization forced on the executive
branch by the Congress) reviewed the previous several years and reiter-
ated the themes and general ideas of Ford’s policies, namely, to stimu-
late domestic resource development and deregulate energy sources to the
extent possible. The report noted that Congress had been hostile to these
general goals all along and had frustrated many of them.115
The foregoing analysis of administration battles over ideology may
make it appear that there was more coherence in the executive branch,
or at least among White House aides fighting for their principles, than
was actually the case. In summarizing his long chapter on energy in the
Ford years, de Marchi emphasizes that, for all of the White House’s
protestations about the importance of free markets, they were not pre-
pared to endorse them in a wholehearted way.116 Real deregulation
would have resulted in substantially higher prices to consumers and 
devastation in certain segments of the fuel industries, leading to sub-
stantial political costs to President Ford. He had to be wary of such costs,
both because he had never been elected and because of the immediate
aftermath of Watergate. Watergate seriously, if temporarily, realigned
power in American policy making, and the Republican president who
had pardoned Richard Nixon as almost his first official act held a sub-
stantially weakened office. Congress, on the other hand, had gained influ-
ence in the aftermath of Watergate. In addition to being averse as a whole
to imposing high costs on constituents, several legislators sought to
realize their own goals in energy policy, often trying to push the Ford
administration faster and farther than it wanted to go. The administra-
tion did in fact increase funding dramatically for previously neglected
energy sources, including solar. Nonetheless, the institutionalization of
the broad, and sometimes contradictory, normative goals of keeping
energy prices low, reducing imports of oil, relying on the free market,
and defining the problem in terms of inadequate supply choice, created
a policy context in which solar advocacy had a hard time being taken
seriously.
Problem Framing and Policy Response: Carter
Programmatic and normative debates over energy policy raged in and
out of government during President Carter’s term. When he took office
in 1977, energy prices were still much higher than they had been prior
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to the 1973 oil embargo, with natural gas prices still going up in real
terms and oil starting to rise again in 1979. Fuel shortages, especially of
natural gas, exacerbated the hardships of the very harsh winter of 1977.
Numerous private groups were sponsoring energy policy studies, and
many of these sought to influence the incoming administration.117 Much
of the energy controversy during Carter’s administration focussed on oil
and natural gas, the complex histories of which are analyzed else-
where.118 This analysis looks at the more general debates about energy
policy.
On Inauguration Day, President Carter promised to deliver to the
Congress in ninety days a National Energy Plan, a comprehensive set of
programs to deal with the energy crisis. He made James Schlesinger head
of the Energy Policy and Planning office in the Executive Office of the
President. Schlesinger assembled a team of about fifteen professionals,
and they worked out the plan on schedule. Team members were mainly
from government and academia and, unlike the people who worked
under President Ford, were much more positive about the role that gov-
ernment could play in energy policy. Because of the magnitude of the
task and the severe deadline, the group worked long hours and largely
in isolation. There was no time to try to develop a plan based on a care-
fully nurtured consensus with public groups, Congress, or even other
executive branch agencies. The National Energy Plan process was, as a
result, quite technocratic.119
The National Energy Plan’s overall depiction of the problem con-
fronting energy policy was simple:
The diagnosis of the U.S. energy crisis is quite simple: demand for energy is
increasing, while supplies of oil and natural gas are diminishing. Unless the U.S.
makes a timely adjustment before world oil becomes very scarce and very expen-
sive in the 1980’s, the nation’s economic security and the American way of life
will be gravely endangered. The steps the U.S. must take now are small com-
pared to the drastic measures that will be needed if the U.S. does nothing until
it is too late.120
This is a typical narrative of decline and loss of control. The increasing
demand and shrinking supply seem like inexorable natural forces, both
stated in the passive voice, removing the question of agency. These events
just happened, and would wreck havoc unless the country adopted the
necessary preventative steps immediately. The policy story had no clearly
defined villain.
Also in the National Energy Plan was the concept of a transition. The
authors of the plan, and many energy analysts outside government as
well, saw the decline in oil production and rise in prices as part of a
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larger historical movement away from oil and natural gas toward some
renewable energy system. According to this idea, the United States had
made two previous historic transitions in its use of energy – from wood
and water to coal, and from coal to oil and natural gas.
A graph like the one in Figure 1 appeared in many analyses. In this
view, energy policy was merely a response to the inexorable changes in
resources. Through natural processes, demand was exceeding supply, and
these constraints dictated that the nation must undergo another transi-
tion. The only issue was whether the transition would be orderly and
relatively painless or abrupt and costly.121
Framed in this way, policy makers’ options appeared very circum-
scribed. Such a framing of the problem did not allow for a status quo,
do-nothing approach; if the changes were coming, one might as well
manage them. The challenge was guessing which energy sources would
come next and thinking about how best to put them into place.
As I will discuss in detail in later chapters, the Carter administration
was friendlier to solar energy than its predecessors. Nonetheless, the
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Figure 1. The United States has shifted to different fuel use patterns. (Source: U.S.
Bureau of Mines and Federal Energy Administration.)
problem framing that they used and the ideas that they associated with
energy policy created large obstacles for solar energy, since they empha-
sized needs that solar could not, in the short-term, satisfy. Those inher-
ent conflicts would leave the administration frustrated with solar energy
and its advocates and the solar movement frustrated with and suspicious
of the administration.
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Solar Advocacy in the Crisis
The energy crisis provided a unique opportunity for solar advocates of
all types. The public’s and policy makers’ loss of confidence in conven-
tional energy policy opened the way for advocates to argue for new ways
of looking at energy policy and the role of solar technology in it. Con-
currently, the solar movement began to incorporate influences from some
of the other social movements of the day, including environmentalism
and radical critiques of technological society. Bringing these issues into
the debate split the solar movement, as competing elements within it
articulated different visions of society and the role of solar energy in it.
PUBLICLY CONSTRUCTING SOLAR ENERGY
During the energy crisis, solar advocates produced a rapidly increasing
volume of articles and books that argued for more attention to and
resources for solar energy. The multiplicity of solar advocates can again,
for our purposes, be divided into two categories. The modest differences
that separated solar advocates in the 1950s and 1960s deepened in the
1970s, with the more ambitious advocates tying their advocacy of solar
energy tightly to strong environmental values and often to whole cri-
tiques of modern industrial capitalism. For this reason I name the more
guarded advocates conventional and the more ambitious advocates eco-
logical.1 Although any such classification scheme does some injustice to
the many variations within each category, in the mid-1970s solar advo-
cates began to diverge in the ideas and, particularly, the values that they
associated with their technology and with energy technologies more gen-
erally. These two groups did share some common ideas. Both groups
expressed concern with nontechnical barriers to increasing the use of
solar energy, recognizing that economic, institutional, and social barri-
ers stood in the way of a widespread use of solar technologies. Economic
barriers encompassed not simply high prices but also factors like diffi-
culties in getting financing for novel technologies. Institutional barriers
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included, for example, building codes and failures to incorporate sun
rights into property deeds. Solar advocates defined social barriers less
clearly, often using this catchall category for consumer or vendor resis-
tance to solar that did not fit into other categories.2
These groups split over the fraction of the nation’s energy that solar
could provide in the medium term. For example, in the last month of the
Ford administration, the Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration (ERDA) released a study that it had commissioned from the
MITRE Corp., which claimed that solar was already competitive with
electric heating in many parts of the country, although it was still more
expensive than oil or gas. In contrast to this positive assessment, at about
the same time the ERDA assistant administrator for solar publicly ques-
tioned the feasibility of solar technologies for generating electricity and
called for a study to see if the government’s budget for such technolo-
gies should be reduced. Also at the end of 1976, analyses published in
respected scientific sources argued that solar energy could contribute very
little, at least in the short and medium term, to U.S. energy needs.3 In
contrast, writings by solar advocates, while mixed on the extent to which
solar was ready to be commercialized, unanimously argued that it could
and should be a large part of the American energy system in the near
future.4
Conventional Advocates
A number of indicators suggest that the solar movement grew rapidly
during the energy crisis.5 The movement contained groups with diverse
ideologies and views on the nature of the energy problem and the role
that solar could play in it. The conventional, guarded advocates saw
solar as simply another fuel to plug into the existing energy system, car-
rying no implications for social or political changes, and arguing that the
removal of conventional impediments to the diffusion of solar, such as
financing or getting high-quality installation on new devices, would lead
to substantial growth in the solar energy market. Solar was desirable
because it would last forever as a replacement for fossil fuels and could
not be embargoed by foreigners (the national security rationale).6 Simi-
larly, these advocates based their criticism of the government’s solar pro-
grams on conventional criteria, such as arguing that the government was
neglecting important technologies like passive solar or that it was dis-
torting markets by subsidies to conventional fuels.7
Less guarded and more ambitious for solar, at least in the long run,
were some scientists and engineers promoting their own particular solar
technologies. For example, Peter Glaser wrote in 1969 that the future of
solar energy could lie with space satellites that collect large quantities of
solar energy and beam them back to earth in the form of microwaves to
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be collected by a receiving antenna and distributed to the electrical grid.
This was the highest of the high-tech solar proposals.8 In another case
of large-scale thinking, in 1970 Aden and Marjorie Meinel, both scien-
tists, proposed that part of the Arizona and Southern California desert
be turned over to a huge, centralized solar electricity–generating system,
a National Solar Power Facility, that would, in due time, supply the entire
United States with electric power. They regarded decentralized, roof-top
solar as too small to make a significant impact on energy usage and
thought that Glaser’s ideas of going into space presented other practical
difficulties, though they liked his approach of thinking big. Rejecting
photovoltaics combined with storage as too expensive and low-
temperature collectors as too inefficient and therefore expensive, they
proposed high-temperature concentrating collectors coupled with molten
salt storage as the way to provide a constant source of heat to drive elec-
tric generators. They suggested building the system in units of 1,000
megawatts (electric), eventually accommodating 1,000 such units on the
equivalent of a square of land only seventy-four miles on a side.9
The Meinels understood the importance of language in depicting their
technology and used metaphors skillfully to describe it and the values
associated with it:
One must be aware of the degrees to which words polarize people when it comes
to sensitive topics. We have become aware that the moment we mention power
plants some people cease to hear what we are saying because of the opposition
that has been generated to power plants in the past two years. We are tempted
to call our proposal for solar farms to reap the energy harvest from the sun since
in a very real sense we are not destroying a resource – we are creating one out
of sunshine.10
These technologically ambitious conventional advocates still maintained
a guarded social view of the change to solar energy. While conscious of
solar’s environmental benefits, they saw no reason to make a large social
change in the process of moving to a solar energy system. They assumed
the status quo in the basic technological ensemble and in the social and
political structures that go with it. They saw their technology as a way
of preserving the status quo, albeit with more attention to environmen-
tal consequences. They emphasized growth and prosperity, narrowly
conceived.11 All of these proposals conceptualized solar energy simply as
a replacement for conventional fuels, and so they implicitly endorsed
conventional values about technologies and social systems. As Ford and
Kane concluded, “The most satisfactory response to these problems is to
find an energy source which is not in short supply and which can provide
a major fraction of our energy needs without causing major environ-
mental disruptions.”12
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The scientific trade press – journals targeted broadly to scientists as
opposed to narrow technical journals – began paying more and favor-
able attention to solar energy. For instance, reporters from the Research
News section of Science published a book on energy that argued that
solar could be competitive in only five years and that it should get sub-
stantially more R&D money from the government.13 However, solar’s
coverage in the mass media, though growing from 1969 to the embargo
in 1973, remained scant.14
After the 1973 oil embargo this group of solar advocates, some 
technologically guarded, others more ambitious, continued to accept the
social and political norms that went along with conventional energy
systems. The virtues of solar to these advocates included that it was
cleaner than fossil fuels, it was inexhaustible, and it was not subject 
to foreign embargos. This group did not, in the main, challenge the 
fundamental assumptions that the demand for energy would increase
inexorably and that the purpose of new technology was to find better
ways to meet that demand. They intended solar energy as something that
could plug right into the existing technological system, in some cases
almost literally. Their main goals for government programs, besides
removing institutional barriers, were to bring down the initial costs of
the solar energy systems. Repeatedly they averred that solar systems were
almost competitive with conventional fuels and that R&D programs
could soon make them fully competitive.15 These advocates were leery
of making what they considered extravagant short-term claims for 
solar energy.16 This group included a few mainstream politicians and
businessmen.17
By the mid-1970s, some very large corporations, including some elec-
tric utilities, were getting involved in the solar industry. General Motors
announced in February 1977 that its radiator division would begin
making flat-plate collectors and firms like General Electric, Exxon,
Mobil, ASARCO (a mining and metals processing firm), and Grumman
were already in the solar business, many having bought out smaller solar
equipment firms.18 These large firms formed a significant and conserva-
tive segment of the guarded solar advocates. This group tended to have
more restricted views about the potential for solar. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, these actors associated purely conventional values with solar tech-
nology, principally that of economic efficiency. The energy problem was,
to them, simply a question of meeting market demand for energy at the
lowest possible price, and solar was interesting insofar as it could solve
such a problem.
Similar organizations and individuals, including national politicians,
also promoted solar development and associated with it very conven-
tional values. These writings depicted solar as good for a state, region,
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or industry because it protected the users from future price increases or
shortages of fossil fuels – a combination of economic rationality and
security goals.19 Others, particularly politicians, noted that solar was eco-
nomically more competitive than many people realized, but was being
held back by other barriers, such as building codes, bankers’ conser-
vatism, and uninformed consumer habits.20 These conventional solar
advocates promoted solar without any intention of changing the funda-
mental normative orientation of social and political institutions. They
took an endlessly growing consumer culture and the ways of life that
went with it for granted.
Ecological Advocates
The period from 1969 to the embargo saw the continuing emergence of
a different normative idea in the energy debate, that of environmental
protection. Several institutional developments, changes in public dis-
course, changes in problem definitions, and dramatic external events
came together to make environmental issues highly salient and link them
tightly to energy policy.21 Environmental groups made their presence felt
in numerous policy arenas. President Nixon, in his 1970 State of the
Union Address, recognized the importance of environmental protection,
and his administration gave its approval to the first Earth Day. The value
of protecting the environment rapidly became an important part of the
American political discourse, from the grassroots to the presidency, and
an issue to be faced when thinking about energy policy.22
Solar advocates touted their technology as environmentally benign,
and environmentalists came to see solar as an important part of the solu-
tion to the structural problem of energy-related pollution. Due to cleav-
ages in the solar community, solar advocates and environmentalists never
became a single unified force. Nonetheless, they overlapped substantially,
with major figures in the environmental movement playing lead roles in
the solar movement by the late 1970s. Solar advocates of all stripes spoke
up about the environmental benefits of their technologies, especially
compared to conventional energy technologies. For example, the Meinels
discussed the potential environmental impact of their ideas for a large-
scale system for generating electricity in 1971 and concluded that nega-
tive effects would be minimal even though theirs would have been 
the most environmentally disruptive of the solar technologies.23 Many
authors discussing or advocating more modest-sized applications of solar
also mentioned its environmental benefits.24
Just as important, environmentalists by this time began to think that
solar energy could play a role in leading a more environmentally har-
monious life.25 Organizations such as the Sierra Club, the Audubon
Society, and Friends of the Earth began publishing articles and editori-
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als in their organizations’ magazines that called for greater attention to
and resources for solar energy. They often presented it as the only way
out of the environmental disruption caused by the use of conventional
fuels. They explicitly criticized the Nixon administration’s emphasis on
nuclear power and fossil fuels.26 An article in Audubon summed up the
thinking of these groups:
How the electricity is generated has been of little concern until recently. The
cheapest way was considered the best way, and the environment be damned (or
dammed!). We must rethink our whole concept of supplying energy to the nation.
. . . Solar power offers exciting prospects. . . . Although we must not delude our-
selves into thinking solar power is a cure-all, we must pursue it because, when
all the resources, energy, and ecological balance sheets are tallied up, solar power
will almost certainly be the most efficient way. . . . We will need massive invest-
ments in R&D, but when you can put a man on the moon, there is little you
can’t do – technologically, that is.27
The message of this sort of writing is quite clear: If one were serious
about protecting the environment, then one must also think very seri-
ously about solar energy. By this line of thinking, not only was environ-
mental protection an important value when thinking about energy, 
but solar energy became the very embodiment of that value. These writ-
ings also included a direct challenge to the notion that conventional eco-
nomic measures, particularly short-term ones, should dominate energy
policy.
After the 1973 oil embargo, environmentalists increasingly couched
their advocacy of solar in a critique of nuclear power.28 The conflict
between solar and nuclear power formed the major axis of cleavage
within the solar movement and in the energy debate more generally. Solar
advocates of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, with perhaps one exception,
would have found such a conflict puzzling at best, as many of them had
worked on nuclear power and were sympathetic to it. But by the mid-
1970s a substantial antinuclear movement vigorously opposed new
power plant construction, and utility executives were concerned about
anything that could undercut public support for nuclear power.29 One
such problem was public enthusiasm for solar energy and the broad
public perception that it was already available or soon would be. An
October 1976 article in the Solar Technology Report, a publication for
the utility industry, noted with dismay a recent national survey that indi-
cated that the public thought solar was the cheapest form of energy.
According to this publication, “Electric utilities, as represented by EEI
[Edison Electric Institute], see this perception of solar energy as ‘cheap’
as leading to an erosion of favor for nuclear power.”30 Clearly, some
pronuclear interests had reasons to be hostile to solar energy.
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From the environmental and antinuclear movements thus emerged
another type of solar advocate, which I call an ecological advocate, who
injected explicit and different normative concerns into the debate over
solar policy – some related to ecological relationships and others
focussing more on social and political matters. The latter were funda-
mental to the ecologists’ critique because they saw alternative modes of
living as essential for a sustainable society. Such advocates talked about
ecological stewardship, the moral obligation to preserve resources and
ecosystems for future generations. They also discussed how solar, done
properly, would use more decentralized technology that would enhance
communities by giving them more autonomy and control over their 
most crucial systems.31 Advocates expressed these sentiments in a variety
of ways:
Energy attitudes, both nuclear and solar, are currently characterized by an inor-
dinate concentration upon technological “tricks”. . . . The question of energy
choice must be looked at as a LIFE CHOICE. What kind of people do we want
to become?32
Early Ecological Advocates
From the beginning of the energy crisis, a group of analysts often 
linked their concerns about environmental degradation to a set of 
critiques of the broader structures of a modern technological capitalist
society. These analysts came from a variety of perspectives but had in
common the notion that environmental problems resulted from funda-
mental incompatibilities between modern political and social structures
and living in harmony with the natural world. According to these 
critiques, modern technological systems were not simply malfunctioning
or manifesting inefficiencies; they were in some profound sense unable
to preserve the environment, and the social and political structures that
had produced those technologies could not make sufficient improve-
ments to prevent a serious ecological disaster. In particular, these cri-
tiques asserted that conventional values like economic growth and
national security were so deeply embedded in modern technological
systems, as in the sociopolitical systems that created them, that acting
on other values like ecological preservation required a wholesale trans-
formation of both systems. Shortly after the 1973 oil embargo, these
notions began to penetrate the solar movement and to cause serious
cleavages within it. After almost thirty years of consistency in the values
associated with energy, including solar, these structural, ecological con-
cerns provided an entrance to a whole host of new values, challenging
the conventional values that analysts had associated with energy for
decades.33
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These ecological solar advocates put their views of solar technology
into a broader framework that had a characteristic analysis of energy
policy. Despite some variation, their core idea emphasized that an ever-
growing consumption of energy and other materials was not sustainable,
no matter what technological breakthroughs society might develop.
Moreover, energy efficiency must be taken more seriously if the energy
crisis was to have any solution.34 As David Brower of Friends of the Earth
wrote in his foreword to Amory B. Lovins and John H. Price’s 1975
book, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy:
The environmental view, then, is that the sooner the threat of energy addiction
is ended, the better. . . . Since extirpatory growth must end sometime, it ought to
be stopped by people, while they and the earth still have some roots left. We are
pleased with the force of the author’s demonstration that there are such strong
economic and ethical arguments for a strategy that is in humanity’s own 
self-interest.35
While these analysts made economic arguments, they insisted that other
values should play a role in energy policy. For example, Lovins wrote in
the introduction to Non-Nuclear Futures:
Fundamental to any discussion of energy alternatives is a choice – usually tacit
but nonetheless real – of personal values. The values that make a high-energy
society work are all too apparent today. The values that would make a lower-
energy society work are not new; they are in the societal attic, and could be
dusted off and recycled. They include thrift, simplicity, diversity, neighbourliness,
craftsmanship, and humility. They also include the clear thinking needed to 
avoid a prevalent confusion between growth and distribution (the “let them eat
growth” theory), between movement and progress, and between costs and 
benefits.36
His metaphor for the values that needed to be put into energy choices
likened them to old family mementos, or perhaps clothes, that we would
find in our attics – nothing new or exotic, still serviceable, and needing
nothing more than dusting off.37 Presented in this way, as a return to tra-
ditional values, Lovins’s propositions were more appealing than a call
for radical change. His arguments could minimize people’s fears that they
might have to take on situations and ways of life that were foreign to
them. But adopting such social norms would in fact have meant a drastic
change to the 1970s status quo.
This ecological group of analysts generally opposed nuclear power.
Organizations opposed to nuclear power grew in numbers and political
sophistication during the late 1960s and 1970s.38 Such advocates saw
solar as the answer to the question of what to do if society did not
expand nuclear power.39 In the most sophisticated versions, they
grounded their opposition to nuclear power in the same normative 
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concerns that led to support for solar energy, namely, that energy systems
had to function in ways that were ecologically sustainable and socially
desirable. Exactly what constituted socially desirable values varied
among writers, but some of the items quoted above from Lovins
appeared frequently. These writers saw technological systems as putting
into place structures and incentives that encouraged certain ways of life
and discouraged others. To them, nuclear power, as the extension of 
conventional energy practices and technologies, would continue to ac-
celerate the negative trends already in evidence, from environmental
degradation to the erosion of local, familiar institutions and their
replacement by larger, bureaucratic, and insensitive ones. In this sense
they considered technology to be like legislation, and they felt that a 
drastically different society would require drastically different techno-
logical systems as well as different laws, indeed that different techno-
logies would constitute new opportunities and constraints, much like
new laws.40
Contemporaneously, many writers engaged in a broader discussion
about what they called appropriate or alternative technology. They called
into question the conventional set of technologies used in industrial soci-
eties and the social arrangements that had grown up with and around
them. All of these works criticized large-scale technological systems and
all argued for social values that could be attained only with the use of
alternative technologies.41 The arguments varied among different writers,
who did not always fully develop them.42 Nonetheless, most of them con-
curred with a critique of conventional technologies summarized in the
magazine AERO Sun Times:
Continuation of present technologies is neither possible nor desirable. The tech-
nologies themselves are proving socially, environmentally, and spiritually dam-
aging, and often uncontrollable. The values they support are no longer desired,
and their product no longer seen as the primary wants of our society. And alter-
native technologies are available.43
The appropriate solar technologies would be small, decentralized, labor-
intensive, relatively simple, and so forth. The emphasis was to improve
people’s quality of life while reducing their quantity of consumption.44
Some people regarded ecological solar advocates as simply alternative
technology (AT) adherents who focused on energy in trying to achieve
their broader aims. While it is true that people and ideas overlapped
among AT groups and ecological solar advocates,45 the reality was more
complex. Individuals came to the position of ecological solar advocacy
from a variety of paths, and they had differing degrees of support for
the more general AT movement. In particular, some solar advocates
regarded the AT emphasis on the development of small rural communi-
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ties in both the developing and industrialized worlds as missing the major
issue in energy debates, namely, the political and economic conflicts
between solar and nuclear energy systems and, more generally, between
industrialization and sustainability.46
In sum, ecological solar advocates saw technologies as legislation.
They explicitly associated technologies with normative ideas, regardless
of the direction of causal arrows, and thus they promoted solar energy
technologies because they also favored certain ways of life and social and
political institutions, such as environmental sustainability or community
self-reliance. The line between the AT movement and the ecologically ori-
ented solar movement was often fuzzy, and sometimes it was not clear
who was on which side.
Ecological solar advocates began growing in importance in the solar
movement right at the time that solar energy began growing in popu-
larity with the public. Congress had increased the budgets for solar R&D
beyond the amounts that President Ford had requested his last year in
office.47 A Roper poll taken two months after President Carter took office
identified solar energy as the public’s favored energy source to replace
foreign oil in the long term, and solar was second only to coal in the
short term.48 The solar movement gained strength and grew in size and
organization, despite its fragmentation. In addition to the American
chapter of the International Solar Energy Society and the Solar Energy
Industries Association, by early 1977 organizational solar advocates
included environmental groups, such as Friends of the Earth, and public
interest groups, such as Ralph Nader’s Public Interest Research Group.
The movement also encompassed grassroots solar groups and others
based in universities.49 Many of the grassroots groups embraced ecolog-
ical solar advocacy values in the ways they framed the energy problem
and the values they associated with solar technologies. They contrasted
their technologies’ values with those of conventional technologies, such
as those expressed in a statement focusing on “the difference between
self-reliance and dependence, self-determination and centralization,
cooperation vs. competition and accountability as opposed to exploita-
tion.”50 Debates about the values involved in energy choices were often
implicit or carried on in some of the small newsletters or journals cited
previously. But they leapt into public prominence in 1976 and 1977 in
arguments over the proposals of a young energy analyst, Amory Lovins.
Lovins and the Soft Path
In October 1976, Amory Lovins, a consultant physicist and energy policy
analyst working for Friends of the Earth, published an article in the high-
profile journal, Foreign Affairs, that was later expanded into a 1977
book, Soft Energy Paths.51 These works affected the energy policy debate
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remarkably, triggering an immediate and furious response from many
critics, with Lovins responding in detail to each of them. He presented
a thorough critique of conventional thinking about energy policy and the
most creative and sophisticated arguments in favor of solar energy to
date. His analysis provided a conceptual focus for a group of growing
importance in the solar movement – those who based their attachment
to solar energy on beliefs about the nature of environmental problems
and the relationship of energy technologies to them.52 Lovins’ arguments
fit into the cleavage between solar and nuclear power well, as part of his
strategy for a soft energy path included a rejection of future central
station nuclear power plants, and he had written previous works that
had also been critical of nuclear power.53
Lovins had two fundamental analytical points that diverged radically
from more conventional analyses. First, in estimating the needed energy
supply, he started from end-use demand and worked backwards, fol-
lowing the principle that energy supply should be matched to end-use
needs in scale and quality. By matched in scale he meant that we should
use large energy production facilities for large uses and small ones for
small uses, and thus not build a large power plant to heat a house when
passive solar design and solar hot water heaters will do the job. By
matched in quality he meant that we should not use expensive forms of
energy, such as electricity, to perform low-grade jobs, such as domestic
space heating and hot water. Electricity should be used for tasks for
which it is uniquely suited, such as lighting and telecommunications. His
second analytical point was that the costs of energy from different
sources should be compared in terms of their long-run marginal costs,
not their current average costs, since the latter for fossil fuels were often
artificially low.54 Based on these analytical principles, he argued that over
the next fifty years the United States should move toward an energy
system characterized by reliance on very efficient energy technologies
combined with a variety of renewable energy resources, many of which
would be more decentralized than was then the case. In particular, he
argued that the United States should not build more large, central station
power plants.55
Lovins defended his technical claims at length. Just as importantly, he
understood that debates over energy policy were political and ethical,
debates over the kind of society in which one wants to live, and said so.
“In my view, on the other hand, the energy problem is chiefly a social,
political, and ethical one of how to accomplish our society’s diverse goals
by meeting its heterogeneous end-use needs with an elegant economy of
energy.”56 He regarded his soft path superior to the hard path (conven-
tional energy policy) in many ways, including on the basis of a tradi-
tional value, economic efficiency. The soft path energy system would be
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cheaper in the strict microeconomic sense than the hard path, assuming
that the accounting was done properly. He also emphasized that the soft
path would better promote pluralism, another value important in 
American political culture that had been little evoked in energy discus-
sions. People could live a variety of lifestyles, if they were willing to pay
for them, under a soft energy path, but certain lifestyles would be cur-
tailed under a hard one. “In my view of the future, people who want to
live [in a manner that uses a great deal of energy] can do so, but those
who don’t needn’t: there is room for diverse lifestyles, including those
representing post-industrial values.”57
While the soft path was consistent with ecological values, Lovins
argued strongly that it did not require them, that it could co-exist with
more conventional values like economic rationality. Nonetheless, the eco-
logical side of the solar movement embraced his work with enthusiasm,
and supporters and critics associated those values with him and his work.
The split within the solar movement deepened, and these ideological
arguments provided the backdrop for debates during the Carter admin-
istration over solar policy.58
Critiques of Lovins
Lovins’ work prompted a flood of editorials, articles, reports, and photo-
copied papers that circulated quickly in energy policy communities,
including fierce criticisms written by both nuclear and some solar advo-
cates in academia and industry. A set of senate hearings collected many of
these, along with Lovins’ responses to them. The final documents ran to
over 2,200 pages.59 The critiques published in this report often attacked
Lovins on a variety of arcane technical grounds, and he responded to them
in kind. One of his contentions that had made the soft energy path argu-
ment so important and provocative was that it was optimal from a narrow
economic point of view.60 However, a reading of the record makes it clear
that the often vituperative tone in Lovins’ critics was not a mere dis-
agreement over data or calculations. The criticisms often turned ad
hominem, ridiculing and nasty. These people were upset.
For example, Dr. Ralph Lapp, an energy and nuclear consultant,
wrote that “Mr. Lovins has authored a very irresponsible article.” Later
in his critique he said, “By the same token he [Lovins] suffers from the
Aladdin Syndrome; he apparently believes that non-existent energy
sources can spring forth from an R&D lamp, fully developed and eco-
nomically viable.” Perhaps most revealingly, he said, “Mr. Lovins here
seems incapable of understanding that the trend to electrification in an
industrial society does have its own logic and that the trend is now inten-
sified by the necessity to shift from fluid to solid fuels.”61 This last
comment revealed a conception of the energy problem reminiscent of
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those since the 1950s, where human agency vanished entirely. The energy
problem derived from some deterministic “logic” instead of government
policies, business decisions, and the actions of other human institutions.
This type of policy narrative depicts the energy problem as an acciden-
tal cause, like the weather or an earthquake, one in which unguided
actions, the logic of electrification, result in unintended consequences,
the rapid growth in demand for fuels.62 This lack of agency also implies
a lack of responsibility and control. If no one or no institution caused
this electrification, then no one was responsible and nothing could be
done about it except to supply the electricity that was needed. This
problem framing could only reject Lovins’ notions that the United States
could change the path of its energy system.
Many other Lovins critics argued in similar ways about nontechnical
issues. They clearly associated normative values with certain technolog-
ical choices, and they reacted vigorously to what they perceived as
Lovins’ challenges to some deeply held values. Ian Forbes, a consultant
who had numerous exchanges with Lovins, written and oral, said,
Even if Lovins’ path were feasible and non-coercive, it is not clear that it is
axiomatically a desirable goal. It flies in the face of centuries of human transi-
tion and the desire for less individual physical effort. In fact, it is in many ways
a re-run of the protracted debate over industrialization in 19th century England.63
Equally vehement and vituperative critiques came from some conven-
tional solar advocates. Sheldon Butt, then president of the Solar Energy
Industries Association, wrote a furious article, reprinted in the hearings,
in which he described Lovins as possessing the “arrogance of a self-
appointed Messiah.” Claiming that the social and political implications
of an energy strategy are the most important, he said,
In summary, Chapter X of Lovins’ article truly identifies his goals as being those
of creating a “new society” founded upon the concept of “elegant frugality” –
in short, a society of peasants and craftsmen. The promises made earlier in the
article that we can abandon much of our present energy capital stock and replace
it with “soft” energy without giving up the material benefits which we 
have received from our present system are revealed by Chapter X as purposeful
falsehoods.64
Aden and Marjorie Meinel, who had worked on the development of
central station solar power plants in the desert Southwest, wrote yet
another strong ad hominem attack on Lovins:
We are chilled at the actions advocated by this seductive and well-written article
and appalled that a person claiming to be a physicist could resort to what appears
to us as distortions of technical reality. . . . Should this siren philosophy be heard
and believed we can perceive the onset of a New Dark Age.65
128 During the Energy Crisis
Previously implicit values in debates about solar energy and energy
policy came out into the open. Lovins was accused of being Messianic,
elitist, a liar, and a zealot who intended to turn modern democracies into
feudal dictatorships. Can one be the Antichrist just for developing a
novel approach for calculating dollars per BTU? Obviously not, but
Lovins had hit on some very sensitive nerves, challenging directly the
fundamental values and technical beliefs that dominated conventional
thinking about energy policy, and he had done so credibly and in an
important forum so that defenders of the status quo felt the need to
respond quickly and vigorously. The debate reached the White House,
with some of Lovins’ critics from the nuclear industry sending their com-
ments to Katherine Schirmer, President Carter’s chief aide for energy. By
the end of October 1977 even Lovins’ critics realized that they were
getting nowhere attacking his technical arguments, so detailed and ready
were his responses, and that he was besting them in debates.66 These
debates were never resolved in any simple sense. They instead became
rallying points for those on different sides of the issues. Interestingly,
some of Lovins’ claims about energy efficiency that critics branded 
as outlandish in 1977 became part of conventional wisdom not many
years later.
RECONSTRUCTING ENERGY POLICY
Solar advocates of all stripes did more than promote their technology;
they also tried to present a view of energy policy more generally that was
congenial to their view of their technology. The growing energy crisis
provided conventional and ecological solar advocates an opportunity to
reconstruct energy policy in important ways.
Conventional Solar Advocates
Even before the oil embargo, conventional solar advocates sounded an
alarm of imminent shortages. They framed their arguments in terms of
an impending crisis: Only by beginning the change to solar energy imme-
diately could society avoid disastrous shortages in the near future. In his
1972 book, B. J. Brinkworth stated dramatically in his first sentence,
“Our grandchildren will live in a world without oil.”67 Metaphorically,
conventional solar advocates depicted all energy as a physical entity, and
they believed that society was using a finite source in fossil fuels that was
running short. As Daniel S. Halacy put it:
Of importance is the fact that while there is still fossil fuel left, we have already
gone through the cream . . . and are now working on the skimmed milk, with
the bottom of the bottle embarrassingly visible. Surely there is more coal and
surely there is more oil. We just have to dig deeper, or haul farther, or process
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more. But it takes energy to mine a ton of coal, and when that energy approaches
what is contained in the coal itself, we are in trouble and had better leave the
stuff in the ground.68
Conceptualizing energy as a set of distinct physical goods leads to very
different conclusions than, for example, the concept of energy as an eco-
nomic good whose scarcity is indicated by price.
By 1971–1972 solar energy received good press in journals read by a
wide segment of the scientific community, as well as in specialized seg-
ments of the lay media. All of these accounts tended to depict solar as
necessary because of the eventual exhaustion of fossil fuels, and as desir-
able because of its limited environmental impacts. Those concerned 
with the end of fossil fuels used a language of crisis. An article in the
Smithsonian declared that,
This is the energy crisis, a crisis which has little to do with the summertime dif-
ficulties of power companies or the political considerations of importing Mideast-
ern oil. It requires recognition of the fact that our energy resources are dwindling,
the bitter realization that at some not-so-distant hour the party will be over.
This meant that, in the words of the Washington editor of the New 
Scientist,
even the nation’s politicians – President Nixon among them – have begun to cast
around in some desperation for energy technologies that will see the United States
through to the next millennium. Power from the Sun, while even on the most
optimistic of forecasts is not expected to provide more than a small fraction of
these needs, is suddenly no longer regarded as a quaint, if intellectually appeal-
ing, technological backwater.
These articles, and others like them, typically reviewed several solar tech-
nologies, noting recent developments and that all or most of them were
not yet commercially competitive. The articles usually ended by stating
that solar received only a tiny fraction of federal funding on energy. Pre-
senting solar energy this way, especially in the scientific trade press, as a
neglected but developing technology, built a case for it as a legitimate
topic deserving of more research funds.69 All of these authors, while indi-
cating a strong sense of crisis, accepted as inevitable and unremarkable
the technological, social, and political arrangements that led to that
crisis. Perceiving that the country is “running out” of fossil fuels, 
they responded by seeking technologies that could deliver the same 
quantities of bulk energy to keep those very technological, social, and
political arrangements functioning. The crisis, they hoped, had a 
technological fix.
After the oil embargo and price increases of October 1973, conven-
tional solar advocates sounded the same themes, this time with an acute
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crisis to give their points more salience. For example, Paul Fannin, a
senator from Arizona and long-time supporter of solar energy, framed
United States energy policy as starkly dichotomous choices:
Thus, the United States seems to be faced with two choices: reduce the nation’s
consumption of energy, with a parallel reduction in the standard of living; or
take steps, including intelligent conservation programs, to ensure a continuing
ample supply of energy for this country and for other nations as well. Most
Americans would agree that the second choice is the wiser, assuming that it is
possible.70
The rest of the article talked about the potential of various solar tech-
nologies and the barriers to their adoption. Senator Fannin sought to
preserve the existing arrangements that constituted contemporary
society, arguing that the absence of solar could lead to social change.
This view of the energy crisis led conventional advocates in par-
ticular policy directions. They tended to be broad in their support of
solar, arguing for all kinds of solar technologies.71 Many of them had an
especially strong orientation to large solar projects. The Meinels, dis-
cussed earlier, were quite explicit in preferring large projects, in their case
solar farms in the desert Southwest. Since the energy system required
large quantities of electricity, it made sense to them to build large pro-
jects that enjoyed economies of scale.72 Another popular concept
throughout the 1970s was ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC).
The sun heated the top layer of sea water, but deeper waters remained
very cold. By exploiting this temperature difference, huge floating power
plants could generate large amounts of electricity.73 All of these large
technologies would be expensive undertakings, and their proponents
acknowledged that their costs, at least for the initial few plants, would
be greater than for conventional plants. But they claimed that the acute
crisis and environmental constraints made the investment a wise one in
the long-term:
There’s no doubt that bulk power can be made through solar energy conversion.
We’ve got the technology. The problem is cost. But the expensive conversion of
sunlight into electricity is becoming more attractive as our fossil fuels run out or
become too dirty to burn.74
Most of these conventional advocates had no opposition to other
long-term energy sources, such as nuclear power, though they thought
that solar was better. Many thought solar to be only one part of the
future energy mix, one that included breeder reactors. “It is necessary to
continue to use all these [other energy sources], and to develop such
follow-on sources as the breeder reactor and fusion power plants.”75
While these advocates argued that solar was not getting its fair share 
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of social resources, almost none of them were associated with the 
antinuclear movement.
A key policy point for these advocates was the notion of barriers; 
solar needed governmental help to remove financial, institutional, or
other barriers that impeded its adoption, even when it was econom-
ically competitive. For example, solar technologies required a large 
up-front investment that could dissuade potential buyers, even if the
long-run cost was favorable. This feature became an economic barrier
without easily available financing mechanisms to enable consumers 
to realize the long-term cost savings. Some barriers were questions of
habit and custom. Consumers, utilities, and banks were not familiar with
using these new technologies and so might prefer those that they knew
better.76
Ecological Solar Advocates
Ecological advocates had a different approach to energy policy. They
shied away from the view that the new technologies, such as solar or
fusion, could simply plug into the existing energy system and would
require no changes in the economic, social, or cultural context of which
the energy system was a part. To the contrary, many of these advocates
saw the roots of the energy crisis in precisely such nontechnological
factors, and so their prescriptions for change ranged more widely.
A common theme in these advocates’ writing was that of a transition.
The principle sources of energy had changed in the past from wood to
coal and, later, to oil and natural gas. As oil and natural gas became
scarce, society would have to make a transition to some new energy
source. The question was, which one?
The notion of a transition was not unique to ecological solar advo-
cates. Energy policy analysts of many stripes used the same word. Indeed,
the very same graph began appearing in diverse government energy
policy documents (see Chapter 5). For example, during the Ford admin-
istration the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)
released a major planning document for energy R&D. To justify the gov-
ernment’s accelerated R&D program, the document talked about the
transition to “unlimited energy supplies” as part of a longer historical
process. It included a graph showing the sequential rise and decline of
wood, coal, and petroleum, and the possible rise of nuclear power. The
report acknowledged that, in addition to technological problems, “Of
equal importance will be the difficult institutional problems which tran-
sition will impose.” However, other than this cryptic sentence, the rest
of the report read as if the only problems were technological.77 Three
years later, a DOE report on the status of solar energy used the exact
same graph, minus the nuclear part, to talk about the coming transition
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and the need for new energy technologies. Again, the transition appeared
mainly technological.78
The ecological advocates thought that the impending changes in the
energy system would bring with them large social, political, and eco-
nomic changes:
Just as in the past cases, the coming transition to sustainable energy will entail
far more sweeping changes than simply the shift from one energy source to
another. The transition will entail radical transformations in the panoply of tech-
nologies involved in the production, conversion, and consumption of energy; in
the structure of institutional, economic, group, and individual relationships; and
in the theory, philosophy, values, and goals that define the direction of social
behavior.79
Moreover, this transition was one of choice. There was not a single,
inevitable next energy system, but rather a competition between solar
energy and breeder reactors or nuclear fusion. According to these ana-
lysts, different technological choices would lead to very different social
futures:
But energy sources are not neutral and interchangeable. Some energy sources are
necessarily centralized; others are necessarily dispersed. Some are exceedingly
vulnerable; others will reduce the number of people employed. Some will tend
to diminish the gap between rich and poor; others will accentuate it.80
These social and political concerns, as well as environmental ones, led
ecological advocates to promote certain types of government policies and
solar technologies.
For some analysts, the implications of the transition also lent urgency
and danger to the choices of future energy technologies. As David Orr
put it:
Historical evidence indicates that the shift can involve great turmoil leading to
social and political disintegration. We might reasonably assume that the greater
the dependence on nonrenewable energy sources (e.g. fossil fuels) and the greater
the demand for energy, the more difficult the change will be. . . . Because of the
high capital costs of the renewable energy options, they are to a large extent
mutually exclusive.81
In this view, energy policy did not possess the luxury of trial and error.
Since the new energy system would utilize inexhaustible fuel and
consume most of the available capital, a bad choice would produce very
long-lived bad consequences.
Note that, for the purposes of analyzing what drove various solar
advocates, it does not matter whether the ecological advocates were
correct in their assessment that certain political and social consequences
would in fact flow from the preferred technologies. What matters is that
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they believed that their preferred technologies – in this case small-scale,
decentralized solar energy – would produce the society and politics they
desired. One could criticize this approach as a naive technological deter-
minism, which in some instances it was, and one that solar advocates
shared with their critics. For our purposes, however, it is more useful to
see this advocacy as something different. A pervasive energy system
would, in their view, erect powerful incentives and constraints affecting
social actors, that is, technology would act as a form of legislation. In
particular, these advocates claimed that small-scale solar energy would
encourage a society more environmentally benign, less hierarchical and
bureaucratic, and with greater social justice.82 Given the tight linkage
that they perceived between technological choices and these social
norms, it seems clear that these normative values drove this debate, cre-
ating a serious cleavage with more conventional solar advocates and
most senior government officials. Those officials were, in a profound
sense, seeking different goals and solutions to different problems.
ECOLOGICAL ADVOCATES CRITIQUE
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
These normative concerns also led ecological advocates to oppose large-
scale alternatives to solar, such as breeder reactors and nuclear fusion.
While both would be almost inexhaustible, the breeder was controver-
sial in terms of safety, and its use of plutonium raised concerns about
weapons proliferation. A workable fusion reactor did not (and does not
yet) exist, and so its costs, availability, and environmental problems were
still speculative. Yet, while these problems were part of the ecological
advocates objections, they were also concerned with the normative issues
associated with those technologies.
These normative commitments also led ecological advocates to favor
certain types of government policy support, not just support for partic-
ular technologies. Ecological advocates were very critical of government
programs that favored traditional linkages with large corporations and
more centralized technologies, even centralized solar technologies. For
example, in a 1977 series of articles Allen Hammond and William Metz
critiqued the government’s solar program, arguing that it was modeled
on the nuclear power program, which looked mainly to large centralized
electric power plants and which sought to choose a technology early and
build large-scale facilities very quickly. The driving assumption of such
a program was that only large-scale facilities could expand supply
quickly, and there was considerable pressure on government officials to
do something about the energy crisis.83 Such a policy, they warned, would
make the same mistakes that the nuclear program had made, choosing
a technology too early and so possibly missing a superior technology that
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was in an earlier stage of development. Just as important, the develop-
ment model of the nuclear program, whatever its virtues, was singularly
inappropriate to a solar program. Hammond and Metz argued that solar
was qualitatively different from other energy sources:
Solar energy is democratic. It falls on everyone and can be put to use by indi-
viduals and small groups of people. The public enthusiasm for solar is perhaps
as much a reflection of this unusual accessibility as it is a vote for the environ-
mental kindliness and inherent renewability of energy from the sun.84
This quote demonstrates an explicit recognition of the value content
of energy policy choices that was still uncommon in the mainstream sci-
entific media. Instead of starting the article with a criticism that federal
policy was not going to minimize costs, Hammond and Metz went
directly to a normative issue. Federal policy did not recognize the nor-
mative properties of solar energy technologies, their “democratic” and
decentralist character, and so the solar programs would fail to develop
solar in the best way, that is, they would fail to develop it as a qualita-
tively different kind of energy source.85 This conception of the energy
policy problem frames the issue quite differently than does the conven-
tional one. Solar is more than simply a replacement for declining fossil
fuel supplies. One is doing more than simply unplugging conventional
supplies and plugging in solar. Rather, in this view, solar energy, if devel-
oped in a way that acknowledges its normative properties, brings with
it the prospect of changes in social and political institutions as well as
energy sources.
Hammond and Metz understood that much of the debate over the
feasibility of solar energy, that is, how much it could replace fossil fuels
and by when, was in fact a hidden normative debate:
Assessments of this question [potential for solar market penetration] tend to get
swept up into what has become a highly charged debate between environmental
advocates and the defenders of coal and nuclear power – a debate whose terms
are more nearly philosophical or ethical than economic.86
Coming on the heels of the furor raised by Lovins’ work, this conclu-
sion may not seem surprising. But its publication in Science, a widely
read and respected mainstream journal, gave the ideas both exposure and
legitimacy. Policy makers, including White House aides, who were at all
informed on the issue probably knew about it.
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7
Limited Access: Solar Advocates and 
Energy Policy Frames
A key question for any government institution is whether and how citi-
zens can influence its policies. The pluralist model of American govern-
ment suggests that its institutions are highly permeable, that most
organized groups, assuming they can mobilize the necessary political
resources, can press their views and affect policy. A more complex view
analyzes how institutional rules, practices, and structures deeply influ-
ence who can have access to the institution and what kinds of access
they can have. In executive branch agencies the White House staff could
limit solar advocates’ access to top decision makers by appointing offi-
cials not friendly to those advocates. On the other hand, the discussion
in Chapter 5 of the conflict between the White House and both the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the Ford administration
suggests that the staffs in those agencies, particularly below the political
appointee level, often thought about energy problems quite differently
than did the White House and may have been a channel of influence for
advocates who could not get access to the White House.
In addition to the agencies, the administrations sometimes operated
ad hoc policy studies and processes. These activities often got much press
and advocates’ attention. I analyze one of them at length, the Solar
Domestic Policy Review (DPR) of the Carter administration, examining
how it provided outsider access to the policy process, to whom it did so,
and the effect of such access. I have chosen the solar DPR because it
resembles a critical case; if you expect solar advocates to influence policy
anywhere, you expect it there. Other ad hoc policy exercises, such as
Project Independence under Presidents Nixon and Ford, provided little
or no access for solar advocates. For example, Project Independence did
have an outside advisory committee, but most of the members were pres-
idents of coal, oil, and utility firms, and none of them was associated
with the solar movement. They also held a series of ten hearings around
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the country, most of which targeted regional fuel sources and none of
which focused on solar energy.1 In addition, the Nixon and Ford White
Houses were not easily accessible to solar advocates or alternative con-
ceptions of energy policy, as discussed earlier. Greatly increased access
for solar advocates during the Carter administration provided a strong
contrast to earlier administrations and also demonstrated starkly the lim-
itations of that access when advocates are unable to change the concepts,
values, and problem frames under which top officials formulate energy
policy.
ACCESS FOR SOLAR ADVOCATES UNDER CARTER
Government support for solar energy rose rapidly in Jimmy Carter’s
administration, but then began to fall even before he left office. Solar
advocates enjoyed their greatest success as a pressure group during his
presidency, but they failed to change the way top policy makers framed
the problem of energy policy and the normative and technical ideas asso-
ciated with it. They could not institutionalize a new set of values in key
segments of the policy process, suggesting the limitations both of plu-
ralist pressure group tactics in affecting long-term policy changes and of
institutionalizing values only in organizations that are peripheral to the
policy process. Hence, despite the ecological solar advocates’ prominence
in the solar movement during the Carter years and their substantial
public support and access to policy makers, they could not make changes
in the problem frames of either the Department of Energy or key parts
of the White House. As a result, support for their technology foundered.
The focus of this chapter will be two instances of advocates’ access,
one with the president and one with DOE officials during the solar DPR.
These cases provide instances of, first, direct access to the president and,
second, prolonged and intensive interaction with DOE officials. Another
important policy exercise, the National Energy Plan, also had a public
participation process, which, in principle, could have been a channel of
access for solar advocates. But the NEP was done in such haste and the
public response to its work was so massive that the officials working on
the plan could make no use of it. For instance, a request for public
written comments on the NEP received 27,898 responses, more than a
staff writing a report in ninety days could manage.2
White House Access: Lovins Meets Carter
On October 18, 1977, President Carter met with Amory Lovins. Origi-
nally only the president, Lovins, Stuart Eizenstat, who was the chief of
Domestic Policy Staff in the White House, and Katherine “Kitty”
Schirmer, Eizenstat’s chief aide for energy issues, were going to attend.
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At the last minute Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger and Science
Advisor Frank Press received invitations. Scheduled for ten minutes, 
the meeting went on for thirty, suggesting that the president took 
considerable interest in the conversation.3 Lovins remarked later that
Carter had read Soft Energy Paths and seemed quite knowledgeable
about its concepts, more so than any of his aides.4 Lovins was by this
time solidly identified with the ecological wing of the solar movement,
even though his arguments were, in part, grounded in conventional eco-
nomics. Carter’s preparatory briefing paper suggested a discussion that
focused on the competing economics of different energy technologies and
did not encourage him to get into a discussion of normative issues with
Lovins.5
The effect of the meeting on policy is impossible to gauge, but Presi-
dent Carter took Lovins seriously enough to irritate some nuclear power
advocates. Ian Forbes, an opponent of Lovins, wrote to Eizenstat, com-
plaining that the president, the day after meeting Lovins, had quoted
some of Lovins’ numbers at a meeting of international experts on the
nuclear fuel cycle. Forbes was upset that the experts would know where
the numbers came from and claimed that the numbers were not credi-
ble, and so would discredit the president. Referring to Lovins’ numbers
as “amateurish miscalculations,” Forbes said that the president had only
to ask and he could get much better advice from other experts, such as
Forbes.6
Obviously, by itself a single half-hour meeting with the president is
not likely to affect large changes in policy. But the meeting indicated a
more extensive level of contact and visibility for Lovins among senior
White House officials. This meeting took place within the context of a
raging, highly visible, debate over Lovins’ ideas in the energy policy 
community, as I detailed in Chapter 6. White House staff concerned with
energy were certainly aware of that debate.
In addition, one does not get an appointment with the president by just
calling his secretary and asking for one. Lovins’ meeting with the presi-
dent could have happened only if the president and some of his staff were
aware of Lovins’ work. The meeting would have been preceded by some
level of contacts between the president’s staff and Lovins. In short, the
meeting was important not just as a thirty-minute encounter, but also as
a reflection of a higher level of visibility for Lovins and his ideas among
White House staff. The ecological solar advocates could well begin to feel
that they had growing access to powerful decision makers.
Ad Hoc Policy Exercises: The Solar DPR
The Carter administration devised the Domestic Policy Review (DPR)
system to conduct interagency reviews of nonclassified issues. Presiden-
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tial staff had to rely on agency expertise for many issues, and getting
advice from a variety of agencies was a way of avoiding dependence on
a single agency, and hence a single source of expertise and its possible
biases.7 The administration conducted DPRs on only a small number of
issues, and getting such a review meant that high-level officials, as well
as outside constituencies, would devote substantial attention to that
issue.
In September 1977 officials at the Council for Environmental Quality
(CEQ) proposed a solar DPR and lobbied the Domestic Policy staff for
it.8 For some months the Domestic Policy staffers resisted and denied
publicly that the White House would conduct a solar DPR.9 Those
denials soon ceased. On April 6, 1978, Energy Secretary James
Schlesinger and CEQ Chair Charles Warren sent a memo to Eizenstat
formally requesting a solar DPR. In their request they depicted solar as
inexhaustible, environmentally benign, and becoming increasingly com-
petitive economically.10 This depiction reflected the traditional value of
economic rationality, with a bit of environmentalism added, and was
roughly consistent with the values expressed in the Ford and Nixon
administrations.
At the same time, Congress had been pressuring the administra-
tion to show that it was serious about solar energy. Several legislative
aides had formed the Solar Coalition, a group promoting solar legisla-
tion and an increased DOE solar budget. The coalition was determined
to push an aggressive solar program, regardless of administration
desires.11
Partly as a result of these and other pressures, Eizenstat and Schirmer
sent a memo to the president recommending the solar DPR. They noted
that “undertaking this review is not designed to commit the Adminis-
tration to larger solar budget expenditures.” Next to this comment
Carter wrote, “I agree.”12 These comments reflect a technocratic and
naive image of the role that policy analysis plays in policy making, one
that sees analysis simply as a way to inform policy makers’ decisions. In
fact, such a large undertaking as a DPR is also a political activity, one
that involves the building of coalitions, providing channels for access,
and the opening up of new policy arenas for debate and advocacy. By
involving officials from a variety of agencies and engaging in an exten-
sive public participation program, discussed later, the officials running
the DPR could not help but encourage solar advocates, despite those
advocates’ skepticism toward the administration’s solar policies. Presi-
dent Carter announced the solar DPR on Sun Day, a privately organized,
nationwide celebration of solar energy.13 Solar advocates in and out of
government were pushing for more resources, and Sun Day demon-
strated a growing public constituency for solar energy. Implementing the
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solar DPR coupled with the growing public enthusiasm for solar put
more pressure on the administration than the mere decision to under-
take the DPR might have otherwise entailed. Simply going ahead with
the study would make it very hard to contain its effects to that of merely
advising the president.14
A Solar Energy Policy Committee, a cabinet-level group chaired by
the secretary of energy, formally headed the DPR. They delegated their
responsibilities to a Coordinating Committee that was made up of senior
officials from the various agencies involved in the study. The members
of this committee then designated lower level officials as their represen-
tatives to the Integrating Group, which, chaired by a DOE official, actu-
ally carried out the study. Six substantive panels divided up the work of
the study into such subjects as the impacts of solar technologies, financ-
ing of solar, institutional incentives and barriers, and so on. The Inte-
grating Group then coordinated the panels’ work and put its results
together into a final report.15 The most controversial panel was the
impacts panel, which estimated how big a contribution solar energy
would make to the nation’s energy system by the year 2000 and “the
investment, employment, social, and environmental impacts of the esti-
mated levels of solar penetration.”16
Stuart Eizenstat made the charge to the study very broad, asking the
study about the magnitude of the potential solar contribution to energy
demand; whether all federal solar programs, “taken as a whole,” were
optimal for accelerating solar commercialization; and what kind of
federal strategy could best unite public and private efforts to achieve this
accelerated use of solar. In explaining why solar use was important,
Eizenstat said,
The national security and economic problems posed by our increasing depen-
dence on imported oil establish a clear need for the rapid development and use
of alternative domestic energy sources. Continued economic growth can occur
only if we prepare now to make the transition from oil and natural gas to energy
sources we have in abundance.17
This rationale for the study, along with the formal structure, showed
clearly that top-level officials espoused the traditional values of economic
rationality and national security when discussing solar energy. How
could solar, in a cost-effective way, replace imported oil? Despite the
study’s charge, most of the panels were concerned with narrow, prag-
matic problems in developing solar technologies. In addition, the con-
cerns that motivated ecological advocates, those who had alternative
conceptions of the issues, such as the social impacts of energy technol-
ogy, were relegated to one part of one panel. Given the DPR’s very tight
deadlines, the impacts panel was not going to be able to consider these
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alternative issues in much depth, and the traditional values shaped this
framing of energy policy as they had shaped earlier ones.18
The DPR staff had to perform a wide-ranging analysis under very
severe deadlines, quickly becoming conversant with the technologies and
issues. To help them, the DOE prepared a background report that
reviewed the technologies and issues related to solar, and summarized
eleven recent studies of solar energy. This report, while of great help to
the DPR staff, could also influence how they would think about solar
policy. For example, in summarizing all of the recent studies on solar,
the report emphasized that each of them made estimates of the fraction
of primary energy that solar might provide in the future.19 A section enti-
tled “Key Issues” listed assessing the goals for solar energy as the first
issue, with evaluating the research, development, and demonstration
program as the second. These issues framed the solar policy problem 
as a set of highly technical problems, for which there were strongly 
conflicting answers in the literature. This problem framing dominated
the high-level discussions about the DPR and solar policy, despite the
attempts of many people to interject other issues and problem frames.20
The DPR could have framed the problem differently. The Congress-
ional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) released a solar energy
study just as the DPR was getting started. The OTA study, though
mindful of the economic and national security issues, recognized that
other concerns may be more important, especially given the uncertain-
ties of economic forecasts. The OTA began by criticizing federal pro-
grams for too great an emphasis on central solar electric power plants.
The study recognized from the start that decentralized solar technologies
were not just a value-free substitute for fossil fuels or nuclear plants:
If energy can be produced from onsite solar energy systems at competitive prices,
the increasing centralization which has characterized the equipment and institu-
tions associated with energy industries for the past 30 years could be dramati-
cally altered; . . . Given the increasing fraction of U.S. industrial assets which are
being invested in energy industries, tendencies toward centralization of many
aspects of society could also be affected.21
The report contained a great deal of economic analysis of the different
solar technologies. However, its authors acknowledged that the eco-
nomics were so uncertain that they probably should not drive policy. The
possible range of solar costs overlapped the possible range of conven-
tional fuel costs, which meant that other criteria were legitimate in
making energy policy decisions.22 The OTA’s alternative problem frame
eliminated the need to attempt a precise estimate of how much solar
energy would come online how quickly, the issue that would tie up the
DPR both substantively and politically, and showed that mainstream
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government sources provided alternative problem frames if executive
branch policy makers were interested in them.
In the Issue Definition Memorandum, Eizenstat stated that the DPR
would have a public participation program but left all of the details up
to the staff running it. The staff implemented a diverse and extensive
program, going well beyond perfunctory participation. They engaged the
public from an early stage in the study and used both formal and infor-
mal methods of getting input from citizens. Moreover, the Solar Lobby,
an advocacy group, was very involved in the DPR. The public solar con-
stituency was growing and becoming better organized. The Solar Lobby
helped organize the National Solar Congress, a citizen conference held
in Washington while the DPR was in progress. These activities kept pres-
sure on the DPR to be an open process and ensured that people inter-
ested in solar would participate in its activities. In addition to hearings
and other outreach programs, the DPR staff worked with solar activists
on a daily basis.23 The DPR staff appeared to take the hearings seriously
and commissioned outside analyses of them.24
However, this participation program did not change the way officials
framed the problem. Despite early and in-depth public involvement of
some ecological solar advocates, the values of national security and eco-
nomic rationality remained paramount in conceptualizing the issue. The
problem frame did not entirely determine the outcome, as there were
other forces at work as well, such as the growing importance of the eco-
logical advocates as a pressure group. Nonetheless, the frame did 
constrain the outcome of the study, and its authors had to stretch 
considerably to stay true to their initial values and please this vocal con-
stituency. Moreover, the ecological advocates who were most closely
involved with the DPR had to try to work within a framework defined
by values that for them were not paramount.25
The DPR, though behind schedule, had a draft document ready for
public review by late August 1978. The document served to inform the
public about the current state of the DPR staff’s thinking. A paragraph
of caveats immediately after the title page claimed that, because of the
severe deadlines:
Many of these options may not be good public policy and may not be ultimately
recommended for Presidential approval. Their inclusion here does not constitute
an endorsement of their soundness or appropriateness.26
The draft contained much description of different solar technologies and
existing federal programs for them. It also presented an analysis of how
much solar energy could, under three different scenarios, be in use by
the year 2000, while acknowledging that all such estimates were very
uncertain. It presented the most analysis of the middle scenario, the
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“maximum practical case,” in which solar provided 18.1 quads of
primary energy in 2000.27 The final section of the draft discussed federal
policy for solar and a rationale for supporting it. It could contribute to
“national and international energy needs.” In doing so,
The pace of solar development also will affect progress toward other national
goals such as a clean environment, a prosperous economy, an expanding job
market, improved national security, flexibility in foreign affairs, and decreased
reliance on foreign resources.28
These goals are, with the partial exception of a cleaner environment, all
traditional ones associated with energy policy since the Truman admin-
istration. Despite all the participation, the draft DPR document reflected
no influence of those with alternative normative conceptions of the
problem.
The DPR staff aggressively sought comments on its draft, and they
received 119 by their deadline, with the largest number coming from
industry (including utilities) and public interest groups. Many comments
expressed concern over the economic analysis, with utilities and nonso-
lar industries expressing the most caution about solar potential. Public
interest groups and the general public argued, to the contrary, that 
the draft DPR document was too pessimistic in its evaluations of 
various solar technologies, and they criticized the federal government 
for lacking serious commitment to a strong solar program. The public
interest groups in particular stressed that the DPR should pick a strong
overall goal of the United States getting 25 quads (q) of solar energy 
by the year 2000, while the individual public respondents were less 
concerned about that more abstract issue.29 The public interest groups
emphasized the importance of small-scale solar technologies, while 
the public respondents criticized the draft for inadequate attention 
to the social effects of different energy technologies, including those 
on low incomes, such as the elderly, minorities, and so on. In short, 
the comments from both of these groups reflected some of the ideas 
of the ecological advocacy perspective on solar energy, providing 
yet another opportunity for those ideas to influence the policy discus-
sion. There were some differences between the groups, reflecting 
the greater sophistication at policy debates of the public interest groups,
but both emphasized a conceptualization of solar issues that still had 
not penetrated policy discussions at the top staff and policy-making
levels.30
Media coverage of the draft DPR noted the discontent of many solar
advocates with it.31 Ecological solar advocates published their own 
critiques, arguing that the DPR did not do its economics right and, at a
more political level, that the draft did not reflect the comments that 
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citizens made at the DPR public hearings. They claimed that it promoted
solar policies that would fail to expand decentralized solar and would
maintain or expand large solar projects geared to utility companies 
and large manufacturing firms. In short, the policies in the DPR would
not do much for community-oriented solar, the critics charged, and 
the process itself had been less than democratic, despite the widespread
public interest in solar.32 The DPR staff would have disputed this 
last point, as they felt very committed to the public participation
program and staged an extensive one despite the very tight deadlines
under which they were operating. Nonetheless, many participants in
those programs claimed that their views were not reflected in the final
DPR document.33
From the release of the draft DPR document to the president’s
announcement of his final decision the following June, solar advocates
and government officials engaged in an extensive debate, some of it
private, over what the president would adopt as the government’s solar
policy. The final product of the DPR study, the Response Memorandum
to the President, made it clear that the original framing of the DPR’s
problem thoroughly dominated its analysis and conclusions. The charge
had been to assess the contribution that solar could make to the U.S.
energy supply, meaning the replacement of conventional fuels, and the
best comprehensive solar strategy for enlisting public and private
resources to accelerate solar’s use. No other issue seems to have been of
any importance, despite all that the DPR staff might have heard in the
participation program. Solar was deemed important for standard eco-
nomic and national security reasons, and even the obligatory nod to its
environmental desirability got very little play – none in the Executive
Summary.34
The Response Memo outlined three scenarios: a Base Case, a
Maximum Practical Effort, and a Technical Limits Case. Building on the
then-current use of 4.8q of solar, mostly hydropower and woodburning,
the different scenarios led, by the year 2000, to 10–12q, 18q, and 25–30
q, repsectively. The memo stressed that these levels of solar penetration
assumed action at the federal, state, local, and private levels.35 The memo
then went on to describe three sets of policy options: continue present
policies, expand them, and radically expand them. These options were
not tied explicitly to the earlier scenarios, but the way they were pre-
sented made it seem that they should be. However, these policy packages
would result in drastically less use of solar than what was anticipated in
the three scenarios, except that the radical expansion policy would
supply the amount of solar energy envisioned in the middle, Maximum
Practical scenario.36 This inconsistency would be the target of much crit-
icism and debate over the final solar policy.
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Solar advocates tried to press their case to the administration in
several ways. In mid-December 1978, five members of the Solar Lobby
got a meeting with Stuart Eizenstat. The group consisted of Denis Hayes,
Tom Hayden, a solar advocate from California and organizer of the
Campaign for Economic Democracy, and the presidents of three differ-
ent unions – Lloyd McBride of the steel workers, William Wimpinsinger
of the machinists, and Edward Carlough of the sheet metal workers. The
unionists had requested the meeting, and the composition of the group
made it clear that solar advocates had connected to a constituency that
earlier environmentalists often had not. In preparation for the meeting,
the White House staff developed arguments that the solar advocates
should not measure the administration’s commitment to solar by the size
of its budgets. The aides anticipated that the solar group would ask for
larger budgets and a solar bank, an institution to make subsidized loans
for solar purchases. The final draft of the DPR had been sent to the White
House by this time, though it had not been released publicly, and it con-
tained some policy initiatives that could be very costly.37
In late February individuals from the Solar Lobby and the Solar
Energy Industries Association (SEIA) got a meeting with President
Carter.38 White House aides knew that these two groups had their dif-
ferences but realized that they were coming to present a united front for
stronger support of solar energy. High on their list was the Solar Bank,
more solar tax credits, more federal use of solar energy, dramatically
increased federal solar R&D, and a Solar Policy Council at the White
House level to coordinate solar programs. The staff recommended that
the president not commit to any of the specific programs, but listen and
use their arguments later to help justify whatever policies he did choose.
They noted that he would have to decide soon whether or not to set a
quantitative solar goal, and that the Solar Lobby had just released its
own study calling for a goal that twenty-five per cent of the nation’s
energy come from solar by the year 2000.39
The advocates’ alternative conceptualization of the problem led to
very different conclusions and associated a different set of values with
energy technology. The DPR demonstrated convincingly that none of 
the advocates’ values had managed to penetrate the thinking, or at least
writing, of the officials who drafted the final DPR documents that went
to the president. For the DPR, the only questions were how much oil
solar could displace, assuming that oil prices went up to about $25 per
barrel by the year 2000, and how much such displacement would cost
in terms of new budget expenditures, assuming that everything else, in
terms of institutions and lifestyles, stayed the same. In contrast, for the
Solar Lobby’s Blueprint study, the question was how to think about
energy in the context of what prices ought to be and what was required
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to protect the environment, acknowledging that large-scale energy
choices had serious implications for many aspects of modern life, and
that the end of oil was drawing near. The actual level of the budget was
less important than the net cost to the government and society, that is,
a billion-dollar federal solar budget that led to two billion dollars in
social benefits was a good policy.
The solar advocates did not confine their lobbying to individual meet-
ings and publishing booklets. Denis Hayes sent a memo to some of
Carter’s main political advisors, summarizing the findings and recom-
mendations of the Blueprint and urging them to see this as an opportu-
nity for Carter akin to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech.
He later wrote to Carter directly, promoting the study and making an
economic pitch, arguing that solar and conservation could “place an
absolute lid on soaring energy prices.”40 Moreover, the Solar Lobby was
not the only solar advocacy group trying to reach the president. Members
of the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as state and city
officials, all wrote to him or his aides, urging, almost uniformly, that he
adopt the twenty-five per cent solar goal for the year 2000 and start the
Solar Bank, among other policy initiatives. A group from an association
of mayors added that such a policy would be quite popular, that during
a time when most news on the energy and environmental front was bad,
he could take the lead in developing a positive policy supporting a
popular technology and so benefit politically.41 A March 1979 Roper poll
showed that solar remained the public’s favorite long-term energy source,
by almost two to one over nuclear power, and that it was in second place
just behind coal in the short-term.42
Administration officials began debating solar policy internally soon
after the release of the DPR Response Memo. Secretary of Energy
Schlesinger urged the president to choose the second of the three options
in the DPR and repeated his view that growing public interest in solar
required the president to take a leadership role.43 By May 1979, the
White House staff began drafting a decision memo to go to the presi-
dent, which would lay out his options for a final decision. An early draft
noted the advantages of solar as “reducing our balance of payments,
reducing dependence on oil imports, strengthening national security,
improving the environment, and creating jobs.” The ecological advocate
concerns about scale, decentralization, promoting self-reliant communi-
ties, and so on, were absent from this list. The draft gave as the advan-
tage of the Solar Bank that “It is a major priority of the Solar Lobby
which regards it both as a rallying point and as a desirable means for
providing a visible form of subsidy.” It also noted the disadvantage that
it would do little for the poor, and that the agencies were split, with only
the Domestic Policy Staff, the DOE, and the EPA approving of it.44
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The draft memo also recommended that the president announce a
solar goal for the year 2000 to demonstrate his leadership in what could
be a popular issue in the upcoming election. The president needed a
popular issue. Oil prices had been going up since the Iranian revolution
and the fall of the Shah in late 1978. In March came the Three Mile
Island accident, which further impeded the development of nuclear
power. The president’s April 5, 1979 energy message announced oil price
decontrol, which started shortly thereafter, and a windfall profits tax,
which was delayed in Congress. The spring and summer saw more gaso-
line shortages. Overall, the public was growing increasingly hostile to
the government and the president, largely for energy-related reasons, and
there was a sense of crisis in the White House as staff felt that the Carter
presidency was in serious political trouble.45
The process of the DPR itself had raised expectations among solar
advocates, another pressure on the president, and the draft decision
memo recommended that the president adopt the twenty per cent solar
goal that corresponded to the Maximum Practical Scenario outlined in
the DPR, the middle of the three scenarios. The memo noted that this
goal “does not correspond to any option examined by the DPR.” Next
to this statement Eizenstat wrote in the margin, “Then how can it be
recommended w/ any intellectual honesty?” The memo went on to argue
for the goal as a national goal, one for both the public and private
sectors, and so not one that would damage the budget. Next to this argu-
ment, Eizenstat wrote, “OK, but let’s talk.”46
A later draft of the decision memo gave the same rationales for solar,
and recommended that the president adopt option two of the DPR but
also a solar goal of twenty per cent, along with the Solar Bank and a
few other policies. The memo noted that the goal did “not correspond
directly to any option proposed by the DPR,” but that no longer seemed
to bother Eizenstat.47 The final draft of the memo said the same thing,
and Eizenstat attached a cover memo urging the president to adopt both
the Solar Bank and the twenty per cent goal:
In large measure, the public response to your solar message will be determined
by the reaction of the leading outside solar advocates and the members of Con-
gress who have identified themselves with this issue . . . proponents of solar
would renounce any program, no matter how solid in other areas, which did not
contain these two elements [20% goal and Solar Bank].
The president approved both the Solar Bank and the goal.48 Thus the
policy that came out of the DPR contained some things that the Solar
Lobby and like-minded advocates wanted, but it would do so without
even discussing at the highest levels the reasons those advocates gave for
supporting solar – the social and political values that they saw in a solar
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future. The president and his staff made it clear that they wanted solar
energy to help them with their immediate problems of making the status
quo work better and bolstering the values of economic rationality and
national security, both narrowly conceived.
Eizenstat’s memos also made it clear that the policy coming out of the
DPR had to be the way it was or risk the political wrath of a growing
constituency. Solar advocates had arrived as a pressure group. But the
task set for solar energy, to reduce quickly dependence on imported oil,
was daunting. Since the advocates’ values and reasoning for supporting
solar had not been accepted by the White House, they ran the risk of
losing their influence rapidly. Thus the government officials and solar
advocates were constructing this problem, and energy technologies, dif-
ferently. In the DPR, energy technologies were simply a way of provid-
ing a certain set of goods and services and of protecting the nation from
foreign influences. For the ecological advocates, they were also a way of
preserving the environment and encouraging a different type of society.
The Blueprint claimed that certain types of solar technologies “tend to
foster self-reliance, political and cultural pluralism, and a favorable
balance of payments” and that the alternatives, particularly nuclear,
entailed environmental problems. The Blueprint trod fairly lightly on the
social implications of nuclear power, but its authors cited in their foot-
notes studies that argued for severe political implications of the wide-
spread use of nuclear power, such as the need for secrecy and the
infringement of civil rights in a society in which plutonium would be in
routine commerce.49
While the Solar Lobby had an alternative set of values that shaped 
its approach to energy policy, it did not own this issue. It could not get
its definition of the issue accepted as the official definition. Despite 
the Solar Lobby’s frequent interaction with the DPR staff, despite having
one of its employees on loan to the DPR, despite its ability to be 
recognized as a significant pressure group and get meetings with the pres-
ident and his top aides, it could not change the fundamental framing of
the issue or the values that were inherent in that framing. So far, their
success as a pressure group had not led to the institutionalization of 
their values.
The president announced his solar policy at the dedication of the solar
hot water heating system on the West Wing of the White House, which
I described in the Introduction. The previous fall the White House had
announced plans to install the solar system, and its high cost had received
much negative publicity. Unhappy solar advocates argued that the col-
lectors were much more expensive than they had to be due to the special
problems of doing construction on the White House. The White House
itself emphasized that the collectors were not intended as a demonstra-
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tion of the technology but instead as symbols of the president’s com-
mitment to solar. The system was finished at the end of April 1979 and
dedication scheduled for June 20.50 The form as well as the substance of
the presidential solar policy announcement became contested issues in
the White House. Gus Speth, acting chair of the CEQ and a strong sup-
porter of solar energy, argued for it being a prime-time televised address.
Failing that, he wanted a major speech, not just “low-key, off-the-cuff
remarks.”51
Speth lost. The president announced the new solar policies at the ded-
ication of the White House solar system in a brief speech. The White
House also released a twenty-six-page Fact Sheet to go with the speech
and to accompany his solar message to Congress and, two days later, a
background report for the press.52 Both documents discussed the Solar
Bank, the goal, tax credits, and other programs. They stressed that all
of the programs, spending and tax credits, would add up to a $1 billion
solar program. In describing why solar energy was important, the back-
ground report reiterated all of the conventional arguments that had
appeared in the internal memos: the need to replace foreign oil, work
against the day when fossil fuels would be depleted, protect the envi-
ronment, hedge against inflation, and so on. In one sense, the back-
ground report put a great deal of emphasis on solar, but only in
conventional terms. “True energy security – in both price and supply –
can ultimately come to this nation only through the development of solar
and renewable technologies.”53 The administration paid no more atten-
tion to the values of the solar advocates in public than they did in private.
The advocates present at the speech, as mentioned in the Introduction,
began complaining to the press immediately after the ceremony about
the lack of depth in President Carter’s commitment to solar.54
Access Denied: Solar Advocates in Carter’s Last Years
Ecological solar advocates’ and environmentalists’ relations with Presi-
dent Carter deteriorated rapidly after the June 20 speech announcing the
solar DPR results and policy. The president gave a major speech on
energy on July 15 in which he proposed, in part, an Energy Mobiliza-
tion Board, which could override environmental regulations to get energy
production facilities built, and the Energy Security Corporation, to
produce subsidized synfuels. Environmentalists strongly opposed both
measures. In a five-page memo, Gus Speth of the CEQ spelled out the
situation for the president. He pointed out that there were about 50
national and 2,500–5,000 local environmental groups in the United
States, and he reminded the president that they had been “among your
earliest and strongest supporters.” This latest administration proposal
had deepened a growing rift with environmentalists.
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The reaction to your July 15 energy program and subsequent related Adminis-
tration actions is fundamentally different. The environmental community’s split
with us on that program is apparently deep and pervasive. Relations are now at
a low ebb. A major rebuilding effort is essential if we are to patch things up to
a satisfactory point for 1980.
Speth pointed out that some environmentalists had already started
working for Carter’s Democratic rivals, and then set out actions that the
administration should take to win them back to the fold, including com-
promises on the Mobilization Board and Security Corporation, followed
by a strong environmental record for the rest of the term, including filling
several environmental vacancies in the administration. Carter’s reaction
to the memo seemed positive, as he wrote on it:
To Stu and Gus –
a) Plan mtg to discuss w/ environmentalists key issues.
b) Have staff screen my public statements (& others) & distribute pertinent 
comments to key groups.
c) Marshall admin. support.
d) Advise me on further action.
JC55
President Carter did take Speth’s advice on appointments. He
appointed Speth himself and Denis Hayes, both well-respected environ-
mentalists, to chair the CEQ and to head the Solar Energy Research 
Institute (SERI), respectively. On the same day that Speth sent the afore-
mentioned memo to the president, he also sent one to Hamilton Jordan,
Carter’s closest aide, about “upgrading CEQ’s Role in the EOP [Execu-
tive Office of the President]” and argued that the CEQ should be made
more a core organization in White House decision making, both through
formal procedures and by giving the CEQ more perks and visibility to
increase the respect with which its staff was treated. The memo made its
way to Carter, who wrote on it, “To Al – Environmentalists are impor-
tant to me. Talk to Gus and assess best role for CEQ. J.C.”56 As head
of the CEQ, Speth continued to try to influence the administration in
proenvironmental ways.57
Denis Hayes’ appointment as the director of SERI upset some people
outside the environmental movement because he was such a well-known
ecological solar advocate. The environmental community, however,
could only praise appointing the organizer of Earth Day and Sun Day to
head SERI. There was some resistance at SERI to Hayes’ appointment,
but within a year he seemed to have won over the staff and raised its
morale. He was also attempting to redirect the institute toward smaller
technologies and away from the larger ones.58 Neither of these appoint-
ments, however, were enough to win back the environmentalists who
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were so upset over the July 15 speech and subsequent programs. They
still thought that the administration was turning against their values.
And even the environmentalists within the administration had little influ-
ence over policy. By a year after his appointment as the CEQ chair, Speth
had lost most of his battles within the White House.59 Subsequent devel-
opments in solar policy would not heal the rift.
CONGRESS AS A LIMITED ALTERNATIVE VENUE
Congress is often an attractive policy venue for advocates who have 
lost in other places. The diversity of its membership meant that solar
advocates could often find sympathetic members to champion their 
policies. The fluidity of its committee structure, especially in times of
crisis, meant that advocates could search for a committee dominated by
solar supporters if the more traditional committees lacked such sup-
port. And in fact numerous members did support solar. Congress as a
whole passed numerous solar bills and, as discussed in earlier chapters,
often provided solar programs with more money than the Executive
Branch requested, creating a “bidding war” that frustrated the White
House staff.
Prior to the oil embargo, much of the support for changes in energy
policy, and for solar in particular, came from Congress.60 The White
House often either had to enlist the support of important legislators for
its initiatives, or it had to propose programs to preempt congressional
initiatives. As the energy policy debate expanded to involve more groups
and constituencies with diverse values and definitions of the problem,
these actors looked to a variety of congressional committees and sub-
committees when they found the Executive Branch closed to them.
The same held true after the oil embargo. In the first fourteen months
following the oil embargo, Congress passed thirty-two bills related to
energy, only one of which the president vetoed. Legislation covered all
kinds of energy issues, including environmental. Solar sometimes showed
up as parts of larger bills, such as the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act (PL93-383), which promoted solar and conservation in
housing, as well as in exclusively solar bills.61
Democrats controlled both the House and the Senate during the
energy crisis, and they developed energy strategies different from the
Nixon and Ford administrations. For example, during the Ford admin-
istration, Senator John O. Pastore and Representative Jim Wright co-
chaired the task force that drafted such a strategy, and they intended it
to challenge the president’s in fundamental ways. Their plan argued that
energy policy had to be consistent with broader economic policy and that
the most important economic tasks were to reduce unemployment and
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inflation. They claimed that President Ford’s plan would only exacerbate
each. “We reject the fundamental premise of the President’s program that
the only way to achieve energy conservation is deliberately to raise the
price of all petroleum products to all American consumers by heavy
indiscriminate additions in taxation.” The congressional task force
emphasized conservation in the short- and medium-terms and the devel-
opment of new supplies in the longer term (into the 1980s) as the way
to achieve energy independence.62 This approach rejected one of the basic
ideological premises of the administration’s program, namely, the
reliance on free markets as the solution to the energy problem. The White
House saw this ideological difference over the market versus government
intervention as one of the largest gaps between it and congressional
plans. They also claimed that the congressional plan simply would not
work, in part because it did not allow enough freedom for market forces
to act to cut consumption.63 While the normative ideas that drove this
congressional energy strategy were quite different from those of ecolog-
ical solar advocates, the plan suggests that Congress might have been an
institutional venue in which different values and actors could get
involved in and influence policy making.
Congressional solar advocates experienced the same normative divi-
sions as the solar movement itself. For example, Representative Michael
McCormack, a Democrat from Washington and an early supporter of
solar energy, had worked as a research chemist at the Hanford nuclear
facility and became the only scientist in the House at the time of his elec-
tion in 1970. Assigned to the House Science and Astronautics Commit-
tee, he sought aggressively to make energy his issue. However, fossil fuels
were the turf of the Interior Committee and nuclear energy of the Joint
Committee for Atomic Energy. So McCormack chose solar energy and
conservation. He came to advocate much greater funding for solar R&D.
Yet he was a most unlikely candidate for championing solar energy in
the 1970s. For just as solar was becoming more associated with the envi-
ronmental movement and its criticisms of nuclear power, one of its main
champions in Congress was zealously pronuclear and a harsh critic of
environmentalists.64
McCormack sponsored the two most important solar bills in 1974:
the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act (PL93-409) and the
Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act (PL93-
432). McCormack was strongly pronuclear and saw solar as a comple-
ment to nuclear, not a competitor. In promoting his bills, McCormack
emphasized that solar was abundant, clean, secure from foreign influ-
ences, and nearly competitive economically – all of the conventional
values associated with solar for decades.65 Yet by 1976 he spoke as the
voice of restraint, arguing against extra appropriations for solar, in large
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part because solar became increasingly associated with antinuclear leg-
islators. He reemphasized that the country needed both the breeder and
solar energy.66
Environmentalist legislators, such as Richard Ottinger of New York,
formed a second category of congressional solar advocates. Ottinger got
involved in energy policy immediately, acquiring an appointment to
McCormack’s Energy Subcommittee. He often had a critical perspective
on the way ERDA was handling solar energy. He questioned ERDA wit-
nesses in the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act oversight
hearings about his concerns that the research components of the solar
demonstration program would make the cost of solar look higher than
it had to be.67 He was also antinuclear, which incurred McCormack’s
hostility, and his growing leadership in the solar area was one of the
factors that associated solar technologies with values attributed to its
ecological advocates, which in turn led McCormack to pull away in his
support of it.68 The split in the broader solar movement was reflected in
the split among solar advocates in Congress, and is one of the things 
that limited Congress as an effective alternative point of access for solar
advocates.
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Solar Policy in Crisis
Solar energy policy was part of energy policy for all three administra-
tions during the energy crisis. All three hoped that new technologies in
general could solve at least some of their problems in dealing with the
crisis and could do even more in preventing worse crises in the future.
Each administration harbored ideas about solar energy and the way it
fit into energy policy, which constituted their problem frames. Those
ideas, interacting with their institutional settings and interested actors,
led to battles over the solar budget, which exhibited all of the volatility
that one might expect from a technology burdened with great uncertainty
and an unstable policy environment.
THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL FIX
Every administration sought a technological fix to the energy crisis, at least
in the long-term. Policy makers did not like the implications of solving the
energy crisis by doing less, so wedded were they to the ideas that using
less energy meant stagnation, decline, and so on. Locked in as a core
assumption in their problem frame was the need to find ways to deliver
large blocks of bulk energy, and to increase that level of energy con-
sumption into the indefinite future. Given that problem frame, consistent
since the Truman administration, they all sought technological fixes.
The Nixon administration put a heavy emphasis on increasing energy
R&D, including substantial increases for nonnuclear R&D. Thus began
a rapid run-up of the energy R&D budget that would last for the rest of
the decade. The administration proposed $772 million for FY 1974, a
twenty per cent increase over FY 1973. That increase looked modest
compared to Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson’s proposal for a $2 billion
energy R&D in the FY 1974 budget. These proposals came six months
before the oil embargo.1 Nixon later upped the ante even more when,
on June 29, 1973, still well before the embargo, he announced a series
of new policies:
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America faces a serious energy problem. While we have only 6 per cent of the
world’s population, we consume one-third of the world’s energy output. The
supply of domestic energy resources available to us is not keeping pace with our
ever-growing demand, and unless we act swiftly and effectively, we could face a
genuine energy crisis in the foreseeable future.
As part of that swift action, he announced a five-year, $10 billion energy
R&D program to begin in FY 1975. He also announced an additional
$100 million in R&D for FY 1974, at least half of which was supposed
to go to coal research. He immediately initiated a study of where to spend
the money, suggesting that the White House did not have any specific
plans for the money but felt that it had to take the lead in championing
energy R&D.2 By mid-October, already into FY 1974, the R&D numbers
rose again. The new budget, including a few congressional add-ons,
totaled $1.002 billion, a whopping thirty-seven per cent increase over
the recalculated FY 1973 budgets. Roughly sixty-two per cent was to go
to nuclear research, fission and fusion, about seventeen per cent to coal,
and about ten per cent for research on mitigating environmental effects
of energy production, leaving eleven per cent for everything else put
together. Solar received an enormous percentage boost, rising from $2
million in FY 1973 to $13.2 million in FY 1974, but that still left it at
about one per cent of the total. Conservation fared little better, at $15.5
million.3 Thus, on the eve of the embargo, the Nixon administration’s
energy R&D program established a set of priorities by investing sub-
stantially in two classes of new energy supply technologies, nuclear and
coal, technologies that could, in the administration’s view, deliver bulk
supplies of electricity or fluid fuels. This policy identified nuclear and
coal as the energy sources of the future, with a nod to environmental
protection, and loose change to solar and conservation.
This emphasis on the technological fix and these priorities among
technologies continued under President Ford, though with a longer time
frame. In the short- and medium-terms, President Ford put a heavier
emphasis on deregulating energy markets, especially price deregulation
for oil and gas, and environmental deregulation for coal and nuclear
power. In reports and memos, top officials clearly stated that new tech-
nologies were years from solving America’s energy problems.4 Despite
this conviction, they continued to increase investments in R&D. Their
proposed FY 1977 energy R&D budget was $2.24 billion, a thirty-five
per cent increase over FY 1976. Solar shared in that increase, with its
R&D funds going up thirty-five per cent to $116 million. That said, the
proportions of the energy R&D budget changed only a little. For FY
1977 nuclear energy R&D, including fusion, would get sixty-two per
cent of the total, fossil fuels twenty per cent, and solar five per cent, a
larger piece of the pie than three years before, but still only a small slice.
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Both Nixon’s and Ford’s aides claimed that in the short run oil 
and gas deregulation was the key to solving the crisis, the presidents
believed them, and Ford himself argued for it publicly. Nonetheless, they
talked and acted as if they believed that in the longer term the country
would require a technological fix, that the existing energy system was
not sustainable. The emphasis on deregulation embodies the normative
idea of economic rationality – that government policies should act so as
to let the market function in as unfettered a manner as possible. Note
that this is a more refined notion than the emphasis on economic growth
that we saw in the Truman administration. The emphasis on the tech-
nological fix in the longer run shows two things. First, both presidents
accepted the notion, common among economists, that private firms, if
left to themselves, would underinvest in R&D, and so the government
should step in to provide this public good.5 The energy crisis was simply
a signal to speed up the government investment in this particular branch
of R&D.
The emphasis on the technological fix also tells us something about
their implicit notions of technology and its effects on social and politi-
cal life. The very idea of the technological fix is that one can use new
technologies to avoid making social or political changes in societies that
are in some sense under stress.6 New energy technologies were supposed
to enable American society to continue as it had in the recent past, with
no concessions to problems of energy supplies. The technological fix
shored up the status quo, and so policy makers saw new technologies as
ways of avoiding any serious social or political changes. This notion
excludes the idea of using new technological systems to encourage new
ways of life and social organization.
President Carter’s administration kept this focus on a technological
fix for the long-term. His short- and medium-term policies varied a bit
from Nixon’s and Ford’s, still stressing price deregulation for oil and
natural gas but also including a larger role for government in encourag-
ing greater energy efficiency and the production of synthetic fuels. The
National Energy Plan, his administration’s first energy policy statement,
listed the development of new energy technologies including solar, as the
key to solving the long-term energy problem.7
ADMINISTRATION IDEAS ABOUT SOLAR ENERGY
While all of the administrations of the 1970s focused on energy policy,
they paid very different levels of attention to solar energy. What becomes
clear from the following analysis is that none of the administrations took
solar to be the solution to their energy problems, and so in that sense
never took it as seriously as its advocates wanted. We need to examine
solar policies from two different perspectives – solar as a long-term 
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technological fix and solar’s relationship to the short-term energy crisis.
These ideas and policy frames did not, of course, exclusively determine
policy, but instead interacted with the institutional structures and inter-
ested actors involved in the issue. This chapter pays close attention to
solar advocacy within government. Such advocacy was not merely the
result of prosolar persons within government, but also derived from insti-
tutional structures and practices that gave such people the opportunity
to advocate for solar and ties those government advocates had to solar
advocates outside of government.
Solar Potential Identified Under Nixon
Throughout President Nixon’s administration officials made references
to solar energy as a promising long-term technological option for helping
to cope with energy shortages, but only one among several, including the
breeder reactor. In his June 1971 energy message to Congress, he
included one short paragraph on solar. After noting the immense poten-
tial of solar, he said that the “National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration and the National Science Foundation are currently re-examining
their efforts in this area and we expect to give greater attention to solar
energy in the future.”8 That reexamination turned out to be a joint panel
established by NASA and the NSF in January 1972, which reported its
findings in December 1972. The panel concluded that the importance of
solar, if it could make a substantial contribution at all, came from two
properties – it was both environmentally clean and inexhaustible. The
report’s authors accepted conventional projections that energy demand
would continue to rise and that fossil fuels would face depletion at some
point. In contrast to fossil fuels, the resource potential for solar appeared
to be huge if it could be harnessed economically.9
The panel’s assessments were remarkably positive, asserting that there
were no substantial technical barriers to the use of solar and that it could
be economically competitive within a very few years. Solar, they claimed,
could provide thirty-five per cent of building heating and cooling, thirty
per cent of gaseous fuels, ten per cent of liquid fuels, and twenty per cent
of electricity by the year 2020, despite projections of very high energy
consumption by that year. As they understated, “On close examination,
the possibilities for the economic use of solar power, given reasonable
R&D support, appear much better than generally realized.”10 In terms
of public R&D resources, the report put its heaviest emphasis on solar
electric technologies, mainly solar thermal power plants and photo-
voltaic panels. This emphasis on electricity was controversial in the solar
community, though very much in keeping with what some of the most
visible solar advocates had argued. Solar advocates split in their reac-
tions to this report, which reflected a growing divergence of opinions in
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the solar community, discussed in earlier chapters as the differences
between the conventional and ecological solar advocacy.11
The NASA/NSF Solar Energy Panel devoted only a few paragraphs to
environmental concerns, industrial issues, and “sociological” issues.
They noted that, if done right, solar energy could be very environmen-
tally benign, thus imbuing solar with the environmental values that were
growing in importance at that time. Indeed, they thought that solar
would be more economically competitive than was commonly realized
because the costs of generating electricity in the future would have to
include the substantial costs of pollution abatement for conventional
fuels.12 The industrial problem was one of creating circumstances that
would induce industry to invest in a risky venture with a long-term
payoff. A single paragraph addressed the possible social implications of
developing solar energy:
Research on the social conditions which foster solar energy technology protects
against the truncating of a technological policy by the social responses it engen-
ders. . . . There is a need for more social scientific work to define the social
(including economic, political, and cultural) problems presented by solar energy
utilization. The establishment of National priorities for the use of solar among
other energy forms should recognize the social impacts of the utilization of each
energy form.13
Thus the panel explicitly recognized, however briefly, that developing
and diffusing energy technologies were more than just technical or eco-
nomic acts. The social or political response that the panel cautioned
against was a negative one that could “truncate” a policy. Aggrieved
social groups could organize to stop technological developments that
government policy sought to promote, as was happening then with
nuclear power. The panel suggested that such protesters could be headed
off at the beginning by working to address their concerns at early stages
of policy making. This view of the sociopolitical implications of a tech-
nology saw them as problems of encroaching on people’s interests and
getting strong negative reactions. Nonetheless, the NASA/NSF panelists’
recognition that any political and social implications followed from
favoring a certain set of technologies over others moved a substantial
step beyond the conventional technical and economic assessments of the
ties between a technology and society.
Despite its visibility, the NASA/NSF report did not become the offi-
cial problem frame for solar energy. Presidential policy makers in the
Nixon White House perceived solar quite differently than did the panel.
The fundamental conclusions of the NASA/NSF panel never affected the
thinking of senior White House aides or President Nixon. In fact, prior
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to 1972, solar hardly appeared on the White House’s energy map at all.
In his 1971 summary memo, John Whitaker described to President
Nixon thirty-seven possible actions the president could take in response
to fuel shortages, including long-term actions that he did not consider to
be particularly efficacious. Not one of the possibilities listed included
solar energy development.14 Firms and interest groups made some effort
to alert White House aides to the discussions of solar going on outside
the government.15 Peter Flanigan, the chief White House aide for energy
in Nixon’s early years, explained the administration’s lack of interest in
solar energy to an academic solar energy advocate:
There are undoubtedly many reasons why solar energy is not receiving attention
as a major power source, but perhaps the most fundamental is the dearth of
imaginative technological proposals suggesting that solar energy can, in fact,
produce electric power at prices competitive with alternative sources. Neither the
product – electricity – nor the basic scientific theory is new, so one is immedi-
ately involved in a commercial engineering venture unlike the exploration of
space and the development of atomic weapons. . . . In order to justify a major
new program or an agency devoted to solar energy, I feel there must be a real
technological breakthrough in thinking about the means for making a practical
system. Without such a spark, I am afraid it will be difficult, if not impossible,
to get any effort started.16
Flanigan’s argument shows the supply orientation in White House think-
ing. By assuming that the U.S. energy system would always consume
large quantities of bulk energy, especially electricity, he defined the issue
in terms of what kinds of technologies one could plug into the system to
keep delivering that energy. Moreover, Flanigan clearly did not think that
solar would ever become such a source. He conceptualized new tech-
nologies as ones that had made substantial breaks with the past, that
were qualitatively new and based on new, exotic, science. According to
these criteria, nuclear power, particularly breeders and fusion, could
make a claim on the future, but solar could not. The basic solar tech-
nologies had all been in existence for some time, and Flanigan did not
see incremental developments as adequate to bring solar to the point
where it could be a major power producer. Solar did not offer excite-
ment; in Flanigan’s terms, it had no “spark,” much less an explosion, to
propel it into the policy makers’ imaginations. Cautions about pollution
did not suffice to induce the White House aides to take solar seriously
before 1975. Concerns had not yet become fears.
Despite administration skepticism, legislative hearings prior to the
1973 oil embargo led to increased funding for solar research. Six months
after the mid-1972 hearing on energy R&D policy, the House Commit-
tee on Science and Astronautics released a staff report on solar energy
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research. It defined the energy problem as the difficulty in providing
“adequate, clean energy.” The report stated that long-term energy needs
would probably depend heavily on solar and that federal R&D funding
levels were very low, about five to six million dollars in FY 1973. It rec-
ommended increasing federal funds to about $150 million per year or
more, spending three billion dollars over the next fifteen years.17 The
amount finally appropriated for FY 1974 was about $12 million, a sub-
stantial increase in percentage terms over FY 1973.18
Despite this surge in spending, congressional action did not change
the terms in which officials discussed the energy problem and solar
energy. Congress and the White House continued to see the problem as
economic efficiency and, to a lesser extent, national security. Environ-
mental values had entered the official discourse, but in the narrow way
of just seeking cleaner fuels. The more profound critiques of the pro-
duction and use of energy that had begun to take hold among environ-
mental organizations had made no impact on official discussions in either
branch of government. Executive branch reorganizations that might have
given such groups more chances to be heard in the policy process had
not yet materialized, and the creation of new policy venues in Congress
still confined participation to groups that had always been represented
in such places.
Skepticism Prevails Under Ford
Early in the Ford administration, top officials saw questions of cost and
commercial feasibility as the greatest barriers to the diffusion of solar
technology. These officials did not believe that the technologies could yet
compete, and they also believed that commercializing the technologies
too quickly with government programs would only damage solar’s long-
term development. For them, it was still a technology of the future, and
reducing the capital cost of solar was the issue.19
Other officials, lower down in the government hierarchy, began devel-
oping conceptualizations of energy policy more favorable to government
support for solar technologies. For example, in November 1974 the
Federal Energy Administration released the final reports of Project Inde-
pendence. The report’s solar volume promoted solar technologies on the
grounds that they could soon be commercially feasible and were envi-
ronmentally benign. However, they also argued for the use of life-cycle
costs when comparing two different energy systems, including assessing
environmental impact costs, instead of simply comparing capital and fuel
costs. Such costs did not enter into standard commercial calculations,
that is, the environmental costs of energy systems were not usually inter-
nalized into their market prices. For that reason the government would
need to provide financial incentives to producers and consumers of solar
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technologies. The recommended incentives included things such as tax
credits, low-interest loans, direct subsidies, and mandated solar use in
certain circumstances. While the report acknowledged the impossibility
of estimating quantitatively the effects of the various incentives, they did
estimate the maximum future contribution from solar technologies at
12.7q by 1995 and 38.8q by the year 2000.20 This particular study gave
solar a substantial long-term role in producing the nation’s energy.
The concepts of life-cycle costing and internalizing environmental
costs into prices represented different normative ideas than were in the
conventional problem frames, and gave the value of environmental pro-
tection greater emphasis. If the administration had adopted these ideas
for the official problem frame for energy, solar would have fared much
better. But the emphasis at the top of the Ford administration was to
deregulate energy markets, not impose further requirements on them. In
this case both approaches would have had a similar effect, since dereg-
ulating prices and internalizing environmental costs both would work to
raise energy prices, though with the revenue going to different places.
The important differences were normative.
The president and his advisors also saw little potential for solar as a
short-term solution to the energy crisis. An Energy Resources Council
study reiterated these sentiments:
Emerging technologies will not play a significant role in stabilizing our energy
situation in the next ten years. Solar, geothermal, and synthetic fuels will make
only a small contribution to domestic energy supplies by 1985 – about 1 per cent
of total use. While the technology for these sources exists, they must be proven
economically viable on a commercial scale.21
This official skepticism about solar’s short-term potential and view of
energy in general played out in a set of constantly changing institutions
under Nixon and Ford.
Solar advocacy began to increase within the executive branch 
during the Ford administration because in part of the creation of insti-
tutional homes for such advocacy. The National Science Foundation
ceded its solar program to the newly created Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration (ERDA), which commissioned three studies of
the commercial potential for solar technologies, one each from General
Electric, Westinghouse, and TRW. The studies produced such an unman-
ageable volume of material that ERDA then commissioned Battelle Lab-
oratories to summarize the results of the previous studies. The purpose
in assigning the task to four different contractors was to receive a diver-
sity of views by which to define future research needs.22 Yet the list of
contractors and subcontractors included no environmental groups or
other industries that specialized more heavily in solar technologies.
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Nonetheless, the Battelle report identified social, political, and philo-
sophical analyses as one category of research needs. Battelle mostly con-
ceptualized such research as understanding why consumers would or
would not buy solar technologies. Nonetheless, some of the proposed
research would investigate the indirect or higher order effects on com-
munities of adopting solar technologies, explicitly recognizing that wide-
spread use of solar energy systems would affect communities in ways not
directly related to energy use.23
However, these broader social concerns did not penetrate to the highest
levels of ERDA or the White House. According to Administrator
Seamans’s early report to the president, ERDA’s goal for the solar program
should be “to develop at the earliest feasible time those applications of
solar energy that can be made economically attractive and environmen-
tally acceptable as alternative energy sources.”24 An interagency task force
on solar reached a similar conclusion a few weeks later.25 Thus, only con-
ventional interpretations of energy goals or concerns filtered into White
House discourse from this report. The ideas that did not fit administra-
tion preconceptions and ideologies received no hearing.
The Ford administration’s choices of top personnel for ERDA also
helped to exclude solar advocates. Robert Seamans headed the agency,
having worked formerly in NASA and as Secretary of the Air Force.
Seamans had no ties to the old AEC, a White House attempt to allevi-
ate concerns that ERDA would be the AEC in disguise.26 But the selec-
tion of the assistant administrator for solar and geothermal energy
sources shows the exclusion of solar advocates from top administration
positions.
On January 14, 1975, Senators Hubert Humphrey and Henry
Jackson, both senior senators on committees important to energy, wrote
to President Ford about the pending appointment of the assistant admin-
istrator for solar and geothermal. They made their wishes quite clear:
“A special effort is needed to ensure that this position is filled by an 
experienced advocate of solar and geothermal energy. We cannot afford
to continue our present reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear systems to
the neglect of solar and geothermal energy.”27 Two days later a deputy
assistant to the president replied with perfunctory assurances that their
letter would be brought to the attention of the president and his assis-
tants supervising the hiring. The letter said that the director of the 
personnel office was “presently reviewing recommendations for these
positions.”28 In fact, the administration had made its choice five days
before Humphrey and Jackson had even written to the president.29 Dr.
John Teem received the appointment as solar assistant administrator.
Trained as an elementary particle physicist, Teem was in charge of
research for fusion, high-energy physics, materials, and other physical
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sciences at the AEC. His only background in solar was a short stint with
the small firm of Electro-Optical Systems, Inc., which made photovoltaic
cells for the space program. Xerox bought the firm, and Teem moved up
the ladder in Xerox until he went to the AEC.30 While he had experi-
ence with one solar technology, he was by no means a solar advocate.
This was precisely the sort of appointment that solar advocates had
feared – someone from the nuclear bureaucracy in the AEC. It suggested
that, while the government had created a new policy venue in the form
of the ERDA, new constituencies had little voice in it, and that both the
form and magnitude of solar programs would continue to reflect the old
AEC bias. ERDA’s General Advisory Committee also contained no solar 
advocates.31
About one year later, Dr. Teem resigned, and his replacement, Robert
L. Hirsch, was someone even further removed from solar technolo-
gies. The full name of the solar division referred to solar, geothermal,
and advanced energy systems, also encompassing fusion research. 
The new assistant administrator came from a fusion background, having
concentrated on fusion and other nuclear topics for his entire career. 
The president’s aides recognized his lack of expertise in solar, and one
of them commented on the recommendation in a memo to President
Ford:
Hirsch’s background appears to be almost entirely in the nuclear field. This could
raise a question as to his qualifications under the statute. It also could be made
the basis for criticism by opponents of nuclear energy that these alternative
sources of energy will not receive sufficiently vigorous leadership under someone
whose background is in the competitive field of nuclear energy.32
Despite these questions, Hirsch got the appointment, reflecting a lack of
concern among top administration officials for the solar division of
ERDA.33
In June 1975, ERDA delivered to the president and Congress, as
required, its first national plan for energy research, development, and
demonstration (R,D&D). This plan listed the twenty-one categories of
technologies that ERDA intended to support and estimates of the future
energy contributions of each of them. It expected solar heating and
cooling to make a “substantial” contribution (the middle of three rank-
ings) by the year 2000 and solar electric and biomass to make “moder-
ate” contributions by 2000, the lowest of the impact ranks.34 Solar was
in the program, but not at its center. The document stated explicitly that
the highest priority technologies were those that would come online the
soonest, would substitute for oil and gas, were near to being marketable,
and would make the largest contribution to the energy system – difficult
criteria for solar to meet.35
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The ERDA plan received heavy criticism from Congress. The 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report released
in October 1975 contained a sharp and detailed critique of the ERDA
plan. The OTA criticized it for proposing a program that could not meet
its own goals and for putting too heavy an emphasis on supply tech-
nologies, especially for electricity, relative to conservation technologies,
which only got two per cent of the ERDA budget. The OTA also ques-
tioned ERDA’s solar program because it heavily emphasized solar elec-
tric applications, although the best near-term results would come from
the heating and cooling of buildings. Such technologies required more
than research to promote them, and the OTA criticized ERDA for giving
short shrift to nontechnical barriers to solar in particular and energy in
general.36
The OTA study incorporated a greater diversity of views than did
ERDA or the executive branch more generally. The panel that advised
the OTA on the solar chapter had much wider participation from the
academic community and the solar community, including the scientist
George Löf and the head of the Solar Energy Industries Association,
Sheldon Butt. In addition, OTA invited critiques of the ERDA plan from
twenty-three organizations, such as firms, trade associations, and inter-
est groups, including four environmental groups. Those environmental
groups’ access was growing and was already greater in Congress than in
the executive branch.37 Thus OTA, the analytical arm of Congress, was
becoming a new institutional venue in which actors shut out of the exec-
utive branch could argue their case and interject new values into the
policy debate.
These concerns did not get very far in the White House. In late 1975
a top White House aide advised against the president’s attending Solar
Expo ‘76 the following January. “Solar energy,” he wrote, “has very little
near term (pre-2000) potential, based on current knowledge. . . . Presi-
dential participation in the Expo would lend credence to the claims of
the far out advocates.”38 In early 1976 an official at the OMB, com-
menting on a draft speech by someone in the Consumer Affairs Office,
also reacted negatively to a positive assessment of solar’s potential.
“We’ve reviewed Virginia Knauer’s draft speech and found it overstated
the case for solar and understated the case for coal and nuclear. (She
didn’t mention nuclear at all!)”39 The Ford White House perceived solar
and nuclear as competitive, antagonistic energy choices, and the staff
clearly did not favor solar. The revised ERDA national plan of April 1976
reflected the criticism of both the White House and the OTA. In defer-
ence to the normative values dominant in the White House, the plan gave
much greater prominence to the private sector. Responding to the criti-
cism of OTA, the plan argued for a big boost, especially rhetorically, for
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conservation. Solar heating and cooling, as well as solar electricity, num-
bered among the technologies slated for support. While the major
problem with solar was still its cost, ERDA’s new plan recognized other
barriers to its adoption, all of which related to the difficulty of getting
the building industry to accept a new technology.40
In a speech to the Illinois Solar Energy Conference, Frank Zarb,
Administrator of the FEA, displayed senior officials’ thinking about the
technological possibilities for solar, and why those officials were skepti-
cal about near-term reductions in solar prices. Consistent with the views
of the Nixon administration, Zarb argued that solar’s high cost would
not come down much because the necessary technology already existed
and its simplicity made it harder to reduce the costs.
But the very simplicity of the technology is one of the impediments to reducing
its cost to the very low levels needed to make solar electric power competitive.
It will be very difficult to reduce the cost by simplification. The answer lies in
expanding markets and – perhaps – different technological approaches.41
Despite his caution, Zarb ended his speech affirming the administration’s
commitment to developing solar energy and their belief that it could be
a major energy source in the next century.42
Zarb’s speech suggested the same model of technological development
as the previous administration. He assumed that incremental improve-
ments in existing solar technologies could not produce a dramatic drop
in price. If such technologies were little more than mirrors, glass, and
plumbing, we already knew how to make those things, and so the price
could not come down in a very rapid way. Large price reductions only
come, in this way of thinking, via “breakthroughs,” the creation of
entirely novel technologies, which then have the opportunity to mature
and simplify into an inexpensive commodity item. Zarb’s model is at
odds with the history of many technologies, but the point is that the
model’s prevalence in policy makers’ minds in the 1970s led them to
downplay the chance that solar could make a near – or maybe longer –
term contribution to the energy problem. Yet, running counter to the
White House perspective, an ERDA economic analysis of solar heat and
hot water systems in 1976 concluded that they could be competitive with
electric heat in a very short time, given some assumptions about the
future price of fuel and the costs of collectors going down to twenty
dollars per square foot.43 The higher one went up in the administration,
the darker appeared solar’s future.
In funding for R&D the Ford administration maintained its commit-
ment to freer markets. These policy makers saw technological innova-
tion moving along a continuum from basic research through
development and demonstration to the final marketing of a product.
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From their perspective, the government had a strong role to play on the
research end, but its proper role declined as an innovation moved toward
the market end of the continuum. Therefore, officials gave more support
to research and development than for demonstration, which they viewed
as better left to markets. Nonetheless, President Ford sometimes signed
demonstration legislation even though he and his staff considered them
bad policy. For example, the administration had opposed the modest
Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974, but decided to
sign it anyway because they feared a larger one. Furthermore, the bill
passed the House 253–2 and the Senate by a voice vote, and so would
have easily survived a veto attempt.44 The ERDA National Plan for
R,D&D released in 1976 reemphasized the importance of the private
sector and the need for the federal research effort to fit in to it. The
federal job was to “establish an appropriate policy climate for private
sector action, share risks with the private sector, and conduct a comple-
mentary RD&D program.”45
Despite substantial solar energy R&D funding increases after the
embargo, some members of Congress and solar advocates regarded the
executive branch as indifferent or hostile to solar energy. One senator
alleged that the administration was suppressing an AEC report on solar.
Another raised concerns about press reports that, at an early meeting of
the R&D Advisory Committee of the Federal Energy Office, the members
of the committee laughed derisively at a presentation on solar and wind
energy.46 In fact, most of the top officials in the White House did not
consider solar a solution to energy problems in the short- or medium-
term.47 To counter this general perception of his administration’s reti-
cence, President Ford and his aides asserted continuously in public that
they very much did support solar energy and pointed to increasing
budgets as proof. On one such occasion, April 2, 1976, Ford went so far
as to claim that he had “increased in next year’s budget the research and
development funds in solar from about $80 million to $120 million – all
that they asked for and more, too.”48 This last claim was not true.
President Ford’s February 28, 1976, energy message to Congress out-
lined his view of the energy situation and the appropriate next steps. The
accompanying Fact Sheet devoted a few paragraphs to solar energy. The
problem with solar was “its high cost and the abundance of inexpensive
alternative fuel sources.” His policy for solar contained announcements
of the forthcoming request for proposals for siting SERI plus a sharp
increase in the solar R,D&D budget for FY 1977.49
In terms of budget authority, President Ford proposed a solar energy
R&D budget that would increase from $41.9 million in FY 1975 to $160
million in FY 1977, a factor of four in two years.50 Most of the money
would be spent on four groups of technologies. The largest amount,
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$45.3 million in FY 1977, went to solar heating and cooling of build-
ings, the technologies most often associated with solar. The second
largest amount, $43.4 million in FY 1977, went to solar thermal elec-
tric applications. These large technologies usually concentrate the sun’s
rays to achieve high temperatures and drive a steam boiler to generate
electricity, a form of central station solar electric power plant. The third
technology, photovoltaics (PVs), often called solar cells, got $32.8
million in FY 1977, and wind power received $17.1 million.51 An assort-
ment of other technologies got the rest of the funds.
Note two important points about this distribution of funds. First,
ERDA spread its funds widely. With no clear favorite, all technologies
received some money. The proportioning of funds differed little from that
recommended in Dixie Ray Lee’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
1973 report to President Nixon on energy R&D.52 Second, roughly equal
funding went to the types of solar technologies associated with different
ideologies. Typically, windpower and heating and cooling of buildings
could be installed in a decentralized fashion and were therefore favored
by the ecological advocates. Solar thermal electric and PVs were associ-
ated more with large industry and high technology, and so sometimes
fell under the ecological advocates’ attacks. It seems that the government
was trying to cover all of the bases in its funding.53 Nonetheless, this
apparent equality of treatment can be deceiving. Both during the Ford
and later in the Carter administrations, critics claimed that most of the
ERDA solar money went to large corporations. They protested that the
many small firms in the solar industry did not have the staffs, sophisti-
cation, or other resources to get money from the government, and that
the larger corporations were wired into the agencies both by long habit
of association and representation on study panels, advisory councils, and
the like.54 These issues caused the schism in the solar movement to grow
wider in the coming years.
The Ford administration fought both Congress and ERDA over the
solar budget. Congress sought to spend more money, and spend it in a
different way, than did President Ford and his advisors. For example,
several senators urged Ford to seek supplemental funding for the Federal
Energy Administration to start an aggressive solar commercialization
program. The administration declined, in part taking the usual tack that
the technology was not ready, and so a commercialization program
would be premature. It also asserted that the government should not, in
any case, seek to “overtake” the private sector – commercialization was
none of the government’s business.55 This response showed White House
and Congressional disagreement over the status of solar technology and
reiterated Ford’s normative commitment to keeping the government out
of private markets.
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In other budget battles, Congress tried, and often succeeded, in adding
funds to the energy R&D budget. The appropriations bill for ERDA for
FY 1977 passed Congress in early July 1976 with $130 million more for
solar energy than President Ford had requested, for a total solar budget
of $290 million. OMB officials strongly urged the president to veto the
bill (which also contained some unwanted water resource projects),
arguing again their two fundamental points. First, the solar program was
already amply funded and larger budgets would simply be wasteful, as
ERDA already had “large unobligated balances in this program.”
Second, as always, they argued that such budgets would infringe on the
private sector too much, distorting the free market. Even if Ford’s veto
were ultimately overridden, the OMB saw it as desirable to set the stage
for the budget battle the next time around.56
The White House also had an ongoing conflict with ERDA over its
budget, including its solar budget. Neither the administrator, Robert
Seamans, nor his assistant administrator for solar, John Teem, were by
any means part of the solar movement. But soon after taking office, they
began arguing for larger solar budgets than the White House wanted to
give them. In July 1975, the beginning of FY 1976, the White House did
not budge, turning down Seaman’s request for supplemental appropria-
tions for the solar heating and cooling demonstration program, explain-
ing that such an increase would be premature because there had been no
cost-effectiveness study done of the optimal size of the demonstration
program.57 Although it lost that battle, ERDA continued the fight, sub-
mitting a FY 1977 budget to OMB that was $1.1 billion in budget
authority over the planning target that OMB had set for it. In his cover
letter Deputy Administrator Robert Fri was not the least bit apologetic:
The OMB target leaves no room for growth in key programs, many of which
are in their initial stages and require substantial increases to develop into effec-
tive programs. . . . Nearly all ERDA programs involve high priority Presidential
commitments and objectives. . . . The timely accomplishment of these program
objectives is fundamental to the Nation’s energy independence, economic well-
being, and national security.
Among the items for which ERDA was fighting was an increase in the
solar budget.58 The conflict took a toll, and John Teem resigned. He said
publicly that his disagreements with OMB had affected the timing of his
resignation, an allegation that the White House denied.59
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back with Carter
Solar energy got top billing in President Carter’s first National Energy
Plan’s (NEP) list of long-term possible sources.60 The description of solar
energy was the same since the 1940s, as having massive potential, 
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possibly great importance, but always a day away, in this case after 
the year 2000. Nonetheless, the plan described solar space and hot water
heating as “ready now for more widespread commercialization” and
proposed a set of tax credits to encourage market growth. About a
month before the NEP was released, ERDA had chosen a site in Golden,
Colorado, for the new Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI), a process
that had begun with solar legislation in 1974. The creation of SERI gave
solar R&D much more visibility, despite controversy over its operation.61
The NEP also called for the use of solar in federal buildings as a way to
stimulate the market and for increased R&D on technologies that were
not yet commercial, such as photovoltaics.62 This plan depicted solar
energy as it had been traditionally by policy makers – as a replacement
for fossil fuels that one could simply plug in to currently existing 
political and technical systems. The plan did not hint that adopting 
solar energy implied any drastic shift in social or political institutions,
or that using solar energy on a wide scale was a means for importing
other values into society or politics. Outside of government circles,
however, such debates were raging. Government policy toward solar 
may have been positive, though not as much so as the advocates wanted,
but it seemed unaware of the ideological battleground that solar was
becoming.
Allen Hammond and William Metz reported in 1977 on the percep-
tion that solar was not regarded seriously by important government
energy officials. “Indeed, the potential of solar energy is still regarded
with skepticism by many government energy officials and publicly dis-
counted by spokesmen for oil and electric utility companies.” The
budgets for solar were as high as they were because of strong popular
and congressional support. Evidence for this skepticism was the relative
size of the solar budget compared to the much larger fossil and nuclear
budgets. In part, Hammond and Metz attributed this skepticism to solar
programs’ structure. Government solar energy programs were being
done in the nuclear model in the sense that they were funding research
aimed at large solar centralized power plants. This approach made solar
look bad, according to Hammond and Metz, because solar centralized
power plants were not the task for which the technology was most
suited.63
A group of solar advocates organized a celebration of solar energy,
called Sun Day, scheduled for May 3, 1978. President Carter agreed to
make a speech on Sun Day. The debate in the White House over his 
Sun Day speech took place against a backdrop of growing interest in
Congress and among numerous constituencies, as well as widespread 
suspicion that the Carter administration had a weak commitment to
solar energy programs, despite their favorable mention in the NEP. Just
Solar Policy in Crisis 169
before Sun Day, an article in the National Journal, a publication
respected by Washington policy makers, reiterated these themes, partic-
ularly that the new Department of Energy was not giving a very high
priority to solar and was perceived as hostile by solar advocates:
Inside and outside the Administration there is some dissatisfaction over the
Energy Department’s treatment of the solar option. The new department 
seems to be ranking solar among the also-rans in its still-evolving energy supply
strategy. 64
Within the administration, the advice going to the president was
mixed. The chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Charlie Schultze,
was strongly opposed to a new solar initiative and generally negative on
solar’s potential to contribute to the nation’s energy supply. He claimed
that its costs would remain high and that it would not be an important
source of energy in this century:
The exotic sources are a bottomless sink for budget resources and have ques-
tionable payoffs. Many of the CEQ proposals (a solar farm in each state) sound
romantic, but do not make good budgetary or energy sense. We should continue
to pursue basic research in this area but avoid further unnecessary commitments
to unproven exotic sources.65
These and other similar comments framed the solar issue in the way that
solar advocates opposed. Schultze called solar technologies “exotic,” a
term that advocates claimed was no longer accurate and that made them
seem distant from commercialization. He branded the CEQ proposals as
“romantic,” a derogatory appellation in policy circles, and claimed that
solar was not important because it did not satisfy economic rationality
criteria. The other negative comments on the solar initiatives came, not
surprisingly, from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which
often resists programs that would increase budget expenditures.66
In contrast, some White House aides, such as Charles Warren and Gus
Speth of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), strongly sup-
ported an increased solar program. They urged the president to increase
the solar budget, begin a wide-ranging study of solar policy (the Domes-
tic Policy Review of solar energy discussed in Chapter 7), use replace-
ment cost pricing when judging energy investments in federal buildings,
and put a solar hot water system on the White House. In addition to
conventional criteria, Warren and Speth argued for these initiatives in
normative terms:
Not since Earth Day, eight years ago, has there been such a massive, popular
statement of support for a new direction in American life. Earth Day marked the
acceptance by this country of a new set of values, and Sun Day promises to evoke
a similar reappraisal.67
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This memo began to frame the solar issue in an entirely different way,
but it did not spell that frame out completely. Warren and Speth never
articulated specifically which values they thought might gain public
acceptance due to Sun Day, though clearly they were related to envi-
ronmental values. They did not mention problems of cost or competi-
tiveness, except for arguing for a new way of calculating such things,
and they did not emphasize the value of economic rationality. They
simply stated that additions to the FY 1979 solar budget, which the
administration had submitted to Congress long ago, were justified “on
their merits” and
are essential to a convincing demonstration of Administration commitment.
Moreover, budget increases in the solar area are probably inevitable, given 
Congress’ initiatives both to assert its leadership and to ensure consistency with
existing programs and goals.68
Thus Warren and Speth urged the president to champion a strong solar
program to gain leadership in the issue and credibility with an impor-
tant and growing constituency. This kind of argument does more than
try to shift the normative basis of policy debates. If the president accepted
Warren and Speth’s line of argument, the ownership of this issue would
change. Environmentalists, particularly ecological solar advocates,
would set the terms of debate, giving them ownership of the issue and
making it possible for substantially different values to be pursued as a
result of government energy policy. The energy crisis had thrown old
problem frames into question, and new ones, along with their accom-
panying empirical and normative ideas, were competing for top policy
makers’ attention.
Two other important advisors tried to influence the Sun Day speech.
Frank Press, the president’s science advisor and the head of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), sent the president a memo
encouraging him to accept many of the individual program elements pro-
posed by the DOE for the solar initiative, despite OMB opposition. Some
of the new proposals would have answered earlier criticisms that the
solar program neglected smaller technologies. Press did not suggest that
the values that drove solar and energy policy should be changed in any
way, though he recognized that criteria other than narrow technical or
economic efficiency were important in these decisions. In discussing a
dispersed renewable energy technology initiative, he said, “This program
has little technological value, although it may be important politically.
The program is small. A political call.”69
Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger also suggested to the president
specific new solar programs. Schlesinger supported not only his depart-
ment’s program, but also much of what the CEQ wanted, especially the
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use of marginal cost pricing in making energy decisions for federal 
buildings. Schlesinger’s memo did not argue that the public was making
a radical shift in its values. Instead, he based his decision on the value
of economic rationality combined with the need to accommodate a
rapidly growing political constituency that had substantial support in
Congress.70
President Carter delivered his Sun Day speech at the newly chosen site
for the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI) at Golden, Colorado. The
final message reflected particularly the advice that he had received from
Schlesinger, Schirmer, and Speth.71 He emphasized the importance and
magnitude of the solar tax credits as a way of answering charges that
the NEP had little for solar. He also announced plans to put a solar hot
water system on the White House, as well as solar energy technologies
on some federal buildings. He announced a $100 million boost in the
solar budget, the minimum that Schlesinger had said would be credible
with solar advocates. In addition, he officially launched the domestic
policy review of solar energy, the DPR. He said nothing about Sun Day
itself, and made it clear that the driving forces of energy policy were eco-
nomic and security concerns related to reliance on imported oil, though
he also briefly extolled the environmental virtues of solar energy. This
speech delivered much that the solar constituency wanted, but made no
mention of the values that they championed and gave no hint that the
president intended to change the normative basis of energy policy. The
ecological solar advocates had begun to come into their own as a polit-
ical pressure group, but they did not define the energy issue, and hence
did not own it.72
The events on Sun Day, including the president’s speech, received
front-page coverage in the national media. Many solar advocates, includ-
ing some in Congress, had used Sun Day to take the administration 
to task for having too much emphasis on synthetic fuels and nuclear
power in its energy policy. The papers noted that the House Science and
Technology Committee had added $150 million onto the administra-
tion’s original request for FY 1979, more than the president’s $100
million.73
At about the same time as Sun Day, both the CEQ and the Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment released reports on solar energy,
both of which argued that solar energy could play a much larger role in
the nation’s future than conventional wisdom suggested. The CEQ report
claimed that the United States could get twenty-five per cent of its energy
from solar sources by the year 2000 and half by 2020. Implicit in these
claims was a criticism of the administration’s policies, which had 
much more modest goals.74 Thus, while President Carter participated in
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and embraced Sun Day more than any of his predecessors had earlier
solar events, the growing solar constituency used it to argue that the
administration still lacked sufficient commitment to this new source of
energy.
Members of the Carter administration debated solar energy policy vig-
orously throughout Carter’s term. The June 1979 dedication of the White
House solar hot water system, with its announcement of the twenty per
cent solar goal and other results of the solar DPR, marked a zenith in
the administration’s solar policy. Environmentalists in and out of the
administration suffered numerous reversals after that time, beginning
with the July 1979 malaise speech that came only a few weeks later.
Before that time, administration officials focused on how to build a solar
program. After that, solar advocates fought a rear guard action trying
to prevent cuts in solar programs.
Prior to July 1979, most of the relevant senior officials in the 
administration favored building a solar program, associating it with
thoroughly conventional values and even suggesting that solar tech-
nologies could have a significant impact on energy supplies in the 
near-term. For example, within the White House, the head of the domes-
tic policy staff and his chief assistant for energy, Stuart Eizenstat and
Katherine Schirmer, urged the president to sign a photovoltaics R,D&D
bill. The legislation was ambitious and its level of funding was, in 
their view, excessive. They depicted photovoltaics as just another way 
of producing electricity, with no normative implications attached to 
their use. The only problem with photovoltaics was their cost. Eizenstat
and Schirmer urged the president to sign the bill because it would do 
no harm and, more importantly, because signing it would signify the
administration’s support for the technology, while vetoing it would 
signal the opposite, and antagonize solar advocates in Congress and the
public.75
Frank Press, the head of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
in the White House, gave the president similar advice, with a heavier
emphasis of relying on the market. In a review of assorted DOE and
CEQ solar energy initiatives, he recommended accepting many of them,
emphasizing research and education and discouraging government com-
mercialization activities.76 The Department of Energy likewise proposed
a package of solar energy initiatives in this period, including research,
development, and demonstration projects in photovoltaics, wind,
biomass fuels, and small hydropower facilities, along with education and
other outreach programs. They also supported “small-scale technology
grants” and “a decentralized technology demonstration program,”
without any indication that these programs might have unconventional
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normative ideas associated with them. They also claimed that their
program would “accelerate commercialization of renewable technologies
which can pay off in the near term.” This remarkable last claim set up
solar to fail in the eyes of the president.77
The CEQ articulated the only alternative normative vision within the
administration, arguing that moving to a solar economy was much more
than simply changing technologies. They grounded their argument in the
notion that solar was associated with a normative as well as technolog-
ical transformation, that adopting solar technologies meant putting into
place a system that encouraged a different kind of political, social, and
ecological life. The CEQ officials were trying to define this issue as one
of accepting and encouraging new political, social, and environmental
norms instead of simply making an economic calculation. Senior White
House officials in previous administrations had never articulated this sort
of argument.78
CEQ lost the argument. No one else picked up their framing of the
issue, and it appeared to play no part in the final presidential decisions.
Debates within the administration over solar energy increased during the
period of the solar Domestic Policy Review, as described in the previous
chapter. Those debates began to change after the president’s announce-
ments on the DPR in June 1979 and his “malaise” speech a few weeks
later. This latter speech was a turning point in his administration with
regard to energy.
Midway through his term, and after repeated setbacks in the 
energy crisis, including recent shortages stemming from the Iranian 
Revolution, President Carter began to emphasize factors other than 
economics in thinking about energy policy. By July 1979 the adminis-
tration was very unpopular and, in the view of the White House staff,
in a crisis. The president cancelled an energy policy speech scheduled 
for July 5 and instead went to Camp David, where he held a domestic
summit, calling in advisors from the government and elsewhere. The
president and his top advisors felt the need to redefine his presidency 
and regain leadership over the crucial issues of the day, especially 
energy policy.79 The July 15 speech itself had both normative and pro-
grammatic parts. The president spoke of his own failures of leadership,
and of the failure of spirit that seemed to be gripping the country. 
He then posited the energy crisis as the arena in which America could
regain its mastery over its destiny, and listed six points as his program
for doing so.80
He mentioned the twenty per cent solar goal and the Solar Bank as
part of his overall program, but that was the only good news for solar
advocates. He called for an immediate cut in oil imports and for the cre-
ation of two new governmental entities discussed in Chapter 7, the
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Energy Mobilization Board and the Energy Security Corporation. The
Mobilization Board would be set up to steamroller over any delays in
siting crucial energy facilities, including delays caused by environmental
regulations. “We will protect our environment. But when this Nation
critically needs a refinery or a pipeline, we will build it.” These were not
sentiments that would appeal to environmentalists. The Energy Security
Corporation would be funded by the government to develop synthetic
fuels from coal and oil shale, abundant resources but much disliked by
environmentalists.81 In short, the speech repudiated the environmental-
ists’ values. It defined the most crucial problem as importing too much
oil and the president asserted his leadership by declaring that the United
States would reduce its imports quickly and sharply. This goal bode ill
for solar advocates, for there was little that their technology could do to
reduce imports in the short-run. The Carter administration was not
waiting for the long-term technological fixes, and no longer believed that
the emphasis on conservation and efficiency that undergirded the first
National Energy Plan was sufficient.
Much attention to the followup to the speech focused on the dra-
matic way in which Carter fired some of his Cabinet and staff, includ-
ing the secretary of energy, Schlesinger, whom he replaced with Charles
Duncan.82 However, White House aides were also working on the pres-
ident’s new energy strategy. Patrick Caddell, a private pollster who was
also a strategist for the president, sent him a long memo, drafted with
the aid of some other unofficial advisers, detailing what such a strategy
should look like. In the section on building allies, Caddell listed eight
types of groups that the White House should seek as part of its coali-
tion, including governors, mayors, business groups, and labor leaders.
Environmental groups were not on the list.83 White House staff reacted
favorably to Caddell’s ideas, adding some of their own, emphasizing the
need for action, and suggesting that they develop a more detailed plan.
A month after Carter’s speech, he must have been feeling very frustrated
with the time that it was taking to get something off the ground. He
wrote in hand on a memo that the staff sent to him: “To Jack and Ham
– We seem to be going backward from more specifics to generalities. Let
Fritz, Charles, Al, Jack, Ham, Stu, Pat, Larry or someone develop a plan
and act. Kirbo can help with oil co. support, etc. Enough W.[hite]
H.[ouse] memos. J.C.”84
The administration continued to push its solar program after the 
July 15 malaise speech, with letters to important legislators and with 
a meeting with members of the Solar Energy Industry Association
(SEIA).85 The composition of the meeting suggests how far the adminis-
tration was from the environmental side of the solar movement. The
meeting was only for the SEIA, with no one from the Solar Lobby or
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other environmental solar groups invited. The reasoning for the 
meeting was that industry would have to push solar heavily, both in
terms of investment and marketing, to reach the president’s solar goal,
and particularly to displace fossil fuels as quickly as possible. The orga-
nizations represented were the large firms that had bought or were sup-
pliers to solar businesses, including Libbey-Owens-Ford, Olin Brass,
Grumman, and Exxon. “Our agenda is to get the industry to go out and
sell solar.” This was also a group that was not so averse to the synfuels
and Energy Mobilization Board parts of the program of the July 15
speech.86
Despite this meeting and other ongoing administration programs,
solar energy had become a low priority for the administration. The
agenda seemed to be set by events that the president could not control.
On November 4, 1979, the Iranians took the American diplomats in 
Iran hostage, beginning a crisis that would last until President Reagan’s
inauguration day. That event also signaled the end of Iranian oil sales 
to the United States, and by December oil prices on the spot market
reached $40 per barrel.87 Events in the White House and the agencies
suggested that solar also was being neglected by a range of policy makers,
not just at the presidential level. For example, as part of his June 20,
1979, solar speech, the president announced the creation of a Solar Sub-
committee to the Energy Coordinating Committee, an interagency orga-
nization that included White House staff and was intended to monitor
and coordinate solar policy. Despite pressure from the White House, the
subcommittee was not even able to schedule a meeting until May 23,
1980, almost a year after the president had announced it.88 Another blow
came when someone leaked to the Solar Lobby a May 17, 1980, confi-
dential memo from Charles Duncan, the secretary of energy. The memo
outlined spending plans for a five-year period, from FY 1982 to FY 1986,
and called for cuts in solar and conservation spending and increases in
nuclear and fossil fuel budgets. Environmental groups called the memo
an “outrage” and cited it as evidence that the administration had aban-
doned solar energy and energy conservation. The DOE acknowledged
the memo but denied that it constituted an abandonment of solar,
arguing that it was taken out of context and failed to give the larger
picture.89
The administration’s solar program had, by the summer of 1980,
come under severe criticism by reports from the Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) and the General Accounting Office
(GAO). In a July 18 memo Speth urged that the White House 
form a small, high-level group of officials from DOE and the White
House staff to recommend responses to these criticisms. However, it 
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was late September 1980 before Eizenstat formed such a task force, 
which, to my knowledge, never met. In a matter of weeks the issue 
was moot.90
Sources on solar spending in the Carter administration are difficult to
interpret, due both to variable reporting conventions and other unex-
plained inconsistencies among them. Nonetheless, the broad trends are
clear and indicate one reason why solar advocates were growing disen-
chanted with the administration by 1979 and 1980.
When President Carter took office in January 1977, the govern-
ment was already several months into FY 1977; thus FY 1978 was 
the first year in which he could have a significant impact on the budget.
That impact was dramatic. Research and development budgets leapt up
for all solar and renewable energy technologies, including wind and
biomass. By one estimate, budget authority increased by fifty-two per
cent from FY 1977 to FY 1978. The administration was less generous
with solar heating and cooling demonstration programs, cutting them by
fourteen per cent.91 President Carter would not propose such a large
jump again. About the time of Sun Day – May 1978 – the administra-
tion was considering only a five per cent increase in solar R&D funding
for FY 1979 and a further forty-five per cent cut in heating and cooling
demonstration funds. They did try to sweeten the deal by proposing a
$100 million solar tax credit for FY 1979, and argued that solar hot
water and space heating were so close to being commercially viable 
that the tax credit would do more good than additional demonstration
projects.92
In May 1979, just before President Carter released the solar DPR, the
Department of Energy published the second National Energy Plan. In
that document the DOE proposed to increase substantially R&D funds
for FY 1980, raising the budgets for photovoltaics, solar thermal elec-
tric technologies, and biomass by about twenty per cent or more over
FY 1979 levels. The first two technologies were of most interest to elec-
tric utilities and large hi-tech firms. Other solar technologies received
more modest increases, some less than inflation, and residential heating
demonstration programs were once again slated for large cuts. The plan
proposed to cut all of the “Solar Applications” programs, such as
demonstrations, market research, and training programs, by about eight
per cent overall.93 The ecological advocacy wing of the solar movement
could find much to dislike in these proposals, though the more conven-
tional wing, such as firms associated with SEIA, could find more to please
them. Since the ecological wing had, in 1979, a larger public presence
than SEIA and published its own studies critical of the administration’s
solar programs, the overall public impression was that the solar 
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movement was growing disillusioned with the Carter administration.
The June 20, 1979, speech dedicating the White House solar collectors
included the announcement of increases in some solar budgets, but as
we saw in the Introduction, it was not enough to mollify the solar advo-
cates attending the ceremony.94
The July 1979 malaise speech further eroded relations with environ-
mentalists in general and ecological solar advocates in particular, as
detailed earlier. When the DOE sent its FY 1981 budget request to 
Congress in January 1980, the amounts proposed for solar were not
enough to heal the rift. Solar R&D got only a five per cent increase
overall, less than inflation, though solar applications got a twenty-eight
per cent increase, targeted mainly at training and market testing 
programs.95
Like his predecessors, President Carter had numerous conflicts with
Congress over energy. In particular, Congress kept trying to raise the
solar energy R&D and applications budget beyond the administration’s
request. For example, the Senate recommended increasing the DOE’s FY
1981 solar budget by twenty per cent more than the administration
requested.96 This congressional intervention meant that DOE officials
could consistently look forward to more generous budgets than the OMB
wanted to give them.
These solar budget and policy battles, together with the actions 
of solar advocacy analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7, demonstrate that 
the White House set policy within a serious set of constraints. The
administration had to develop its policies in response to pressures 
from outside groups, internal advocates, and congressional solar cham-
pions. The solar movement as a successful pressure group had arrived 
in the Carter administration, and considering that some of the very 
same people had been successful as part of the environmental movement,
it seemed that the values they advocated were finally becoming a 
force to be reckoned with in policy making. And yet their influence
declined precipitously well before President Carter left office, and 
catastrophically once President Reagan moved into the White House.
The analysis here shows that the values they advocated and the 
narratives they used to frame the energy policy issue never penetrated
the most senior levels of policy making. Even when members of the group
got senior appointments in the Executive Office of the President, they
were put into a marginalized office, the CEQ, and had no discernible
effect on the way the president and his top advisors framed and decided
on policy. Conventional values of economic rationality and national
security held sway, and even environmental values crumbled when they
came into conflict with them, as demonstrated by the administration’s
attempt to create the Energy Mobilization Board. If solar advocates saw
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their technology as a way of encouraging the creation of a new society,
they quickly discovered that top policy makers had no interest in those
sorts of changes. The durability of institutionalized ideas and the deep
conflicts over the meaning of energy technologies go a long way in
explaining the fate of solar energy policy during the energy crisis, as 
discussed in the next chapter.
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New Technologies, Old Ideas, and the Dynamics of
Public Policy
U.S. energy policy makers held remarkably consistent normative and
technical ideas (sometimes called values and beliefs) about energy tech-
nologies for over three decades. Both types of ideas shaped the problem
frame that officials used in thinking about energy policy. Policy elites
who thought about the future and about new energy sources conceptu-
alized their problems in terms of economic benefits and national secu-
rity. Notions of economic benefits changed over time, from the idea that
energy should be cheap to promote maximum economic growth to more
refined notions that energy markets ought to be efficient to get optimal
economic performance. Nonetheless, both notions point to getting
energy at the lowest possible price. Discussions of national security
emphasized importing oil from sources that would not be interrupted 
by political acts.
Precisely how policy makers expressed their values and beliefs
depended on the contingent circumstances in which they found them-
selves, but both sets of dominant ideas made for a problem definition
that greatly disadvantaged solar advocates. Because of its high market
prices, solar was hardpressed to compete with fossil fuels, and because
of its diffuse nature, it did not fit into the existing energy production
system the way nuclear power promised to do. Although policy makers
began to include an assortment of environmental protection values into
their frames, that did little to alter the situation.
In addition, normative and technical ideas interacted in complex ways,
and the boundary between them was ambiguous and contested.1 For
example, consider the apparently empirical notion held by a White
House aide about the infeasibility of solar energy as a major energy
source. As cited in the previous chapter, this aide took from a discussion
with Congressman Mike McCormack what the aide called a “Solar fact”
that getting one percent of the country’s total energy from solar would
require converting ten percent of all houses to solar, and would cost
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$70–105 billion.2 The aide called this a “fact,” the most solidly empiri-
cal of appellations. And yet, contained within this alleged fact were 
a number of normative and questionable empirical assumptions. It
assumed empirically that the price of solar systems would not go down
much. It also assumed normatively that the United States should 
remain a very high-consumption society, which in itself contains assump-
tions about the technological possibilities for energy efficiency and the
normative desirability of ever-increasing material consumption. Changes
in any of these underlying ideas would change this apparently simple
“fact.”
At a more aggregate level of policy discussions, the normative and
empirical ideas became just as enmeshed. As I showed in Chapter 5,
Nixon administration officials regarded high levels of energy consump-
tion as normatively desirable, as indicators of a good and progressive
society.3 The empirical fact of high energy consumption became a nor-
mative standard. Thus the official energy policy frame made sustaining
and enlarging that consumption more than just preserving the empirical
status quo; growing energy consumption was a valued social goal, not
just an empirical fact. This problem frame stacked the odds against solar
energy in normative as well as empirical terms. By this normative stan-
dard, the sorts of technological changes that would most enhance solar
energy’s prospects, particularly large improvements in energy efficiency,
look normatively undesirable, whatever their technical feasibility. Con-
ventional energy policy analysts held these intertwined empirical and
normative goals deeply, as shown by their bitter attacks on Amory Lovins
when he challenged that problem frame, as detailed in Chapter 6.
For thirty-five years solar advocates presented their technologies that
used a variety of renewable energy sources as a way to exploit a vast,
inexhaustible, but diffuse, resource. Most of them for most of the period
did not think that creating a solar society entailed significant social or
political change. Hoyt Hottel, Maria Telkes, Farrington Daniels, and the
other early solar pioneers of the 1940s and 1950s all sought to make
solar affordable, largely with the assumption that it would plug into the
existing energy systems, replacing fossil fuels, and enabling society and
polity to continue functioning as before, with greater security and,
perhaps, less pollution. Most of them saw no contradiction in promot-
ing research and development in both solar and nuclear power, or solar
and synthetic fuels, and their only complaint was that nuclear got an
unfairly large portion of federal subsidies. A few of them, such as Daniels
and Eugene Ayers, sometimes hinted that a substantial change in such a
major technological system would affect more than how one heated a
room or lit a lamp. But for most of these advocates, solar energy tech-
nology offered just another way of securing the status quo against the
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end of fossil fuels. They sought a new technological system to prevent
the social changes that would accompany scarcity.
By the 1970s a new type of solar advocate emerged. These activists
came to the technology from a part of the environmental movement that
believed that the fundamental structures of society and politics – those
concerned with industrial and agricultural production, housing, settle-
ment patterns, and transportation – were, in some deep sense, flawed.4
These ecological advocates did not simply want any and all solar tech-
nologies. They sought technologies that would reinforce and be more
compatible with a qualitatively different society and politics, one in
which ecological sustainability and local community self-reliance would
displace increasing ecological damage, bureaucratic centralization, and
anomie. For them, making a drastic change in the energy technology
system would be akin to making a legislative change for all of society.5
Whether the technologies they sought would have given them the society
that they desired is not the point here. Rather, the point is that their
social goals and ideas about technology as a social force led them to a
very different framing of the energy problem and solar’s role in it. Within
their problem frame, solar was not only a feasible solution to the energy
problem, it was the only desirable solution, the only energy technology
ensemble that would encourage and strengthen the sort of society that
they desired. In their frame, issues such as high initial costs and an imma-
ture industry were problems to be solved, not barriers to policy. This
shared meaning of solar energy technologies bound together ecological
advocates as a social group and drove their choices, leading them to
champion smaller, more decentralized solar technologies and to reject
schemes like the solar-powered satellites.6 The problem frame that came
out of this meaning led them to regard problems like costs as secondary
considerations, just the opposite of conventional frames.
Top-level policy makers never shared that framing of the problem or
the normative values that went with it. Their public pronouncements and
written internal debates show no hint that they ever even considered this
alternative problem frame and set of values. The presidents and their top
aides – in every administration – talked about energy almost exclusively
in economic and national security terms, with occasional references to
narrowly construed environmental values. Even in the Carter adminis-
tration, no one outside of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
gave any sign that they even thought about some of the more radical
alternatives, and they never committed them to paper, suggesting that
such ideas were not welcome in policy deliberations.
These facts suggest a new interpretation of solar energy policy, 
particularly its rapid rise and fall in the 1970s. The conventional expla-
nations for energy policy and solar’s failure to establish itself within it
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do not explain all of the events recounted here. It was not enough that
solar was expensive and its future costs were uncertain. That could be
said of all future energy technologies, including nuclear energy. And it
was not enough that the Reagan administration was ideologically hostile
to solar energy. Solar advocates began losing their battles for support
while President Carter was still in office, and the ideological explanation
begs the question of why Reagan and his people evinced such hostility
to solar energy. The association of solar energy with the ecological wing
of the solar movement was a phenomenon of the 1970s, not what one
might have predicted in the 1950s or 1960s. Perhaps most importantly,
the events analyzed here require us to reexamine the pluralist account of
solar energy policy. Pluralism must, to explain events adequately, incor-
porate the importance of ideas, normative and empirical, being institu-
tionalized into official problem frames.
SOLAR ADVOCATES’ LIMITED INFLUENCE ON POLICY
Standard notions of American pluralism claim that any organized inter-
est group can influence public policy by mobilizing the appropriate polit-
ical resources, such as votes, money, public opinion, and the like.7 From
this perspective one can evaluate a group’s influence or effectiveness by
the extent to which it gets those policy outcomes that it desires. By that
measure, the solar movement, particularly the ecological wing of it,
appeared very powerful and effective for a brief period in the late 1970s.
The question is why it both rose and then fell with such speed. The advo-
cates pushing solar energy did not suddenly lose public support or their
ability to argue their case.8 Instead, the values that ecological advocates
associated with solar energy and the solar movement were in stark con-
trast to the conceptualization of the energy policy problem by top-level
decision makers. The official problem frame, and the values that drove
it, did not change, despite the considerable efforts of the solar movement
to argue for an alternative.
Thus the history of solar energy policy presents anomalies to plural-
ism. Prior to the energy crisis, prominent scientists, engineers, and busi-
nessmen advocated for solar energy, beginning after World War II and
continuing for over twenty years. Well-placed within the technical, gov-
ernment, and business community, these advocates should have been
influential among important policy analysts and makers. On numerous
occasions they were able to make their case to legislative and executive
branch officials, including some cabinet secretaries, members of the
House and Senate, and, in a few instances, to the president via his top
aides. Many of the advocates spoke with the authority of impeccable
technical credentials, exemplified by Farrington Daniels, a veteran of the
Manhattan Project, member of the National Academy of Sciences, and
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president of the American Chemical Society. By the middle 1950s such
advocacy became formalized with the creation of the Association for
Applied Solar Energy (later becoming the International Solar Energy
Society and the American Solar Energy Society), broadening solar’s 
constituency to include business people, bankers, and so on.
So why were these groups not more successful? Part of the explana-
tion certainly lies in unfortunate contingent circumstances, such as Pres-
ident Truman’s firing Interior Secretary Julius Krug only weeks after Krug
had decided to launch a very large solar energy research program. Part
of the explanation lies in unpropitious structural circumstances, such as
the steady decline in energy prices in the 1950s and 1960s. And part of
the explanation lies in traditional interest group analysis. Solar energy
did not have the same level of business, scientific, military, or congres-
sional support that nuclear power enjoyed.
But these factors do not constitute an adequate explanation. To
develop a better one I have focused on recent policy literature that argues
for the importance of ideas, both empirical and normative, in shaping
and changing public policy. The case study itself – the history of solar
energy policy – demonstrates the importance of ideas, particularly the
importance of institutionalizing new problem frames and the technical
and normative ideas that go with them. Absent institutionalizing new
ideas, substantial, sustained changes in policy remain unlikely.
Prior to the energy crisis, most energy policy concerned disputes
between different fuels and the different regions of the country that 
produced and consumed them. With policy makers accepting a problem
frame based in such disputes, solar energy had little to offer except 
as a possible alternative in the distant future. However, since analysts
and policy makers expected future energy demand to be immense, it
seemed that future alternatives needed to produce large quantities of 
bulk energy, a task for which most people considered nuclear power to
be better equipped. Policy advisors did frequently note that the govern-
ment underfunded solar R&D, especially compared to nuclear power,
but, absent a pressing crisis, nuclear’s better fit with existing problem
frames, along with its greater political resources, kept the subsidies
flowing, while solar only got research targeted to auxiliary goals, such
as NASA’s funding for the development of photovoltaics for use on its
satellites.
The beginnings of the energy crisis in 1970–1971 coincided with the
rise of institutionalized environmental protection values in the form of
new legislation and the Environmental Protection Agency to implement
that legislation. Those ideas had some effect on energy policy, but not
enough to put solar energy at center stage. Nonetheless, Presidents Nixon
and Ford began pouring money into all alternative forms of energy,
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including solar, quickly increasing solar R&D budgets, sometimes as a
response to Congressional initiatives. That said, the definition of the
energy problem, the way it was framed, as discussed at length in earlier
chapters, changed little, merely acquiring a sense of urgency from the
energy crisis.
Solar energy policy in the Carter administration shows the difference
between successfully pressuring for a policy and successfully institution-
alizing a new set of beliefs and values associated with some technology.
Those years marked the time when the solar movement was the closest
it ever came to being a mainstream movement, claiming to provide a 
feasible solution to an urgent problem. At the very time that solar 
technologies were commanding increasing resources, the ecological wing
of the solar movement became increasingly influential in policy circles.
The Solar Lobby and related groups began to form a very effective 
pressure group for solar energy, and they clearly got most of what 
they wanted out of Carter’s solar Domestic Policy Review process. But
it is equally clear that high-level policy makers never took the advocates’
values or framing of the problem seriously. The advocates’ political and
social issues were never part of official discourse or debate. Even advo-
cates’ particular conceptions of environmental concerns never penetrated
discussions in the White House. Policy makers simply never accepted, at
least not in writing or in policy, the notion that the environmental prob-
lems related to energy suggested a deeper critique of existing energy,
social, and political systems.
The ecological advocates also argued their case in economic terms,
but their economic frame of reference, too, was different.9 They argued,
unsuccessfully, for the long-run marginal cost pricing of all fuels, and, in
addition, including within the market prices for energy the social costs
of consuming it, such as environmental damage. Policy makers had much
shorter term concerns on their minds, such as reducing imports and the
inflation caused by rising oil prices. If those were the most important
questions, then ecological solar advocates had nothing useful to con-
tribute. In the short-term, their proposed solutions would have raised
prices even more and would not have quickly or significantly reduced oil
imports. Solar advocates did not, for all their temporary influence, own
this issue, and could not affect the official framing of it. Had the Solar
Energy Industries Association (SEIA) wing of the solar movement been
the dominant one in policy making, the outcome during the Carter
administration would have been little different. They too depended on
long-run marginal cost pricing as part of the problem frame to be taken
seriously, and they wanted many of the same policies as the ecological
wing. However, they had nothing more to offer the administration, even
when it reached out to them in July of 1979.
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Policy makers could and sometimes did take a longer term perspec-
tive, as they did with nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s. But the
pressing nature of the energy crisis in the 1970s made that perspective
more difficult to use as a guide for policy, since the existing crisis put
great pressure on policy makers for immediate solutions. Moreover, part
of a long-term solution linked to solar, such as increasing energy prices
to their long-run marginal costs, would have exacerbated the economic
impacts of the OPEC-driven price increases. The long-term solution
would have made the short-term problem worse. Herein lies a conun-
drum: Policy makers were most able to establish the conditions for a
long-term transition to solar energy when energy policy was not in crisis,
but that was when they were least motivated to do so.
Public opinion was also quite limited as a tool for supporting solar
policies. As many researchers point out, solar energy enjoyed great public
popularity during the last half of the 1970s and into the 1980s. Both
Carter’s and Reagan’s cuts in the solar budget, and their bolstering of
other energy technologies, came in spite of strong and consistent public
opinion that supported solar energy as preferable to all other alterna-
tives to oil and gas.10 This fact suggests that public opinion is not related
in any simple way to policy outcomes. The first reason is that not all
issues are of equal importance to the public. Energy is often not a high-
salience issue, compared to crime, inflation, taxes, and similar problems.
In survey data taken during the energy crisis, it was not the most impor-
tant issue, even then falling only somewhere in the middle of people’s
concerns.11 Moderately salient issues such as energy have a complicated
relationship to public opinion. Often policy makers can ignore public
opinion because many of the individuals who may support solar energy,
for example, care more about other issues. The attentive public that
follows energy policy closely is only a minority of the general public, and
only part of this attentive public is trying to influence policy. Thus, while
there was broad support for solar energy, that support was not very deep,
so solar supporters could only mobilize modest political resources on
their behalf.12 Although President Carter may have been hurt by the loss
of environmentalists’ support, President Reagan seemed unharmed by
antagonizing that same constituency. As a result, the electoral politics of
solar and environmental issues did not favor solar advocates at the end
of the 1970s.
Failure to redefine the energy issues and inject new values into the
debate harmed solar advocates in another way. The limited data from
the time suggest that, while a large percentage of the public favored solar,
many of those prosolar persons did not share the values that underlay
those beliefs for the ecological solar advocates. The public may have
liked solar, but they did not widely share the critique of industrial society
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that went with it. They supported the technology but not the values that
the leading advocates promoted. Thus public support for solar energy
was not support for the overall positions of the solar advocates.13
That policy makers associated solar with the ecological advocates was,
from a historical perspective, anomalous. Solar had been promoted by
very mainstream people from the end of World War II to the 1970s, and
still was, in the form of the Solar Energy Industries Association. That it
was, by 1980, generally associated more with ecologically oriented
values was a result of a set of complex events detailed in earlier chap-
ters. Solar energy advocacy could have been popularly associated with a
different constituency and its values, and so constructed differently. But,
as I have argued, that would not have made the biggest difference in the
short-run. The real problem was solar advocates’ inability to change the
official problem frame for energy, leaving both the ecological and con-
ventional solar advocates with a problem definition to which they could
contribute little. The ecological advocates may have seized ownership of
the solar energy issue, but they never owned the more general energy
issue. That is, their definition of the issue never became the official def-
inition of it.14 They had been unable to institutionalize their values into
the top policy-making organizations in the federal government, and so
top executive branch officials never took their framing of the energy
problem seriously.
THE LIMITATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY VENUES
This role of ideas and problem framing suggests another limitation of
pluralism as an explanatory scheme. Baumgartner and Jones argue that
stability or slow incremental change in policy comes from policy monop-
olies, stable arrangements of executive, legislative, and private sector
institutions that agree on interests, values, and problem definitions and
allow little or no outside participation. Substantial policy change requires
disturbing this monopoly. Usually such change occurs when new policy
venues, in the form of different institutions for making policy, take juris-
diction over an issue. The new venue is open to new actors, which means
that new values and problem frames can dominate policy making and
authoritative actors can take new policy solutions seriously.15
The policy history of solar energy presented here makes the case 
that all policy venues are not equal. Chapter 7 shows the difficulties of
using Congress as an alternative venue. For certain types of policy
change, it may be necessary to change the values and problem frames in
a few highly placed institutions, such as the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident, and in a key executive branch agency. It is not enough to find a
few receptive institutions, like the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) or new congressional committees, though those certainly help.
Technologies, Ideas, and the Dynamics of Public Policy 187
My analysis suggests that it was extremely difficult to make major
changes in problem frames and institutionalized ideas in the highest
levels of the executive branch. As fragmented as the American govern-
ment is, and as many points of entry as there are to the policy process,
the top level of policy making is not permeable by a wide variety of ideas
about the nature of and solution to policy problems. While diverse beliefs
and values may float around and find a home somewhere in the gov-
ernment, those values have little chance of penetrating key institutions
except under special circumstances. Solar advocates thought that they
had such circumstances in the form of the energy crisis, but even as Pres-
ident Carter announced the results of the solar Domestic Policy Review
(DPR) and the accompanying increases in solar programs, they knew that
they had not changed the way the administration thought about the
energy problem, and that the new programs were simply the result of
the pressure they had brought to bear within a crisis setting. Those 
successes proved very fragile.
The new institution of energy policy, the Department of Energy
(DOE), did largely centralize energy decision making within the execu-
tive branch after 1977, a goal of every energy study since the President’s
Materials Policy Commission of 1952. But the DOE was wedded suffi-
ciently to the legacy of its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission,
that it was not a brand new institutional venue in which new con-
stituencies could promote their causes on an equal footing with the old
ones.16 In contrast, the agencies and organizations in which solar advo-
cates had more success in institutionalizing such new ideas, mainly the
CEQ, exerted little influence on policy.
THE PUBLIC’S ROLE IN IMPROVING ENERGY POLICY
During much of its history, energy policy has been highly exclusionary,
comprising systems characterized by very limited participation, as one
would expect in a stable policy subsystem.17 The history of solar energy
policy, and attempts to influence the government to take solar seriously,
also exhibit this lack of participation. Until the 1970s, the only way that
solar advocates could be heard in any part of government was through
informal and contingent channels. When Palmer Putnam wrote his solar
chapter for Truman’s President’s Materials Policy Commission, he con-
sulted with as many solar experts as time and funds allowed. In the Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, and Johnson years solar advocates tried to interest
government officials through conferences, speeches, and other forms of
publicity about solar, and we have seen how they would sometimes
succeed in getting the attention of someone, though never the top offi-
cials. In the Nixon and Ford administrations we saw solar advocates
slowly gaining greater access to a wider range of government officials,
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often first through congressional committees and later through agencies
like the CEQ and the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion. These contacts reached higher levels and became more formalized
in the Carter years, when major solar advocates were able to schedule
meetings with the president himself and his top aides, and when some
of these advocates became administration officials. Also in the Carter
administration, the solar Domestic Policy Review developed a program
for extensive public participation, both formal and informal, that
reached out broadly to the general public and reached deeply for
repeated contacts with key individuals in the solar movement.
However, as I discussed earlier, the public participation program even
in the Carter administration was flawed. It did provide a way for solar
advocates to apply pressure on the administration, and to get something
in return, but the durability of the official energy problem frame made
the advocates’ job very difficult and prevented their making a lasting
change in policy. By allowing new groups into the policy process, the
Carter administration did open up parts of the government to new ideas
and ways of thinking about energy and changed the dynamics of policy
making. And the new programs that the president put in place moved
ahead even without his strong support in the last year of his adminis-
tration. But they were unable to survive the active hostility of the Reagan
years. Public participation did not lead to the institutionalization of new
ideas relevant to energy policy in key policy-making parts of the gov-
ernment, but rather activists saw those values ignored or relegated to
institutions that were not crucial to high-level policy, such as the CEQ.
As I have argued elsewhere, a participation program that is truly demo-
cratic must include the ability to debate and influence the definition of
the problem. Absent such influences, the participation programs achieved
only a modest part of their potential and failed to create as democratic
a process as they might have.18
Another difficulty resulting from the lack of participation, which was
historically the case in solar energy, is that it impedes low-cost learning.
Woodhouse has argued that the inevitable uncertainties in developing
any new technology, or even in controlling an old one, make desirable
that the policy process have learning built in, preferably at a low cost.
Some types of participation can serve at least part of this policy learn-
ing function. Participation can potentially deliver a wealth of both good
and bad news about new policies and technologies to citizens and policy
makers, if the process is set up to receive and use it. Such participation
needs to be fairly profound, including allowing arguments that an entire
problem frame is misconceived and needs changing – one of the require-
ments of democratic theory as well.19 While participation increased in
the Carter years, and some of it did provide some important feedback
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to policy makers, the nature of that feedback and the ability to interpret
and incorporate it into policy decisions was clearly very limited.
Winner’s notion of technological citizenship comprises first and fore-
most political and institutional spaces in which citizens can debate and
discuss future technological developments in a broad sense, including the
normative goals that they seek to attain by changing and adapting the
technological systems around them. Absent such a “moral community”
that can make, or at least influence, policy, people are deprived of tech-
nological citizenship, even if they have some success as interest groups.20
Ecological solar advocates at least began the debates appropriate to tech-
nological citizenship. They argued intensely over the most desirable
forms of society and the relationship of their technological choices to
them. Amidst talk of BTUs and thermal efficiencies also arose discus-
sions of ecological stewardship, social equity, decentralization of power,
and alienation. Winner’s concept of technology as legislation enables us
to interpret the linkage of technological choices to social and political
structures; solar advocates saw their preferred technologies leading to
their preferred social arrangements, which explains why and how they
argued for solar energy. That linkage formed the core of their energy
problem and its solution.
Solar advocates published their debates as widely as they could, with
the issues bursting onto a wider stage with the congressional hearings
held on Amory Lovins’s work. As those hearings demonstrated, solar
advocates’ opponents also joined in that wider debate, disputing their
social claims as well as their technical ones. Both sides argued as if they
saw technology as legislation and were trying to play the role of tech-
nological citizen to influence new technological systems and to defend
their preferred form of society.
My argument makes no claim about whether the various sides in this
debate were correct in their views, or even if their arguments were
thought out well. Some of those arguments have since been persuasively
critiqued, sometimes by analysts sympathetic to the ecological solar
advocates.21 The key point is that they at least formed the linkages and
began the discussion.
Despite these efforts, solar advocates never achieved technological cit-
izenship. A sufficiently open, influential, and authoritative forum eluded
them, or perhaps they did not have enough time in the arenas that were
available to them. Either way, the values dominant in energy policy
remained consistent from the Truman to the Carter administrations, and
there was never adequate political space in which alternative visions of
society and polity could be articulated and associated with the choices
of energy technologies. Solar, when it was discussed at the highest policy
levels, was interpreted through those traditional values, and such a
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problem definition made the task of solar advocates quite difficult. Exist-
ing institutions responsible for energy policy showed no interest in
changing the policy problem frame or the values associated with it, and
new institutions, such as the Department of Energy, also failed to provide
a place for such normative debates. Brief appearances at agency or con-
gressional hearings did not enable advocates to change problem frames
or policy narratives. Neither did occasional meetings with White House
staff or even a sympathetic president.
Changing problem frames means getting a new policy narrative
accepted at many levels of society and is a long-term project. A democ-
racy should develop the institutions that provide opportunities for dis-
cussing problem frames. Those discussions might well challenge the
normative and empirical ideas that shape policy problem frames, for
energy issues as for any other. Advocates of different technological
systems will need to argue their case at the grassroots as well as the White
House levels, and to do so consistently for years, to have their norma-
tive and empirical ideas thoroughly considered.
While no crises currently confront energy policy, governments still
need to create policies for the future. New technological systems emerg-
ing in the coming decades will engender as profound changes in society
as such systems have had in the past two centuries. All too often those
changes have been wrenching, and all too often they have left us with
deep social, political, and environmental problems. The history of solar
energy policy shows us that doing better requires a critical examination
of all parts of a policy problem, including deeply entrenched institu-
tionalized ideas. Forms of low-cost learning and technological citizen-
ship may be as important to such an enterprise as the technical exper-
tise that we also require. We have only glimpsed the means for accomp-
lishing such lofty goals, but that is no excuse for neglecting them. Our
growing technological power requires increasingly democratic and 
intelligent policies for the future.
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